Cultural Studies

Final Reflection

2007-12-20T09:55:00.000-07:00

Final Written Reflection

Instructions: You have two hours to complete this reflection. I suggest that you spend a few minutes thinking about which questions to answer, about an hour writing your responses, and another half an hour revising and editing your responses. As we discussed, this is a closed-book reflection, so I don’t expect to see citations or page numbers. You can, if you want, refer to the syllabus to copy article titles.

Please answer one major question (50% of the final grade) and two minor questions (25% each, or 50% of the final grade).

When you are done, please save your file and give it the following name:
NameFR.doc
Mine, for example, would be TomFR.doc. Please also be sure to write your name inside the document itself. Attach the document to an e-mail and return it no later than 4 p.m. on Thursday, December 20, 2007. You can take any two hours from the time you receive these instructions until you complete your writing; you are not required to write between the hours of 1 and 3.

Best wishes,
Tom

Major Questions (answer one).

1. We read extensively from Foucault’s Discipline and Punish. Choose any aspect of that book that struck you as particularly relevant, and explain that relevance. What is it about the concepts he describes that seem particularly useful or interesting? How have you seen his ideas at work in your own life? Be sure to use Foucault’s terms.

2. In his texts, Barthes provides some theories of how a viewer understands images. Choose a digital image from your own collection, or find an image on the Internet, and analyze it using Barthes’ terms. Make sure to include a copy of the image in your response.

3. Early in the semester, we read Stuart Hall’s and Richard Johnson’s definitions of cultural studies, and spent a lot of time talking about culturalist and structuralist models of cultural studies. What is your understanding of these models, and in what camp(s) do you place yourself as a student of cultural studies? Be sure to provide examples.

Minor Questions (answer 2)

1. At the beginning of the semester, you were asked to bring in a cultural artifact and discuss its significance. If you were asked to do the same thing now, what would you do differently? Would you bring in the same object? Why or why not? Now that you have completed this course, how would you analyze the object? What might that analysis reveal?

2 and 3.
Choose any article or chapter that we have read this semester (and that you have not discussed in response to the major question, above) and describe it in as much detail as you can. After you describe the article, tell me what you find particularly useful, interesting or illuminating about it. You can answer this question twice, describing two different articles, in order to satisfy the requirement that you answer two questions from this category.

Abstract of "Panopticism," pages 200-209

2007-12-13T11:08:00.001-07:00

Foucault lauds the Panopticon as "a functional mechanism that must improve the exercise of power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come"(209). He calls it a "perfect disciplinary institution" that will "strengthen the social forces--to increase production, to develop the economy, spread education, raise the level of public morality; to increase and multipy"(208).

Some of the reasons why the Panopticon "perfects the exercise of power"(206):
1. "It can reduce the number of those who exercise [power]" (206).
2. It can "increase the number of those on whom [power] is exercised"(206).
2. "The constant pressure acts even before the mistakes and crimes have been committed"(206).
3. "It assures its efficacity by its preventative character, its continuous functioning and its automatic mechanisms"(206).
4. "The disciplinary mechanism will be democratically controlled, since it will be constantly accessible 'to the great tribunal committee of the world'"(207).

The theory behind the Panopticon as the perfect disciplinary design is that "he who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection"(202-3). In other words, "it gives 'power of mind over mind'"(206).

We skirted around this issue in class on Tuesday. Diane brought up the example of her faculty member colleague who treats TA's and staffers in ways that she would never dream of with a boss or administrator. Tom mentioned the surly checkers at Boise Co-op. I think that all mature, productive members of society have an internal disciplinary mechanism that self-regulates behavior. We decide what it is we want out of life, what our goals are, and we (try to) discipline ourselves in ways that will help us achieve those goals, be it friendship, work promotions, academic success, athletic accomplishment, etc. We don't discipline ourselves to "behave" if we don't believe our misbehavior will interfere with our goals. For example, if my main goal in life is to avoid contention, I am not going to stand up for myself when I have been wronged. If my goal is to do whatever it takes to get a job promotion, I am going to devote long hours to my work, neglecting other human relationships.

What we call disciplinary mechanisms in our society today are really nothing more than inducements to encourage the individual to perform the actual job of disciplining and self-regulation. That is the theory behind the Panopticon and it is effective because it doesn't require corporal punishment, deprivation, or anything else besides the constant threat of surveillance to encourage one to exercise discipline upon one's own behavior.

However, there are several things that confuse me about the concept of the Panopticon:
1. Foucault says that this model can be applied to "barracks, schools, and workshops"(209). He also mentions its use in hospitals. I don't understand if he is simply referring to the idea of constant surveillance? Or does he actually advocate this architectural design for classrooms and workplaces--each person holed up in a cell with a distant and inaccessible supervisor in a central tower?
2. Foucault talks repeatedly of the ability the public would have to come in and observe human behavior within the Panopticon. So anybody could have access to the central tower? What is the purpose of that and wouldn't it disrupt the normal operation of the Panopticon if untrained "supervisors" were occupying the tower instead of official surveillance officers?
3. He also says that it "enables everyone to come and observe any of the observers"(207). Any ideas what he means by that?

Finally, it seems really idealistic to me that the Panopticon will make it "not necessary to use force to constrain the convict to good behaviour, the madman to calm, the worker to work, the schoolboy to application, the patient to the observation of regulations [...]no more bars, no more chains, no more heavy locks; all that [is] needed [is] that the seperations should be clear and the openings well arranged"(202). I discussed in class how the physical arrangement of the Panopticon makes it physically impossible for the supervisor to immediately discipline a wrongdoer. And of course, the supervisor is vastly outnumbered and even though he is at a vantage point to see all, that doesn't mean that he actually does see all. I would be interested in actual evidence of this theory working as anticipated in any of the aforementioned settings.

Foucault: Panopticism

2007-12-13T11:08:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Foucault's "Panopticism"

by Mike Peterson

Summary

In this chapter, Foucault illustrates the shift in the Middle Ages between how people dealt with lepers (mass confinement) to how they dealt with the plague (confinement in segmented, observable spaces), and then he draws a parallel between the shift in confinement methods in prisons to the rise of modern disciplinary institutions, such as prisons, schools, and hospitals.

Foucault discusses Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, which is an architectural embodiment of the abstract concept of the Panopticon, based on Bentham’s belief that power should be visible yet unverifiable. This unverifiable surveillance, both in Bentham’s structure and in the abstract idea, is an efficient, economic and exercisable power that makes discipline possible.

Foucault discusses how the panoptic discipline mechanism evolved during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the functional inversion of the mechanisms, the swarming of disciplinary mechanisms, and the state control of disciplinary mechanisms. He ends by sketching the role of the panoptic mechanism in societal contexts: economic processes, juridico-political processes, and scientific processes.

Analysis

There were two words that kept popping into my head as I read this chapter: Bureaucracy, and Lost.

First, Bureaucracy. On page 207, Foucault says that the “panoptic machine” is under no risk of degenerating into tyranny and that it will be democratically controlled. I struggled at first with this claim. I couldn’t help but think of movies like Cool Hand Luke and Cuckoo’s Nest, and I wondered how Foucault of all people could be so idealistic as to claim the panoptic machine could never degenerate into tyranny. But as I thought of it, I realized that tyranny and abuse of power are two different things. Here, Foucault is talking about tyranny as despotism, dictatorship, or monarchy: where one person has the power—and as we read on the next page, panoptic discipline doesn’t exist in the spectacle of regal power, but in the realm of exercisable, reciprocal power found in the “relations of discipline” (208).

Like our modern bureaucracy, there are checks and balances, there is public accountability, and there is a web of reciprocal power that prevents any one person from becoming a tyrant. At the Sheriff’s office, for example, if we want to change a policy on, say, the use of tazers, there is a gamut of bigwigs (and little wigs) who have to give the OK: the city council, the commissioners, the Sheriff, the captains, the EMS supervisor, the ombudsman, etc. etc. etc.

In Bentham’s panoptic structure, the person in the tower isn’t judge, jury and executioner: he is just one part on a bigger machine. His role, in this case, is that of observer, and while he might express a great deal of power or control over his subjects, his power isn’t ultimate. As we read in previous chapters, we know that Foucault believes power isn’t a static “thing” that a person can possess—it is in a constant state of flux: it is reciprocal, and it is always shifting. Power is exercised, not possessed. The tower worker, like the Sheriff or council-member, is only one of many cogs in this machine that exercises what power they can, but it is a constant game of give and take.

Similarly, in our discussion on Tuesday we talked about how everyone is supervised. Everyone. Even the guy in the tower. It made me think of my Dad’s situation. He is the CEO of a company that supplies doctors to St. Al’s. He is the doctors’ boss: he writes their contracts; he signs their paychecks; and so on. At the same time, those doctors are his boss: they write his contract; they (collectively, not individually) are the ones who can give him a raise or fire him. So there’s a weird, reciprocating exercise of power (and surveillance) between all of them.

On to Lost. I’ll admit I’ve watched a lot of Lost even though it’s the lamest show on TV. It’s like a very long, very bad joke, but I’m dying to hear the punch line even if it’s going to disappoint me. But what has become apparent over these last couple of poorly-written seasons is this sense of being watched, the idea of constant visible but unverifiable surveillance, as the plane-wreck people always feel the pressure of being observed by the “others.” They discover underground laboratories, barracks, etc. all over the island equipped with cameras, logs and journals. And then there is the question of “who is watching who?”

I Googled “Panopticon” and “Lost” and found that I’m not the only one who noticed this: apparently there is a whole online fan community who share there theories about what is going on in Lost, and a lot of them subscribe to the idea of the Dharma initiative being a government-run Panopticon. One fan points out an episode where there’s an obituary or tombstone (or something—he was a bit vague about it) that said “Je …ntham” on it, which he says is proof that the show is based on Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon.

Here's more hard evidence from another fan:

I don’t know that Lost really has any bearing on Foucault’s argument, but I keep a journal of movies and TV shows that I think would be good for teaching a principle (such as clips from Almost Famous or Capote in my ethics-of-representation discussions), and I think some clips from Lost would be a good way of illustrating the Panopticon, both as a physical embodiment (a network of surveillance cameras), and as an abstract concept (the feeling of always being watched and how it effects their behavior, even before they know about any cameras).

Another one...

2007-12-13T09:49:00.000-07:00

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17169317

Something to think about...

2007-12-11T23:26:00.000-07:00

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17098608

Abstract on Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punishment. Part 3, Chapter 3, Pages 199-207.

2007-12-10T22:43:00.000-07:00

Abstract on Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punishment. Part 3, Chapter 3, Pages 199-207.
By Bridgett VanDerwalker
Description of Section:
Foucault in this section discusses the two types of controls needed to operate the Panopticon, which are branding and coercive assignment and differential distribution. The Panopticon, provides both separation of the individuals and discipline from the observation tower but more importantly from within the cell that of the individual monitoring themselves. The Panopticon, is seen as a solution to the dark, hidden, and openness of a dungeon to the fully lighted, enclosed, and visible cell of the Panopticon. Foucault goes on to describe the benefits and effects of such an apparatus upon society as a whole in the many different institutions that employ it. Foucault points out that the Panopticon is a machine, an exercise in power, adaptable, and can be a laboratory.
Key Terms:
Panopticon
Differential Distribution
Analytical Arrangement of Space
Laboratory of Power
Comments and Questions:
Foucault starts his argument by saying that "all the authorities exercising individual control function according to a double mode: that of binary division and branding…and that of coercive assignment of differential distribution…" (199). These two modes of control can be seen in the operation of the Panopticon. Foucault then describes the architectural features of Bentham's Panopticon and the features that make it different from the old dungeon model. The features of the Panopticon enclose the individual, exposes the individual to surveillance by shining light upon them, however, one could make the argument that such a system isn't the best for the individual because they are not allowed a moments rest and it affects the mind over the body which is a much more complex entity. Foucault states that "Visibility is a trap" (200). Indeed, visibility is a trap, in that it expresses the individual's true condition while at the same time the supervisor is invisible which guarantees order in the individual. The individual is always under scrutiny and is never allowed privacy or self decency. This situation results in the individual being the bearer of power, the power to behave, and to summit to the will of the system. The threat of observation is stronger than the individual's will to do wrong in most cases. But as Foucault goes on to demonstrate later in the chapter; this situation applies to many different institutions and manifests itself in different ways.
Foucault summarizes that "The Panopticon is a marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put to it, produces homogeneous effects of power" (202). Foucault is very skillful in presenting an argument in such a way that the reader is left wondering where he stands on the issues he presents. Does he think the previous assessment of the Panoptican a useful and beneficial instrument or an instrument that destroys society's' freedom? Going back to the previous quote that despite the application it individualizes and classifies according to gaps, skills, crimes, or illness. It is this breakdown that allows the observer to survey more efficiently time wise and effort wise. The Panopticon in the above ways can act as a laboratory that acts as a machine that "carries out experiments, to alter behavior, to train or correct individuals" (203). Thus the Panopticon not only acts as a vehicle to carry out tasks but also as a disciplinary apparatus.
Foucault makes the distinction that the measure to contain a plague functions along similar lines of the operation of the Panopticon, the application is different, however, the separation and isolation of a population during a plague is vital in order to keep control over the disease in order to save lives and avoid death. Foucault says: "The Panopticon, on the other hand, must be understood as a generalizable modal of functioning: a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday life of men" (205). The situation of the plague is to save lives while the Panoptican functions to shape lives and demonstrate power. Foucault states that "the Panopticon presents a cruel, ingenious case" (205). Foucault says it is widely adaptable and permeates society in so many different ways that it is unavoidable to be subject to its power. He says the Panopticon "is the diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form" (205). I think Foucault is saying that while constricts the individual it was and is a necessary evil to increase efficiency and ensure order in an ever increasing population. My question is what does Foucault mean when he says that the Panopticon "is a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use" (205). How is the Panopticon a figure of "political technology?"
Foucault describes the many applications that the Panopticon functions to achieve such as to instruct, reform, treat, confine, supervise, and to ensure efficacy. He goes on to say, "It is a type of location of bodies in space, of distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organization, of disposition of centres and channels of power, of definition of the instruments and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons" (205). This quote best describes this entire section in it describes how it functions and where it can be used.
Foucault says the Panopticon is an "exercise of power" in that it perfects itself in several ways. It reduces the amount of observers needed, it increases the number of individuals subjected to its power, and reduces space. The strength of the system is that it never intervenes onto the individual's acts as they act as their own supervisor. The system runs smoothly and without noise. By its very physical design "it acts directly on individuals; it gives 'power of mind over mind"'(206). The design insures economy, provides a preventive measure, and functions automatically. The Panopticon is adaptable to any situation and it is this adaptability and reliability that has allowed it to spread to many different institutions over the last two centuries.
Foucault says, "The panoptic mechanism is not simply a hinge, a point of exchange between a mechanism of power and a function; it is a way of making power relations function in a function, and making a function function through these power relations" (207). Basically, the Panopticon could be seen as a world view where the individual is separated and individualized, observed, molded to be efficient by the very structure's design and a place where even the observer can be observed. The power is contained within the tower and with each individual cell and thus the control is self sustaining.

Foucault pg 195-200

2007-12-10T21:24:00.000-07:00

Michel Foucault Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison
Chapter three, “Panopticism” pg 195-200

Abstract

Michel Foucault begins his third chapter entitled “Panopticism” with a description on what happens when the plague comes. He writes what first happens is “a strict spatial partitioning” (195). Everyone in the city is put in a space. This is done to ensure that everyone can be seen and accounted for. In order to contain and treat the plague everyone must be “caged.” Foucault explains, “This enclosed, segmented space, observed at every point, in which the individuals are inserted in a fixed place, in which the slightest movements are supervised…– all this constitutes a compact model of the disciplinary mechanism” (197). This is necessary, Foucault explains, in order to both control the plague and to control the evil in people that the plague might bring out.

Foucault next compares a leper to the plague. He uses these two examples not only as literal points of distinction, but also as two different methods of being in society. Lepers represent “rituals of exclusion” and the plague “gave rise to disciplinary projects” (198), or, in other words, “The leper and his separation; the plague and its segmentations” (198). While two separate diseases mostly operating in different times, they represent two different ways to deal with society.

Foucault makes clear that while the leper and the plague are certainly two different things, they are not necessarily totally separate. The ideas that were present during the treatment of leprosy are still present with the means of treating the plague or other unwanted societal distractions. For example, we place unwanted people in the society (madmen, criminals) in segmented places (the panoptic building). Foucault believes that this is not something that was practiced just in the high time of leprosy and the plague, but that we continue to do the same thing in modern society. He writes,

The constant division between the normal and the abnormal, to which every individual is subjected, brings us back to our own time, by applying the binary branding and exile of the leper to quite different objects; the existence of a whole set of techniques and institutions for measuring, supervising and correcting the abnormal brings into play the disciplinary mechanisms to which the fear of the plague gave rise. (199)

We currently do the same thing to those who we feel are unwanted and abnormal. Foucault feels this mechanism “to brand him and to alter him, are composed of those two forms from which they distantly derive” (199-200).

Critique

I decided to do the beginning of the reading assignment again for two reasons. First, I feel this beginning part is important in order to understand the subsequent parts of the reading assignment. And secondly, I have had some experience with leprosy and so found his discussion of it particularly interesting.

I was again confused with the language he uses while describing the techniques for trying to contain the plague. I know that his work is mostly based on interpretation and not theory. But, it seemed a very negative description, something that to me felt like he was saying was a bad element of society. Yet, this is what was done in order to contain the plague, which was responsible for killing many people. For example, when referring to the people quarantined in their houses he says, “Everyone locked up in his cage” (196). And he says that this method, “lays down for each individual his place, his body, his disease and his death, his well-being, by means of an omnipresent and omniscient power that subdivides itself in a regular, uninterrupted way even to the ultimate determination of the individual, of what characterizes him, of what belongs to him, of what happens to him” (197). He is of course right, in fact dead on. But I am still confused if he is trying to tell us how it is, or if he is making a judgment. His use of language to me suggests that he is critical of it, but I am just not sure.

I found the section where he talks about leprosy and the plague coming together in figurative terms to describe the way in which we deal with unwanted people today very relevant. For example, people who are deemed insane are both exiled and segmented. I think this is not only true for situations today, it is still true for leprosy today. I studied abroad in Thailand for a year and while there I was able to teach an English class in a leprosy camp. I had previously thought that leprosy was no longer a modern problem, that it was eradicated. However, not only is it still a problem in Thailand, (in fact a rather large one) but it is still being treated in the same way. These people are made to feel they have something wrong with them, some sort of curse, and they are told to live in a colony with other lepers. The Thai government does not force them to go, but they are given no support or treatment if they do not go and once it becomes general knowledge that you have leprosy you are immediately ostracized. It is in fact the ancient equivalent to what Foucault thought would happen in the modern era with more modern problems. He is absolutely right when he explains that the way abnormal people are dealt with today is directly related to how the plague and how leprosy was dealt with in the past.

Foucault: Panopticism

2007-12-10T19:36:00.000-07:00

Response by Matt Dewey

In this chapter of Discipline and Punish, Foucault explains and updates Jeremy Bentham’s theory and structure of the panopticon; ‘a marvelous machine which, whatever use one may wish to put it to, produces homogeneous effects of power’(pg. 202). In practice it affects a simple sense or awareness of being observed, of a visibility or transparentness of action that creates, or disciplines, a method of behavior. It is through this ‘affected consciousness’ that we self regulate.

Foucault discusses panopticism that can or is applied to different type of social contexts. He describes it use or potential uses for the schools, hospitals and prisons as he does throughout the book. But these are concrete or enclosed structures, ‘rigorously closed’ (207) is what Foucault calls it, and in a sense, places that we may have very little say whether we become part of or not. Foucault also discussed the panopticism in the economy, in the mass production of goods; this still seems like an architectural, objective ‘place’ that we move in an out of. What about this movement; physical, conceptual and virtual?

Is this the part where I run for cover from the floating ‘all-seeing eye’?

‘Panopticism is the general principle of a new ‘political anatomy’ whose object and end are not the relations of sovereignty but the relations of discipline’ (pg. 208).

So the panopticon is not a mechanism for the flexing of sovereign or state power but the order of disciplines; it is surveillance for social norms and habits of production, for the disciplines that have been created out of the logic and rationalization of the processes of an, ‘accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital’ (221). But, for instance, I know I can be locked away for certain behaviors and if I didn’t show up to classes I would lose my assistantship (so which one is discipline and which one is panopticism?).

Boise State is a ‘place’ as well, and its panopticism I wouldn’t necessarily characterize as architectural, though individual spaces, such as the setups of class rooms or the placement of offices in some of the buildings, may stretch the definition. So I don’t necessarily feel ‘observed’ in both Bentham and Foucault’s rendering of the panopticon. However certain mechanisms of validity may have this effect:

-are grades a discipline or a panopticism, is there any reason why they are both?
- is Tenure discipline and panopticism as well?
-are evaluations disciplines or the panopticon?

Though grades and tenure are not physical places, they are concrete applications and they are also integrated into the mechanism that is education. So is education the discipline or the panopticon, or does education use the theory of panopticism to reinforce discipline? Is there a difference between education and an educational situation or atmosphere? What does an ‘F’ in a class really mean then; that the student is refusing to be disciplined? Should we look at an ‘F’ so romantically?

So, this string of questions surrounds where Foucault places the panopticon outside the institution…For instance is it the retrievability of information and traffic in the capabilities of the Internet that serve the modern panopticism? I guess this issue with panopticism outside of physical places, or mechanisms of institutions stems from what Foucault says about movement and discipline:

‘...one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; is an anti-nomadic technique’
(pg.218).

‘…That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact grouping of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions’ (pg. 219).

- Movements of information, people?

Is 'Staticness' outdated? We move quite a bit today; if not from job to job and house to house, town to town, then from interest to interest, webpage to webpage, the new to the now. In our present state of economic relations a ‘global environment’ one must utilize changeability and liquidation, outsource, consolidate and restructure based on market needs- our human relations are not so physically defined as they were twenty years ago. This creates a picture of constant movement. There is as well another modern trend- the ability with Internet technology to fulfill ones basic needs and not even leave the house; work from home, have groceries delivered, download games and movies, and webcam just about everything.

In the first scenario it would seem that discipline could not be static in order to assert the same type of control, or the type of control that constitutes modern control, but because Foucault describes discipline as the result of our need for efficiency and order (and finally, on pg. 222, referring to the ‘Enlightenment’), has discipline created such unfixed fluidity or simply the ability to ‘aim’ such movement in a desired direction? What is fixed- the need for efficiency or the types of disciplines…The panopticon would have to move too. If discipline, ‘dissipates groups of individuals from wondering the about the country in unpredictable ways’, then it must some how make those way predictable and perhaps this is forging of predictability is a process of consolidation, for instance in media and bandwidth ownership today.

I guess we could predict that the need for efficiency could discipline us right into scenario two, to our sofas. This scene of willful and necessary banishment from the literal outside makes it easy to imagine a panoptic presence through the Internet and internet protocols. I can easily see email and the type of ‘presence’ that IM adjusts for digital communication as a type of discipline. The message then leaves a digital footprint that can be traced, if needed, recovered, dated and timed and authenticated. This capability, or the threat of using this capability by those in authority, seems to be a characteristic of the Panopticon. Individualized, enclosed, and under surveillance- this seems like a return to the control of a plague stricken town at the end of the seventeenth century that Foucault begin the chapter with.

Observation and Individualization in Part 3, Chapter 2: The Means of Correct Training

2007-12-06T08:42:00.000-07:00

I am interested in exploring Foucault's ideas of observation and individualization as explained on pages 170-177 and 189-194 of the text. I will do this by correlating the concepts with their real-life applications and testing the theories in that way.

The key term in this discussion is "individualization." Dictionary.com, which is based on the Random House Unabridged dictionary, defines individualization as:
1.to make individual or distinctive; give an individual or distinctive character to.
2.to mention, indicate, or consider individually; specify; particularize.
These definitions, to me, are vastly different in terms of practical function. Certainly observation, normative judgements, and evaluation perform the later function of considering people individually in order to specify and particularize. I am not entirely convinced, however, that these forms of discipline give an individual and distinctive character to people. I will explore my opinion of these definitions throughout this abstract.

Observation
Foucault writes at the bottom of page 170, "...the techniques which make it possible to see induce effects of power [...] eyes that must see without being seen". This is the theory behind video cameras to guard against shoplifting, cameras at intersections for law enforcement purposes, and even the idea of God as omniscient--all of these forces have a tranquilizing effect on behavior. However, in the work environment I see a different force at play. I believe many work places today are built "to permit an internal, articulated and detailed control --to render visible those who are inside it [...]to provide a hold on their conduct" (172). What is interesting to me is that power relations are set up based not on who can see but who can't be seen. For example, my father's company "Hawkins Real Estate Development Co." recently moved into a new building in BoDo. The office is in the same wharehouse district that house The Big Easy and other establishments. Since there are so few windows, the company decided to build internal walls of glass in order to allow natural light to shine throughout the building from the few windows. So everybody now has offices made of glass, including my dad, who is the CFO, and his coworker, the company president. However, the company owner and his son and two sons-in-law are the only employees who have offices with walls. So a power hierarchy has been set up based on who still has the freedom FROM observation rather than the freedom to observe. The same is true in the high school I student teach at and in the modern language department. Both the principal at MVHS and the MLL director are the only ones on the staff who have offices without hallway windows.

Foucault says that observation serves towards the "progressive objectification and ever more subtle partitioning of individual behavior" (173). This is certainly true for me. For example, I hate to have my office door open in the MLL department because I can't work as effectively, and it is not because of noise disturbance. It is because with my door open, I am constantly conscious of the possibility of being observed, so I sit straighter (and less comfortably!), worry about my apparent level of productivity (in case my boss walks by) and just generally find it difficult to focus and concentrate. The possibility of being observed definitely alters my behavior to an extent.

It is interesting, too, to think of the role of observation in the digital world. Social networking sites such as facebook, myspace, linkedin, and others all have differing levels of privacy controls and methods of observation. I prefer facebook because I have some control over who I am being observed by. It took me months to finally accept friend requests from professional colleagues because allowing them to "observe me" (view my profile) necessarily changed some of my behavior and activity on the site. Diane also seems to be exploring the function of observation or lack thereof in the digital world through the analysis of anonymous discussion boards.

Another interesting quote: "The perfect disciplinary apparatus would make it possible for a single gaze to see everything constantly. A central point would be both the source of light illuminating everything, and a locus of convergence for everything that must be known: a perfect eye that nothing would escape and a centre towards which all gazes would be turned" (173). This idea instantly made me think of the Christian concept of God. If one believes this to be a religious construct, it is apparent that the idea of observation as an instrument of control has been around for centuries. If one believes in God as a reality, His omnisience is obviously a strong disciplinary force.

Individualization
Foucault writes that "examination also introduces individuality into the field of documentation"(189). At first I think he is talking about the second definition of individualization--procedures that specify and particularize. He says examination places people in a field of surveillance that "situates them in a network of writing; it engages them in a whole mass of documents that capture and fix them" (189). This is true of most types of examination--school grades, medical records, income reports and tax statements, criminal records and more. However, Foucault goes on to say that "[Evaluation] was the problem of the teaching establishments, where one had to define the aptitude of each individual, situate his level and his abilities, and indicate the possible use that might be made of them" (189). This is evaluation that truly has an individualizing effect--that makes a person individual or distinctive. The only place this could be said to be happening in education today is possible in Special Ed where students meet with a team of educators and professionals to determine their abilities and needs and create and IEP (Individual Education Plan). Special Ed is inundated with paperwork designed to both categorize and support the individual needs of students. It may be one of the last frontiers of Evaluation as Individualization.

Foucault talks of two correlative possibilities of evaluation, first, "the constitution of the individual as a describable, analysable object, not in order to reduce him to 'specific' features, as did the naturalists in relation to living beings, but in order to maintain him in his individual features, in his particular evolution, in his own aptitudes or abilities, under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge" (190). This I see as the mission of Special Education--to support students in their exceptionalities. The majority of students, however, fall under the second possibility of evaluation: "The constitution of a comparative system that made possible the measurement of overall phenomena, the description of groups, the characterization of collective facts, the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in a given 'population'"(190). This is the modern system of school evaluation, or grading, as we know it. I don't think this lends towards creating individual and distinctive identities, except for broad categorical identities based on where one fall in the evaluative categorizations. (Ex. an "A" student--a good, conscientious, or smart student). There are correlations in the workplace, in religion, and in our social lives as well.

Abstract on Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punishment, Part 3, Chapter 2, Section "Normalizing Judgment." Pages 177-184

2007-12-04T11:29:00.000-07:00

Abstract on Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punishment, Part 3, Chapter 2, Section "Normalizing Judgment." Pages 177-184
By Bridgett VanDerwalker
Description of Section:
Foucault continues in this section by discussing how the process of judgment and punishment becomes ingrained in the routine of everyday life. Punishment as a spectacle has now become habitual and practiced not only on the offender but on the whole of the society. Punishment has become an everyday institution that "compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes"(183). Punishment has in itself become a power structure that not only punishes the offender but the observers and those who enforce the punishment also.
Key Terms:
Penal Mechanism
Infra-Penality
Micro-Penality
Disciplinary Apparatus
Hierarchzing Penality
Penality of the Norm
Comments and Questions:
Foucault starts off this section with an example of an orphanage that illustrates his idea of how normalizing judgment/punishment has turned into a system that keeps all inline not just the "offender." Foucault says that "At the heart of all disciplinary systems functions a small penal mechanism" (177). I think Foucault is saying that every social system surrounding us has a built in "penal mechanism," to keep people in line. Foucault points to the cause as being an overcompensation to fill in the gaps that law does not regulate. Foucault says that such institutions such as schools and the military are "subject to a whole micro-penality of time, of activity, of behavior, of speech, of the body, and of sexuality" (178). Somehow, Foucault seems to chronicle how punishment became an everyday apparatus that no one can function without; as a result of this gradual process punishment ceased to be a spectacle and became a cultural restraint that affects everyone not just the offenders.
Foucault states that a behavior or individual that doesn't follow the prescribed guidelines can be punished. It seems that punishment has shifted its focus from that of the individual to the group. This next quote exemplifies the above statement. "The order that the disciplinary punishments must enforce is of a mixed nature: it is 'artificial' order, explicitly laid down by a law, a programme, a set of regulations. But it is also an order defined by natural and observable processes" (178). It is human nature, or any living thing for that manner, to avoid punishment by watching and learning from those who are punished. We learn from example and modeling. Foucault says, "In a disciplinary regime punishment involves a double juridico-natural reference" (179). I really don't know what Foucault meant by this sentence perhaps that there are the official punishers and the social judgment or punishment carried out by one's peers.
Foucault talks about how displinary punishment reduces gaps and so performs in a corrective manner. Punishment comes in the form of correcting a 'crime' instead of physically punishing the individual. Foucault states that "To punish is to exercise" (180). This made me think of the army or in PE class when one makes a mistake you are punished by doing extra exercise. I know this is taking what Foucault says literally but it applies to other social activities like school and religion as well.
Foucault states that punishment is based on achieving gratification and avoiding punishment. People want rewards and fear punishment but my question is if physical punishment is not a threat anymore than do we have reason to fear it? If the consequences of one's actions have no dire consequences does that really deter one from committing an offence? Also what about radicals that do things against the establishment in order to reform the system who seek punishment to invoke a response, what then? I think Foucault is too simplistic in his assessment and that it is too cut and dry for any complex society. Foucault observes that penalty operates not on the acts themselves but the individual by their value or nature. I agree and it describes a problem in our own society where the individual is paramount rather than the act itself. For example, those who are on death row, if one commits murder he or she is allowed to live years or decades after judgment has been made. This doesn't seem right to me and doesn't act as a deterrent for the rest of the society when a sentence takes so long to be carried out if ever.
Foucault says that a system that rewards and punishes equally creates gaps and separates people. And that "Rank in itself serves as a reward or punishment" (181). If this is true, why bother fixing the system at all? No matter how hard a system tries, people can't or are unwilling to conform in all possible ways. Conformity is a nice idea but doesn't really work as countless countries, schools, businesses, and other organizations have discovered.
Foucault describes five operations that the regime of displinary power allows. It compares the individuals against the group; it separates individuals from one another, "It measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value, the abilities, the level, [and] the 'nature' of individuals" (183), and defines limits and differences that will be tolerated. This doesn't sound like a system I would want to follow; however, we are all participating in similar systems whether voluntarily or not.
This next point seems essential in this section of Foucault. "The perpetual penality that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary institutions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes" (183). Foucault seems to think that the law system is the only fair or regulated social structure that avoids or at the very least minimizes these effects in a way that is both fair to the individual and the society as a whole. I also think this idea goes back to Foucault's idea of keeping punishment private and not a spectacle in a way that doesn't affect society in such a direct manner.
Foucault states that the "power of the norm" is the new wave of the future, the new law of society. He says this system improves "homogeneity" while at the same time distinguishing the right qualities and harboring them while allowing the individual to evolve. By allowing individuality and encouraging equality within the society the process leads to a better, more efficient and orderly society. I like the idea in theory but it sounds a little too utopian in practice.

A plea to The Means of Correct Training

2007-12-03T22:11:00.000-07:00

by Matt Dewey

What I’ve found to really like about reading Foucault is the somewhat availability or presence of accessible summaries of his main points. Not necessarily the paragraphs that start with ‘ In short,’, or ‘Finally’; they sometimes, in my mind, are not even at what we might naturally or compositionally expect to be the ‘end’ of his reasoning. But discussing some of these ‘neatly wrapped’ conceptual resolutions are what I’m hoping to do in this response...

pg. 182

“This hierarchizing penality had, therefore, a double effect: it distributed pupils according to their aptitudes and their conduct, that is, according to the use that could be made of them when they left the school; it exercised over them a constant pressure to conform to the same model, so that they might all be subjected to ‘subordination, docility, attention in studies and exercises, and to the correct
practice of duties and all the parts of discipline’. So that they might all be like one another.”

and,

Pg. 184

“ In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them one to another."

These two quotes have a relationship that I can’t seem to get straight or that maybe one quote is actually the other and Foucault is simply repeating himself as we all seemed to notice and discuss last week. I think what sticks out in my mind in both of these quotes is the inherent dualities; the double speak or twin objectives that, specifically in the second quote on page 184, seem to conceptually do opposite things.

- The hierarchizing penality is for Foucault a system of ranking, or a reward system that has to do with awarding privilege to those who ‘perform’ to expected levels and a demotion in status or privilege for those that do not demonstrate acceptable aptitude or behavior. I believe Foucault’s observation comes from a military school context, but it seems quite easy to see it happening in other circumstances as well. Morality, ethics (either both good and bad) wealth, and access are all systems in our culture that are both assessed by such hierarchies (straight, pro life, and citizen = ‘the right’ and therefore all others are not, this one plays out in political campaigns; wealth has always been seen as an achievement of a certain level of competency and character while being poor is suggestive of lower skill and aptitude; access is a lot like wealth as far as it suggests certain aptitudes, demands of time, and ‘taste’.) But what Foucault seems to not talk about is the idea that the ‘school’ may be ‘rigged’; that in all the discipline, there are those that never have to take the quizzes. As real as Foucault’s military school discipline observations are, and as much as I agree with its subtlety, privilege is just as real... For instance the ratio of poor to rich soldiers fighting in Viet Nam, or Iraq for that matter.

-Normalization. I love the quote on 184 because I have never read this idea, or seen this concept explained in such a straight forward phrase (though it makes so much obvious sense)... It also illuminates the French obsession with ‘difference’ (specifically, Derrida). I seem to want put the two suppositions in a Foucault ‘action’ timeline:

Normalization ---> Hierarchy of penality ---> Discipline (observation) ---> Gaps?

Normalization ---> Discipline (observation) ---> Gaps ---> Hierarchy of penality?

With each one returning back to normalization?

Or is it simultaneous?

Normalization/ Hierarchy of penality ---> Discipline (observation)---> Gap/Normal?

Or is Foucault saying, like he does on pg. 183, that this process is a byproduct of the rational validity? Of the need to assess and assign facts and proof?

Gap/Norm - For Foucault these are the same or essentially isomorphic. Observation (and examination) is the discipline, and Normalization is the hierarchy of penality (of which we could include things like class, and racial and sexual inequality)?

One of my favorite films by Jean Luc Godard is, Alphaville (1965), which is a classic ‘lone man vs. organization’ film. The central command computer call Alpha 60 becomes a main character and a conscience of the film, computing little fancy tidbits like:

“The essence...
...of the so-called capitalist world...
...or the communist world...
...is not an evil volition...
...to subject their people...
...by the power of indoctrination...
...or the power of finance...
...but simply the natural ambition of any organization...
...to plan all its actions"
(http://www.lafn.org/~cymbala/alphavil.html)

What Alpha 60 seems to be saying is that there is a subversive tendency in all processes of organizing that seek to control all its conditions and outcomes; which, then again, is the reason in which we form the seemingly inorganic and purposive instrumental organizations in the first place...

The idea of a ‘natural ambition’ is problematic for me given in its deep apriori presumptions, but Godard gives a subtlety and aloofness to the ideas and realities of control and power that befits Foucault; that power ( in many instances) is in our rational need for protection (or validation) from both science and God.

But in order to complete the utter randomness of this response even further, I have to make the connection, simply because I’m a mass communication student, (and what kind of comm. student would I be?) to the discipline of Foucault and the use of mass media, since the early 1920’s, of the phenomenon of advertising. Given that the problem of capitalism is not in the production of goods but the consumption of them, one can trace during the 1920’s a shift in the field of advertising from describing the qualities of the product it was trying to sell, to incorporating the product socially, in already communally accepted values of family, love, self esteem, etc. By tapping established relationships between individuals and communities, advertising and manufactures were able to penetrate the very mechanisms of our meaning making and litter them with consumable happiness...
I bring this up to reiterate (I think) the discipline of Foucault as systematic; we have been 'trained' I think, rather passively, to justify the irrational, to suffer in the expectation of a joy in the material when we know it doesn’t ultimately make us happy... There is nothing ‘natural’ in this ability but a logic of reproduction and protection and conservation.

Ecole Militaire

2007-12-03T15:14:00.000-07:00

Ecole Militaire

2007-12-03T15:11:00.000-07:00

Ecole Militaire Paris

Soldiers Marching

2007-11-28T07:24:00.001-07:00

Men Doing Dressage

2007-11-28T07:15:00.001-07:00

Dressage

2007-11-28T07:13:00.001-07:00

Foucault pg 135-141

2007-11-27T22:49:00.000-07:00

Michel Foucault
Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison
Pg 135-141
Abstract by Patricia Helen Little

In the first few pages of the chapter entitled “Docile Bodies” Michel Foucault explains his theory on discipline. Discipline is a word he uses that describes certain methods that are used to dominate ‘docile bodies’, meaning humans who are able to be dominated, namely all of us.

Foucault starts his chapter explaining when he feels this idea of ‘docile bodies’ was first discovered. To do so he uses the example of the soldier. For a long time soldiers were men who were basically born to be soldiers. These are men who physically fit the needed criteria. But some time in the 18th century it was discovered that soldiers could actually be made. Special training and other approaches were used to make a man who was not perhaps naturally inclined to become a soldier. It is at this time that humans are discovered to be docile.

Foucault writes, “A body is docile that can be subjected, used, transferred and improved” (136). This is an important concept because with the realization that people are docile, then the inclination to rule upon these people is also realized. They (who they are is not clear, Foucault never classifies them but I believe we are meant to see them as the subjugators, those who oppress or try to rule others) found that they could have a lot of control over others. While this is not a new concept, (Foucault reminds us that there have been people oppressed since the beginning of time) different methods to oppress presented themselves in new ways. First, they realized that it was more beneficial to exert control over the individual as opposed to lumping everyone together. Also, they would use their power to control other by their “efficiency of movement, their internal control” (137). And lastly, this new theory on control was focused on the process rather than the product. This would ensure control throughout and therefore would be total.

Putting these three ideas together you have what Foucault defines as discipline.
“These methods, which made possible the meticulous control of the operations of the body, which assured the constant subjection of its forces and imposed upon them a relation of docility-utility, might be called disciplines” (137). Basically these disciples are used to dominate people.

Foucault makes it clear that this domination is clearly different from slavery, which deals “on a relation of appropriation of bodies” (137). He feels it is also different from a monastery type of domination because a monastery’s main goal is not utility. “The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely” (137-138). It seems that what separates discipline from other forms of domination is its ultimate utility and usefulness to the oppressors.

This utility is ultimately realized because “discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, ‘docile’ bodies” (138). When the masses are individually dominated you have complete control. Foucault does not feel that this was a sudden discovery. He is not painting a picture of a bunch of evil men together in a room devising a plan to rule the world. Rather, it was discovered and used, as it was needed. He writes, “on almost every occasion, they were adopted in response to particular needs” (138).

Because they were discovered and used in very separate ways the whole body of discipline has to be looked at by reviewing specific disciplines that are generally used. These are “small acts of cunning endowed with a great power of diffusion, subtle arrangements, apparently innocent, but profoundly suspicious, mechanisms that obeyed economies too shameful to be acknowledged, or pursued petty forms of coercion…” (139).

Foucault believes that “discipline is a political anatomy of detail” (139) and so we must look at the little things in order to understand the big picture. Foucault uses the next two pages to clarify why the details are important to study. He uses quotes from scholars that proclaim the truth of his method. For example, he quotes Jean-Baptiste de La Salle, “How dangerous it is to neglect little things” (140). The rest of the chapter is a detailed account of some of these ‘little things’.

Critique

I decided to do this little section because it is very important in order to understand the rest of the chapter. I admittedly ran though these first few pages and was lost and frustrated when I tried to keep going and was not understanding some very key terms. I had to start over and really follow what he was saying to understand the entire chapter.

I feel that this is a strength of Foucault’s writing. He lays everything out piece by piece. This can be bad if you are not reading closely and miss a piece because you will be hopelessly lost. However, he puts his argument out there so that if you are doing a close reading you will be able to follow him, and following Foucault through this difficult material deserves a big pat on the back.

I was especially interested in the way he describes what to me is ultimately the human condition. We are ‘docile’. We can all be led, and we are all led every single day. I have not read enough of Foucault to know what his meaning is overall, if there is one. Does he feel that knowledge is power, and by realizing that we are being subjugated and dominated that we can do something about it? Or is this just the nature of life, something we must resign ourselves to? Did smarter people figure out how to rule and now there is no way to stop it? I am in my end-of-the-semester-paranoia phase and would really like to know where I stand as a human being. Too much to ask? Probably.

Foucault – Pages 16-24

2007-11-27T12:24:00.000-07:00

Abstract of pages 16-24 of “Body of the Condemned,” from Foucault’s Discipline & Punish: the Birth of the Prison.

by Mike Peterson

Summary

In this section, Foucault discusses the shift in punishment from torturing the body to punishing the soul. He discusses how judgment is no longer passed simply on the crime but upon on the soul (passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, heredity, environment), on the subject’s will, and on attenuating circumstances. The introduction of these extra-juridical (and non-juridical) elements in the judgment take the sole responsibility of judgment and punishment off of the judge’s shoulders and redistributes it (along with culpability, responsibility, power) to other players—magistrates, psychologists, etc—who become part of a system aimed at not only punishment, but at curing/treating the criminal.

Foucault discusses the way in which article 64, an 1810 code which states that there is neither crime nor offence if the offender was of unsound mind at the time of the act, has been twisted and forgotten, so that an unsound mind is now just one of many variables in the judgment.

Foucault ends the section by establishing the four rules by which he’ll base his study into the history of the modern soul on trial.

Comments and Questions

Foucault’s four general rules for his study of the history of the modern soul on trial (23-24):
1. Regard punishment as a complex social function.
2. Regard punishment as a political tactic.
3. Find link between the history of penal law and the human sciences.
4. Find link between the entry of the soul into the penal justice scene and
how the body is invested by power relations.

Here, Foucault is establishing the way in which he will approach his genealogy of the penal system. He doesn’t want to adopt a limited viewpoint, such as that of the humanists, but instead he wants to analyze the history of the discourse by examining the interconnectedness of politico/socio/epistomologico/scientifico-juridical phenomena.

Judgment is no longer passed on crime as a mere “juridical object defined by code;” it is now passed on “passions, instincts, anomalies, infirmities, maladjustments, effects of environment, or heredity”—some object and say this isn’t to judge the subject, but to determine their “will” in committing the crime, but Foucault argues the soul is judged along with the crime and must share the punishment (18). Murder, for example, isn’t just murder: there’s manslaughter, negligent homicide, first-degree murder, etc. So many factors go into it: your state of mind, premeditation, how the crime was carried out. If the soul weren’t on trial, murder would be murder, and the punishment for murder would be equal for all those found guilty.

It’s always troubled me that homicide as a crime of passion usually gets a lesser punishment than other forms of homicide. Or for that matter, that everybody arrested for homicide plays the insanity card in hopes of treatment rather than punishment (though I’ve seen Cuckoo’s Nest, and I have to wonder if treatment and punishment aren’t the same thing).

If judges have started judging something other than crimes, they have begun to do something other than pass judgment. They judge—define, impose, etc.—“normality,” which opens the judging to psychologists, magistrates, educationalists, and members of the prison service. “A whole set of assessing, diagnostic, prognostic, normative judgments concerning the criminal have become lodged in the framework of the penal system” Psychiatric expertise gets a justifiable hold not only on offenses, but on individuals: “not only on what they do, but also on what they are, will be, may be” (18). (18).

This makes me think of a typical law and order episode where so many people have their hands in the pie when it comes to a trial: the defender wants his glory (and pay-check), the psychologist wants to look credible, the DA wants to increase his public standing, the victim wants justice for all, the human-rights activists want fair treatment, the Republicans want heads to roll, the prosecutor wants to send a message, the judge doesn’t want to set a precedent, and so on and so forth. So many outside factors come into play: power struggles, judgments of character, politics, social control—pretty much all the stuff Foucault is talking about.

Key Terms

Soul – “the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations” (16).

Genealogy – From what I understand of this, a genealogy is a study of the history of systems of knowledge. Here, Foucault is studying how the discourse of punishment has developed, and how we can (if possible) step outside of that discourse to examine it’s myths, origins, fallacies, etc, in order to…well that’s my question: In order to what? Create a new discourse?

Normality – In order to judge someone as abnormal, someone has to determine what normal is. Defining and establishing normality increases the power exercisable by judges, psychologists, magistrates, etc (since power through the penal system isn’t something to be possessed but exercised) (23).

Questions

Perhaps someone who knows more about literary criticism could answer this. What does Foucault mean on 17 when he says, referencing the end of torture and the beginning of the punishment of the soul, “It was the end of a certain kind of tragedy; comedy began, with shadow play, faceless voices, impalpable entities”? I think it’s beautifully worded, but I’m not familiar enough with comedy and tragedy to get the impact of the statement. All I really have to go on is Sanderson’s summation: Comedy: you wed. Tragedy: you’re dead.

Stabbing at Foucault

2007-11-27T10:54:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Michel Foucault’s “The Body of the Condemned” from Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison

by Tyson Livingston

Description of Article

This piece is the first chapter of the book and also serves as an introduction to the topics and methods of research used for the book. Foucault begins by providing a description of a public execution that occurred in 1757. The description is gleaned from a number of eyewitness accounts and reveals the physically brutal and torturous nature of this type of execution. He then compares this event to a “daily schedule” for prisoners that was written about eighty years after this execution had taken place. Foucault acknowledges that these are examples of different situations with different crimes, but he shows them as representations of two different types of penal styles.

The chapter then focuses on the historical shift from this type of torturous public display of punishment to the modern penal system that we have now in most of the western world. Foucault gives two reasons for this. First, the disappearance of punishment as spectacle (8), and second, the slackening of the hold on the body (10). His discussion of these topics also leads to another key element of this chapter, which is that our modern justice system does not judge merely the criminal act, but the passions and normalcy of the accused. He indicates that “the soul also is to be judged and share in the punishment” (18).

The next section of the chapter launches into a description of the goals of the book, and the core methods Foucault uses in his study. He indicates that the book is a “correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judge...” (23). The four guiding “rules” of the study are, in short, 1) Regard punishment as a complex social function, 2) Regard punishment as a political tactic, 3) make the technology of power the very principle both of the humanization of the penal system and of the knowledge of man, and 4) Try to discover whether this entry of the soul on to the scene of penal justice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of a whole corpus of ‘scientific’ knowledge, is not the effect of a transformation of the way in which the body itself is invested by power relations (23-4). Foucault finishes the chapter by providing information about other theorists who have had similar ideas and describing in greater detail the foundational ideas of their and his research.

Key Terms

Punishment
Penal System
Body
Soul
Technology of Power
Micro-Physics of Power
Corpus of Knowledge
Power-Knowledge Relations
Torture
Passions

Comments and Questions:

This is the first time I have read any Foucault, though I have obviously heard him referenced numerous times, and I have to admit that I found the first chapter of the book much more interesting than I expected. Some of the ideas that initially jumped out at me are physical pain being a possible unintentional but inevitable byproduct of imprisonment — can you have a gilded cage? — and especially the idea that in modern penal systems “an army of technicians” takes over the job of the executioner, that the “immediate anatomist of pain: warders, doctors, chaplains, psychiatrists, psychologists, educationalists; by their very presence near the prisoner, they singe the praises that the law needs: they reassure it that the body and pain are not the ultimate objects of its punitive action” (10). Foucault’s take on the formation of this group, and that they are a result of the interplay of knowledge-power relations within the justice and penal system is extremely fascinating.

Foucault’s ideas of power relations are a little different than I previously understood them. That power constitutes a “network of relations, constantly in tension, in activity, rather than a privilege that one might possess” (26) is a slight shift from how I have traditionally viewed such relations. I tend to think of it as haves and haves not, rather than as a sort of eco-system.

How knowledge relates to power is also very interesting. Foucault states that “Perhaps we should abandon the belief that power makes mad and that, by the same token, the renunciation of power is one of the conditions of knowledge. We should admit rather that power produces knowledge (and not simply by encouraging it because it serves power or by applying it because it is useful); that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (27). This is still a little foggy for me, but the idea above, about psychiatry, psychology, and other specializations to determine the nature of deviancy and possible “treatments” or courses of action to determine the future of the criminal, seem to be the best example of this. This whole body of knowledge, and the careers and institutions that rise from it, are produced because of the power relations between the criminal and the members of the justice and penal systems. They are symbiotic and cannot be separated from each other.

Another area that I am having trouble wrapping my head around is Foucault’s idea of the soul. It is obvious, even before he states it, that his concept of the soul has nothing to do with Judeo-Christian ideology. But it also seems obvious that for Foucault the soul is not simply the sum of our personality, experience, and the elements that we would include to form our concept of “self.” He says that “This real, non-corporal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of this power” (29). To me this seems to indicate that the soul is a construct created out of the activity and tension of power-knowledge relations, which is then superimposed upon “the self.” This construct then becomes the “prison of the body” (30).

Reading/Thinking Foucault; The ‘new’ body of the condemned

2007-11-26T16:13:00.000-07:00

by Matt Dewey

It is sometimes difficult to read Foucault, after reading so many references to his work in the course of a social science education, and not immediately search somewhere in his books, within some strange sentence or agitating prose, an answer to his most blinding contradiction... “How can he both universalize the domination of subjectless power and still leave space for the empowerment of marginalized voices? How can, or why would, subjects which are the effects of power also subvert it (Haber, H., Beyond postmodern politics, 1994, pg. 97-98)? This problematic has be reified and reified to the point of becoming academically passé in its treatment, merely skipped over in progressive arguments of social reconstruction (as in the case of media reform) and identity politics in order to validate new forms of intellectual, social, and political domination...

...this is unfortunate- that Foucauldian arguments get only so far until we loose a vocabulary to speak about emancipation, and that it is this ‘brain worm’ that arrests my reading of Foucault (is this because of a power relation?); there are other important ideas... his critical approach of ‘genealogy’ or tracing the development of ideas and meaning we’ve historically accepted as self evident, for instance that ‘the idea of a ‘truth’ that exists outside cultural production, which we now accept as invalid, resonates in contemporary human studies...

In the first chapter of Discipline and Punishment, we are introduced to the relationship the body has with history, or more specifically modes of production, and in turn, how that relationship has affected the justifications for the types of punishments administered to those deemed criminals:

“...the penitentiary, forced labour and the prison factory appear with the development of the mercantile economy. But the industrial system requires a free market in labour... the role of forced labour in the mechanisms of punishment diminishes accordingly and ‘corrective’ detention takes its place (pg. 25)”.

...here it seems also worth mentioning that the types of ‘acts’ considered or defined as ‘criminal’ get there justification as well from certain modes and rationalizations of production and accumulation...The illegal and therefore untaxable drug trade and its overwhelming race and class representations in US prisons may be one example...

Foucault then on pg. 26, refers again to the significance of ‘modes of production’ and the idea of the body by stating; ‘the body becomes a useful force only if it is both a productive body and a subjected body’. This seems to be reminiscent of post colonial studies in that colonial power is at its most powerful when it no longer needs to show or articulate a sense of force or violence on those it subjugates; hegemonically they self regulate. It is here that Foucault begins to articulate the ‘all encompassing’ or ‘ubiquitous’ nature of power by characterizing it as a function of an entire network of social relations and institutions (a micro-physics of power, pg 26)

“...this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who, ‘do not have it’; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them. This means that these relations go right down into the depths of society...” (pg. 27).

... Foucault also says that power is ‘exercised rather than possessed’, not a ‘privilege, acquired or preserved...but the overall effect of strategic positions (pg 26) and as much as this maybe accurate in some instances it does not seem to take into account that theses strategic positions are exclusive in many respects to members of elite socio-economic classes. Preservation of power and status and the acquisition of more of both, in many instances constitute the political and economic agendas of this class, however consciously or unconsciously callous or apparent the deliberation is. In this ‘ubiquitousness’ of Foucault’s power it seems important to contrast this idea with the way in which, for instance, ‘modes of production’ and ownership are physically organized- typically in the modern age, in top-down hierarchies. It seems as well that within such organizations, or maybe within different social organizational contexts all together, power is not so inconspicuously manipulative but overtly and visibly modulating (Galloway, A.,’ The Exploit’, 2007). In other words, maybe there isn’t an implicit, all encompassing ‘force’ acting through us and upon us in order to get us to behave certain ways, but a political-economic system that simply and overtly takes and rewards where it most benefits its reproduction (this seems to make just as much sense given Foucault’s suggestions of a ‘subjectless power’ and postmodernism attempts to decentralize the subject also). As well, Cornell West has explained in many places that there are certain realities or truths (power relations) that black people in America cannot deny or suggest exist merely in ‘strategic positions’; the power of racism does not necessarily need such ‘strategic positions’ in order to control, exclude, train and oppress. I can’t help but think that just as the ‘specters’ of ‘big brother’ are personified and exercised in the everyday operations of social relations, that it is equally shadowy to assume, with events such as the War on Terror or the Patriot Act, that there isn’t such a controlling entity, exclusive, subjective and with calculated affectations of power...

On the bottom of page 27 Foucault suggests his most grand theory, one that he will outline in the years to come more specifically in a book of writings entitled, Power/Knowledge. The relation ship between power and knowledge for Foucault is that one ‘directly implies’ the other:

…that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (pg27).

…This quote along with a similar one that continues on pg. 28, seem to perfectly describe the college experience, and in particular to my major, the prevalence of certain types of communication study. Along these lines, the idea power itself seems to imply a type of control, whether manipulative or modulating, of social processes; in effect, a control, either physically or ‘psychically’, over the behaviors of others. In order to thwart potential revolution by the masses it is important to legitimize the control and this legitimization becomes the logic and forms of institutions (Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, 1975). The imprint of these institutions of ‘civil training’, the sight, place, or ‘element’ where it affects us it characterized by Foucault as the ‘soul’ (pg29), or he adds, the ‘psyche, subjectivity, personality, consciousness, etc.’ If this is true, then we are simply unable to rescue ourselves…and this is, I think, the new form of prison Foucault is talking about; one without walls or guards, and no hope to escape and we are the new bodies of the condemned...

Foucault - pages 3-16

2007-11-26T14:33:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Michel Foucault’s “The body of the condemned” (pages 3-16) from Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison.

By Jenny Lowry

Description of Article

Foucault begins this chapter with a vivid description of a torturous public execution from 1757, he then fast forwards eighty years and gives a “time-table” of prisoners’ daily life. He goes on to give a history of criminal punishment and the transition from a public spectacle to a more private punishment. He states that with the abolishment of public punishment, the publicity is now the trial and sentencing. He argues that there is a shame in criminal punishment; that the “legal violence” or public torture put shame on the executioner, but now the shame is in the justice system. Even the use of chain gangs was stopped because of its spectacle and public display of criminal punishment. Public punishment turned the punishers into criminals as they became the murderers and made the prisoner something to pity.

Foucault describes how the “body” plays a role in punishment. Unlike the public executions of the past in which the body was tortured, in the current penal system the body is no longer touched: It is the deprivation of liberty that has become the punishment. The prisoner is no longer supposed to feel any pain, even in executions, which should be quick deaths. Machines were made to ensure a quick and painless death for criminals, making capital punishment an “equal death for all.” The condemned man was not to be seen by the public; in executions the prisoner head was covered with a “black veil”- making the crime and the criminal “faceless.” Even with these new tactics, the practice of capital punishment was still too shameful so it had to be moved behind the prison walls, making executions completely private. Even the prison system can be seen as a place of torture since the prisoners body is deprived by the “rationing of food, sexual deprivation, corporal punishment, solitary confinement” (16).

Questions and Comments

I am a little confused about the idea of “shame” and who is or should be ashamed in the penal process. Foucault writes:

“Punishment had gradually ceased to be a spectacle. And whatever theatrical elements it still retained were now downgraded, as if the functions of the penal ceremony were gradually ceasing to be understood, as if this rite that ‘concluded the crime’ was suspected of being in some undesirable way linked with it. It was as if the punishment was thought to equal, if not exceed, in savagery the crime itself, to accustom the spectators to a ferocity from which one wished to divert them, to show them the frequency of the crime itself, to make the executioner resemble a criminal, judges murderers, to reverse roles at the last moment, to make the tortured criminal an object of pity or admiration” (9, my emphasis).

I understand the point he is making here to be that the punishment for the crime was often so much worse than the crime itself that the persons who executed the punishment (executioner, judge) were just as guilty, if not more so, than the criminal himself, but was it there intention do this? I wouldn’t think so, but it kind of sounds like that is what Foucault is implying. I am also confused by the section in italics: does Foucault mean that by this public torture the spectators would (hopefully) not commit crimes? I am assuming that is what he means but I don’t understand the “frequency of the crime itself”? Where the executioners acting out the crime of the criminal? He states later that the shame was on the executioner - but what about the shame of the criminal? In the torture account, the confessors repeatedly tried to get the criminal to admit his guilt but he wouldn’t, is Foucault saying that the criminal is not shamed by the torture? That the act of torturing itself is what is shameful or that the persons doing the torturing should be ashamed by their behavior, their acting like criminals?

I also find this confusing: “Justice no longer takes public responsibility for the violence that is bound up with its practice” (9). Has justice every taken responsibility for the violence in its practice? Did justice take responsibility when they held public executions? Was the fact that they were public seen as responsibility? Are they no longer taking responsibility because the punishment happens behind closed doors?

He goes on to say that punishment was kept in secret that “It is ugly to be punishable, but there is no glory in punishing” (10). Then later in the same paragraph, “Do not imagine that the sentences that we judges pass are activated by a desire to punish; they are intended to correct, reclaim, ‘cure’; a technique of improvement represses, in the penalty, the strict expiation of evil-doing, and relieves the magistrates of the demeaning task of punishing […] there is a shame in punishing” (10). I am still confused as to where the shame comes from? I don’t really understand why the judges or magistrates should be ashamed of punishing a criminal? I can see how the public executions of the past would be shameful in that they were often worse than the crimes committed, but I don’t see how putting someone in prison is shameful. Maybe I am missing something; this is just confusing to me.

Another source of my confusion is the section on the body, which begins on page 10. Foucault writes:

“But the punishment-body relation is not the same as it was in the torture during public executions. The body now serves as an instrument or intermediary: if one intervenes upon it to imprison it, or to make it work, it is in order to deprive the individual of a liberty that is regarded both as a right and as property” (11).

I think he means that punishment is no longer physical in the torture sense, but physical in that the prisoner is confined – not to do as he chooses, but as someone else chooses for him. The prisoner’s body is now the property of the prison system and no longer belongs to him.

It also seems like all of the things Foucault describes as physical punishment are meant more to break the spirit of the prisoner than to cause physical harm. He does discuss the soul in the next section as well as the prisoners state of mind, but I think that the physical punishment, even that of torture, was meant to break the prisoners spirit more than anything else. Even when death was inevitable it was still the ultimate goal to get the prisoner to confess his sins, as is shown in the torture account.

Latino subculture, focusing on media representation

2007-11-13T15:15:00.000-07:00

Here is a link to my cultural studies project. I'm sorry that the technology wasn't working for me today in class. I hope you like the music videos and expect many changes to come!http://la-vida-viva.blogspot.com/

Jenny's Project

2007-11-12T14:43:00.001-07:00

Here is the link to my blog: Flavor of What? This is just a rough draft, so bear with me.

Mike's Presentation

2007-11-06T12:50:00.001-07:00

Here's the blog I'll be using in my presentation. I don't know when I'll be presenting yet, but feel free to take a gander.

www.peterson583.blogspot.com

Diane's Project

2007-11-05T21:36:00.000-07:00

Here is the link for my cultural studies project. It is most definitely a work in progress, so a lot of the pages are still blank. Don't worry, it won't stay like that forever.

http://anonymouscommentary.googlepages.com/

Rethinking West

2007-10-31T09:26:00.001-07:00

After our discussion in class yesterday I would like to offer a "rethinking" of West's article.

I still think that "the threat of nihilism" is a cop out. And these are my reasons: First, West argues that when Africans were brought to the New World that there was a struggle against nihilism, but that the people overcame it by turning to culture and community (277). Second, he states the reason nihilism is a threat now is because of the "commodification of black life and the crisis of black leadership" (278). Ok, I would like to address the commodification of black life first. It was brought up in class that this commodification is of the "hip-hop" culture. I am confused how this leads to nihilism. Is this because other races/cultures are taking on the attributes of a traditionally black culture? In my opinion, and granted it may not be the "correct" one, much of the hip-hop culture has brought community and agency to black Americans. I realize that now, in this day and age, that there is a ongoing debate as to the content of rap and hip-hop, but at the time of this article, I don't think that debate was as prevalent - maybe I am wrong. It seems that many black Americans have been able to pull themselves out of the "asphalt jungles" because of the commodification of black life. Although, this may be an example of what he is arguing is part of the threat of nihilism.

On page 279, West argues that the nihilistic threat was "at bay" because of the breakthroughs in the 60's. But "the combination of the market way of life, poverty-ridden conditions, black existential angst, and the lessoning of fear towards white authorities has driected most of the anger, rage, and despair toward fellow black citizens, especially black women" (279). Is he arguing that history is causing black Americans to turn against their own race? I am confused. I understand that living in poverty would make someone angry or feel hopeless, howver, I don't see the connection between a lessoning fear of white authority and the turning of this anger towards their own people. The market way of life also makes me think that West is arguing that commodities, or the lack their of, are a problem within black communities. Obviously, poverty addresses this issue.

I hope this helps to make my point more clear. I realize my abstract wasn't as concise as it could have been.

Why Not One More

2007-10-30T11:35:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Cornel West’s “Nihilism in black America”
1992

by Tyson Livingston

Description of Article

The article discusses the plight that is at the center of the issue of the future prospects of black America. West initially indicates that currently there are two camps, the Liberal Structuralists, who are concerned with such issues as equal employment opportunities, availability of child care and health care, etc., and the Conservative Behaviorists, who focus on the waning of the Protestant ethic black America, specifically issues such as hard work, deferred gratification, frugality, and responsibility.

West indicates that both camps ignore the central issue facing black America, which is nihilism, an issue that he asserts is a threat to the very existence of black America. He defines what he means by nihilism with this statement: “ Nihilism is to be understood here not as a philosophic doctrine that there are no national grounds for legitimate standards or authority; it is, far more, the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness” (277).

West states that the Liberal Structuralists tend to shy aware from this type of issue because it focuses more on morals, which tends to be a taboo subject that they feel takes away from their focus on structures. On the other hand, the Conservative Behaviorists are inadvertently contributing to the nihilistic condition because they describe blacks as agents to affect their upward mobility while avoiding the inherent structural barriers that exist in society. The result is a deepening of nihilistic attitudes as much of black America encounters barriers that the conservative say do not exist.

In highlighting the central issue of nihilism in black America, West also provides a brief background of the issue, and how it has really been central to the struggle of blacks since their first encounters with the New World. He states that, however, black America was able to maintain civic and religious organizations that provided a form of armor against this condition of hopelessness by teaching and passing down cultural and community values of love and service to others. Ironically, it was after the civil rights movements of the sixties and early seventies, and the reduction of the fear of white physical retribution, that nihilism began to take a firm hold. He also points out the role of the market way of life, which creates an image of the “good life,” especially as expressed through the culture industries of TV, music, video, etc., promoting a way of life that espouses comfort, convenience, and sexual stimulation. In his words, the result of all of this is that “sadly, the combination of the market way of life, poverty-ridden conditions, black existential angst, and the lessoning of fear toward white authorities has directed most of the anger, rage, and despair toward fellow black citizens, especially black women” (279).

West does provide something of a solution to the problem of black nihilism, or at least an initial stepping stone. He is highly critical of black leadership, and indicates that solutions must rather come from grass roots movements that focus on local issues rather than strive for the limelight, be centers of political conversion, and that hold black political leaders responsible to promoting love ethics and the support of these local issues.

Key Terms

Black Nihilism
Liberal Structuralist
Conservative Behaviorists
Love Ethics
Political Conversion
Cultural Armor
Pleasure
Corporate Market Institutions
Political Accountability

Comments and Questions:

Let me start by saying that I really liked this essay, mostly for its structure. West is very good at outlining his topic and supporting points within the essay, making it very easy to understand and follow what he wishes the reader to be aware of. He is also excellent in defining his terms and stating what he means when he uses them. He does this for nihilism, love, the two camps in the black American debate, political conversion, corporate market institutions, pleasure, and other terms.

Overall, I think he makes a good argument. I had some initial trouble with his critique of the Conservative Behaviorists trying to make black people see themselves as agents. My initial reaction is to think that by thinking of yourself as an agent it provides at least a modicum of empowerment. He states that “on the surface, this is comforting advice, a nice cliché for downtrodden people. But inspirational slogans cannot substitute for substantive historical and social analysis” (277). Even though he continues his argument by indicating that any agency on the part of a black American must be considered within the context of his or her victimization, I got the sense that he was opposed to the idea of agency almost completely. He uses phrases such as “inseparable from, but not reducible to” that initially made me feel he was trying not to sound polar in his views but actually was.

However, my initial impressions began to change as I read further. Later, he indicates that he rather promotes agency through the love ethic, which is in fact “a last attempt at generating a sense of agency among a downtrodden people” (280). This would seem to be a legitimate attempt to promote black Americans as agents in the way that West approves, in relation to their level of victimization. This is especially true in light of his criticism of black leadership from which the initial ideas of the Puritan ethic stem. In this light, it is no wonder that he critiques the Conservative Behaviorist for their attempts to promote agency. Their version of it is a shallow and blinded agency that is only open to a few privileged few and would hide the conditions of the bulk of black America.

My only other mild complaint about the essay, is that I feel I have missed out on some of the power of his argument by not having read Toni Morrison’s book. While he holds it up as an example of a solution, he gives little in the way of details. Perhaps this is intentional, as he feels his readership would be more familiar with the work, or as a push for more people to read and consider this piece of literature.

Overall, I find this article very engaging, and wonder if the questions he deploys toward black America are not applicable elsewhere in American culture. Nihilistic ideas are present in other aspects and sub-cultures of American society, and have expressed themselves in such things as school shootings, home-grown terrorism, and increased crime statistics, as well as just general discontent and feelings of powerlessness. Materialism and the values espoused by the Corporate Market Institutions are ever increasing and solidifying. I wonder if some of West’s solutions could be applicable on a broader scale, that if localized grass-roots movements are the way to bringing back some of the values West idealizes to our society as a whole.

Cornel West's "Nihilism in black America"

2007-10-29T17:58:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Cornel West’s “Nihilism in black America”
By Jenny Lowry

Description of Article

West argues that the dilemma of African Americans is divided into two groups: the liberal structuralists who “highlight the structural constraints of the life chances of black people” (275) and the conservative behaviorists who “stress the behavioral impediments to black upward mobility” (275). West contends that these arguments do not come close to understand the problem with African Americans, that the real problem is the threat of nihilism.

Nihilism, according to West, is the “lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness” (277). African Americans are threatened by the lack of hope and the “absence of meaning” (277) in their lives.

Historically, blacks were armored against this threat through culture and community, but something happened along the way that changed this. West believes that this change occurred because of “the commodification of black life and the crisis of black leadership” (278). His solution to the nihilistic threat in black America is take “collective responsibility” and to play an active role in politics that includes many leaders.

Comments and Questions

West argues that “structures and behavior are inseparable”; that people act a certain way according the situation or circumstance they are in. So, a black man raised in the “hood” will act a certain way, while a black man raised in the suburbs will act a different way. He also argues that culture is “structural” like “economy or politics”; that culture is influenced by economy and politics. In this sense, it seems that culture is inseparable from politics and economy; that culture is often times made by politics and economy.

He argues that “economic deprivation and political powerlessness” (276) are not the only reasons for the nihilistic threat to black America. Both the liberal structuralists and the conservative behaviorists ignore the nihilistic threat, and the conservative behaviorists add to it. He argues that this threat is invading black America, but the only example he gives is that of commodification of goods in poverty ridden communities. It sounds like he is arguing that those people are being threatened by nihilism because they cannot afford what other people can. So, without certain commodities they are doomed to have no meaning in their lives. This is ridiculous; every culture and every race goes without something, but that does not mean that they are devoid of meaningful lives

West blames history for the problems of black Americans today for their loss of meaning in life. Slavery and white supremacy are prime examples of where nihilism started in America. He argues that while black criminals should be punished for their crimes, capitalism is to blame for the poverty and lost culture that leads them to nihilism and thus criminal behavior. This argument is ludicrous. What about white criminals? Is capitalism to blame for their criminal deeds as well? How can capitalism be the problem for all crime?

He also feels like black politicians, particularly Jesse Jackson, only serve to halt progression toward eliminating this threat. He sees black politicians as narrow minded and over the top; that politicians like these only serve to further repress black Americans and leave them powerless.

While I am not a black American, this article is rather disturbing to me. It seems like West is dooming black Americans with this incurable disease. The black Americans I do know do not seem depressed or void of meaning in their lives. I agree that political progress should be made within black culture, as it should be in many other cultures in America. West’s argument that meaning is lost in black America seems farfetched to me. The fact that he offers no real evidence of his claim or a solution is problematic.

Cornel West: “Nihilism in Black America”

2007-10-29T16:53:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Cornel West's “Nihilism in Black America”
by Mike Peterson

Description

West argues that the two current and polarized “camps” that discuss the plight of black America—the liberal structuralists and the conservative behaviorists—fail to grapple with and even add to the real threat: nihilism. West discusses how these camps focus too narrowly on structures (liberal structuralists) or on values, attitudes, and individualism (conservative behaviorists), and ignore the nihilistic threat: “the despair and dread that now flood the streets of America” (276).

West argues that nihilism in black America has existed since slavery, but that until the 1970’s the black community has erected powerful buffers against its effects: cultural structures of meaning and feeling, religious and civic institutions that embody values of service and sacrifice, love and care, discipline and excellence. But now the commodification of black life and the crisis of black leadership have resulted in the crumbling of those structures and a relapse of nihilism.

The solution is a politics of conversion, which treats the nihilistic threat as a disease that can be tamed but never cured. For this to happen, leadership needs to be strengthened at the local level. West argues that national leaders are often too charismatic with little programmatic follow-through, which leads black nationalists, with their myopic visions that cause fragmentation, to pick up the slack. This all leads to political cynicism, which hampers the efforts of local activists, on whom the progressive effort depends. West says the model of one black national leader must be shunned, and that local activists must work in conjunction with state, regional, and national networks to form the collective responsibility that can hold back the nihilistic threat to black America.

Key Terms

Nihilism: “…the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness” (277).

Politics of Conversion: Treating nihilism as a disease that can be tamed by love and care, but that can never by completely cured (279-280).

Liberal structuralists: Focus on structural constraints. “More government money, better bureaucrats, and an active citizenry” (275).

Conservative behaviorists: Focus on behavioral impediments. “There projects rest largely upon a cultural revival of the Protestant ethic in black America” (275).

Comments and Questions

I don’t disagree with anything West has to say, but as I read the essay I became a little wary of his writing style. He uses direct, colorful language that is borderline bombastic at times. Does this pathos help or hurt his argument?

A few examples:

“We must delve into the depths where neither liberals nor conservatives dare to tread, namely, into the murky waters of despair and dread that now flood the streets of black America” (276).

– I see the point he’s making, but he generalizes entire groups of people based on ideological affiliation, as if expressing a liberal standpoint makes you incapable of understanding or dealing with the threat of nihilism. Is there a way to talk about polarized ideologies without over-generalizing and exaggerating the “void” of the middle-ground?

“Many black folk now reside in a jungle with a cutthroat morality devoid of any faith in deliverance or hope for freedom” (278).

– I don’t have a critique of this. It’s very powerful language that carries his point well. It’s obvious that the author has a lot of emotional and cultural investment in this topic, which spills out in his language. Does this have the potential to hamper his argument? Could critics dismiss him as being too emotional or too enmeshed in the culture to be reliable?

“…ushering the humble freedom fighters…who have the audacity to take the nihilistic threat by the neck and turn back its deadly assaults” (280).

– Beautiful imagery, but how does one actually take an idea by the neck? Very motivational language, but it lacks concrete solutions or follow-through. I know this essay isn’t the place for West to lay out a direct plan of action, but it does leave me feeling a little let down—I clearly agree there is a problem, but I don’t walk away feeling empowered to do anything about it.

West critiques national leadership based on the current state of affairs (Jesse Jackson, Al Sharpton, etc), and he uses these “failures” to justify his call for increased local activist efforts, collective responsibility, and an end to the one-black-national-leader model. Is West implying that the idea of national leadership is inherently defunct and irredeemable? Is he targeting these specific leaders, or is he saying it’s a plug-and-play model, and it doesn’t matter who you put in their place, the same problems will abound? Or is he saying that these same leaders (again, Jackson and Sharpton) have the potential be effective leaders if local progressive efforts improve and operate in conjunction with, rather than in subordination to, this national leadership?

Abstract of Cornel West’s “Nihilism in Black America” 1992

2007-10-29T16:29:00.000-07:00

Abstract of Cornel West’s “Nihilism in Black America” 1992
By Bridgett VanDerwalker
Description of Article:
West begins his article by explaining the two camps of thought who are trying to deal with the “plight of African Americans” those two camps are the liberal structuralists and the conservative behaviorists. West then tells us why these two camps fail to make progress against black nihilism. West then explains what black nihilism is and why it continues to persist. West claims that it is a result of the breakdown in community; a community that was weakened by the abolishment of slavery and further perpetuated by consumerism.
West feels as though blacks are jealous of whites, which then turns into anger that is turned on their own kind in acts of violence which causes more depression and lower self-esteem. West proclaims that it is through love and caring that nihilism can be curved. He closes his article by calling for strong black leadership. This leadership must start at the local level than at the national by doing so reforms can be passed that will help those who need it but it must start at the local level if any reform is to work. Community strength builds hope, a hope for a better future, and an end to the nihilistic cycle.
Key terms:
Nihilism
The Absurd
Familial/Communal Networks of Support
Politics of Conversion
Collective Responsibility
Discussion, Comments, and Questions:
West indentifies two camp of thought. The liberal structuralists think government programs will mead the ill of the blacks. The conservative behaviorists purpose “self-help programs, black business expansion, and cultural revival” (275). West suggests that the bigger issue of black nihilism is overlooked in three ways by the two camps. One aspect that is overlooked is the idea that “institutions and values go hand in hand” (275). They can’t be separated by taking positive actions this will not elevate living conditions for those living in black society. The second aspect is that one needs to look at all kinds of contributing structures not merely the political and economic ones. One question on this idea is, are mainstream values compatible with black values? I think West’s idea on strong black leadership can bridge mainstream values and those of blacks in particular but only if there are black leaders to speak for their needs which hasn’t happened as of yet. The third aspects that both camps ignore are the feelings of black people the deep-rooted despair and neglect they feel throughout all aspects of their lives. This type of problem is not easily solved and can’t be repaired with a quick patch up job in the form of political or economic reforms.
West explores where these two camps fail in their particular approaches. The structuralists fail to acknowledge the supporting structures like family, churches, and media and their role in reform these structures have to be in cooperation with the political and economic reforms if real change is to occur. Another failure of this camp is they “neglect the battered identities rampant in black America” (276). If the reform makers are white upper-middle class they can’t relate in any meaningful way to the troubles of lower class black citizens.
Conservative behaviorists fail in three aspects in their reforms. They fail to acknowledge that behavioral and political/economic factors contribute to the nihilistic attitudes prevalent among black citizens. The black attitude is one can’t succeed regardless their efforts so they feel cursed and hopeless. A second failure is admitting that they can’t relate to the blacks’ situation and that blacks are victims which only continue the bad feelings towards politicians. Thirdly, their lack of enforcement in policies results in cutbacks which furthers their nihilistic attitudes.
West defines what he means by black nihilism. He says it is the cumulative result of “the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness and (most important) lovelessness” (277). This condition results in detachment from others and society as a whole; West remarks that this affliction is a “distinctive form of the Absurd” (277). I think Camus would agree that without hope the world is indeed Absurd and there is no point in fighting because it is futile in the end. A depressing thought for sure especially if a whole segment of the population feels that way and nothing is being done but denying it exist at all.
West explains that past generations of blacks had “cultural armor” which protected them from threats from the outside and that when the institution of slavery was abolished so to was black culture. West seems to be puzzled as to the reason why this would be but doesn’t reach a clear explanation. West goes on to claim that “Black people have always been in America’s wilderness in search of a promised land” (278). This may be so, in that black people have been neglected by American society as a whole but this doesn’t really explain the last 40 years. They have had the right to vote since 1968, and fought extremely hard to do so; then they seemed to stop fighting and thus disappeared into the underbelly of society. West seems to overlook this fact which weakens his overall argument that they never had fought and have never had self-pride. West explains that nihilistic attitudes “contribute to criminal behavior- a threat that feeds on poverty and shattered cultural institutions” (278). This point is hard to argue against given the statistics that blacks are less likely to go to college than all other minority groups, the highest murder victim rate, and the highest suicide rates in the country.
West’s argument that corporate market institutions are to blame for blacks feeling anger is besides the point in that the media affects everyone especially the disenfranchised which is a fifth of the US population. West claims that corporate institutions try to shift blame back upon blacks but West lacks conviction and evidence in supporting this claim. West says that violence, poverty, and hopelessness are signs “of cultural decay in a declining empire” (279). I think this is true, if a section of American society is decaying than the rest of society will eventually follow. A good example of this is the Katarina/New Orleans fiasco. Why didn’t we don’t we do more to help? Simple answer is 70% of the population of New Orleans was/is black. As a result of this disaster blacks feel more alone and helpless that they have ever did before. And the sad truth of the situation is no one cares. If this disaster had happened in New York or Washington D.C., they would have received more support financially and emotionally and the reason is a big percentage of the population is well-off whites.
West is on the right path when he suggests his politics of conversion. This politics of conversion is a call for strong black collective leadership in and at every level of government. His second idea for improvement is a self-sustaining circle of love and caring for oneself and others by doing so will produce political resistance within the community. West says “The politics of conversion proceeds at a local level then spreads when grass root organizations push for reform at the state and national level” (280). West proclaims that the politics of conversion meet the threat of nihilism head on and connects with everyday people it is trying to help. This is an idealistic vision but one that offers a real chance of hope.
West has three critiques of black leadership. His example of Jesse Jackson, who got caught up in his own politics and that of his party’s resulted in lack of follow through. Others focus too much on race neglecting other disenfranchised people or the bigger issues. West says “black leadership at the national level tends to lack a moral vision that can organize (not just periodically energize) subtle analyses that enlighten (not simply intermittently awaken), and exemplary practices that uplift (not merely convey status that awes), black people” (281). Can Obama do the above things? I don’t know, however, he is concerned with universal healthcare which would benefit everyone and particular blacks. West’s last claim is the lack of strong black leaders reinforces that blacks can’t make a difference just isn’t true. Blacks have the second largest percentage of voters in the US, so that makes them very powerful if they vote it will make a substantial difference. In the 2008 elections, black voters will have 15 million votes and 60% of those voters are Democrats so Obama could have a good chance of being elected. West points out that the real change must occur at the local level because that is where the biggest changes can occur.
West closes the article by saying that a leader must have a genuine want for equality, freedom and responsibility. It is this hope in good civic leadership that the war against nihilism can be won.

Abstract of Paul Willis’s “Symbolic Creativity” 1990

2007-10-24T23:57:00.000-06:00

Description of Article:
Willis begins his article by questioning the institutions of art and what it stands for. Willis proposes that art is not merely a collection of artifacts that we peruse on occasion but something that we engage in everyday by using symbolic creativity. Willis points to how young people engage in symbolic creativity in a multitude of ways because they are shut out of the world of “high culture” art. Willis points out that “symbolic creativity is not only part of everyday activity, but also a necessary part” (207).
Willis defines the many manifestations of “symbolic creativity” can take and how it can be an individual act or a collective effort. Willis then explains what is produced and gained by symbolic creativity. He also explains why “symbolic creativity” should be considered a grounded aesthetic because it raises and creates the culture around it. Willis concludes by saying that a culture should not be defined by art in the form of artifacts but by pure activity and imagination.
Key Terms:
Symbolic Creativity
Grounded Aesthetics
Universalism
Commercial Cultural Commodities
Comments and Questions:
Willis starts his article by calling for a reform in what we should consider art. He states that art and creativity should be examined for what cultural significance it carries for the whole of humanity. Willis states his goal “is to uncover, explore, and present symbolic creativity in everyday life” (207). Willis believes that not only is symbolic creativity present in our everyday lives but that it is a necessary part. It is after this part that my support wavers especially when he says symbolic creativity is “essential to ensure the daily production and reproduction of human existence” (207). While I do believe that symbolic creativity is present in our everyday lives I don’t think human existence would end without it although it would be very dull. Willis discusses that it is through “symbolic work” we produce meanings and learn to communicate to our eternal essence and to the collective group as well.
The following section is where Willis really excels at defining what “necessary symbolic work” entails and what is produced from these endeavors. Willis explains that it is through the practice of language and our capacity to control it that we find “interaction and solidarity with others” (208). We realize our impact on ourselves and others by engaging in symbolic creativity. The second point he makes is that through our active bodies we produce symbolic resources such as singing and feeling. Willis points out that when we engage in “drama as practice” we are able to communicate to others through performing roles and rituals. Such examples of this principle are dancing, story-telling, and making jokes. His forth point is on symbolic creativity itself. By engaging in symbolic creativity we produce new meanings that are “attracted to feeling, to energy, to excitement, and psychic movement” (208). Willis encourages us to see these actions as “realities rather than as potentials” (208). This is an interesting idea and contributes to the idea that while these activities don’t create artifacts they create the reality of our everyday lives. Being human “the human-be-ing-ness means to be creative in the sense of remaking the world for ourselves as we make and find our own place and identity “(208). This statement summarizes why he thinks symbolic creativity is so important and why it should be recognized by the whole institution of art.
Willis then goes into explaining what is produced by symbolic work and creativity. He reintegrates that symbolic creativity forms individual identity and helps the individual make meaning. He then points out that, “Identities do not stand alone above history, beyond history. They are related in time, place and things” (209). While these creative efforts may different dependent on physical environment, time, and a particular culture they produce similar “products.” These products are dance, singing, cooking, jokes, and other similar everyday activities. Lastly Willis says “symbolic work and especially creativity develop and affirm our active senses of our own vital capacities, the powers of the self and how they might be applied to the cultural world” (209). He explains that by participating in these activities it helps the individual make cultural sense of how to manipulate and use symbolic forms in their everyday lives.
Willis asserts that it is this process that helps young people culturally survive and have power to change the world in some small way. It is in the everyday symbolic work that young people contribute to society as a whole. Willis seems to drift out of focus when talking about young working-class women and their lack of power and how they reclaim power by symbolic works. This example while making sense seems to be lackluster in the demonstration of how symbolic works actually function. Willis goes on to explore why youth culture is so important. He says they can “forge new resistant, resilient and independent ones to survive in and find alternatives to the impoverished roles proffered by modern state bureaucracies and rationalized industry” (210). Willis fails to mention how this reformation might be created in real terms which weaken his argument as a whole. Willis goes on to say “symbolic creativity’ is an abstract concept designing a human capacity almost in general. It only exists, however, in contexts and, in particular, sensuous living processes” (211).
Willis discusses the concept of grounded aesthetics which is “the creative element in a process whereby meanings are attributed to symbols and practices and where symbols and practices are selected, reselected, highlighted and recomposed to resonate further appropriated and particularized meanings” (211). Basically, young people are creating their own meanings to old ideas and symbols thus reclaiming power for themselves. Willis says “Grounded aesthetics are the yeast of common culture” (211). This idea makes sense when we reflect back to the beginning of the essay and the idea that “symbolic creativity” is necessary in everyday life because if symbols are not being reused and remade by the youth than a culture as a whole starts to decay. Willis asserts that this process is “the work of culture by culture” (212). Thus this process is both timeless and universal.
The process of grounded aesthetics leads to the concept of universalism which is an awareness of the future and what possibilities may arise from it. Willis proclaims that grounded aesthetics have uses which are “energizing, developing, and focusing of vital human powers on to the world in concrete and practical ways” (213). The result of this process can be wide spread or very personal and act as a treatment for the “injuries of life.” Willis explores the dangers of the above process if it is allowed to result in a text or artifact. He remarks that these material results maybe too narrow in their range of symbolic resources. The “artist” of the symbolic work may focus on the end result instead of meditating and enjoying the process itself. Finally, “Human receivers are allowed no creative life of their own” (213). This last point seems to tie into his over-arching theme that being, symbolic creativity should be enjoyed and that any material result is secondary to the process itself.
Willis sums up his argument by returning his introduction in which “official arts” are removed from the symbolic process and are displaced by time and true and original meaning. When official art loses its underlining context in which it was conceived it becomes merely a “commercial cultural commodity’ and loses the essence of its creation. Willis supports the idea that common culture with time becomes the culture and seeing the results of such an occurrence is what makes life worth living.

“Meaning and Ideology”

2007-10-23T12:50:00.000-06:00

Abstract of “Meaning and Ideology” by Judith Williamson

Abstract by Diane Neu

I. Description of Article

Williamson explains how advertising has created objects that are now an interchangeable piece of human culture. Instead of saying “I love you,” we give flowers. Instead of recycling and reducing consumerism, we buy a new Prius. Advertising has created “structures of meaning” where the good or object is now a stand-in for human language and action (188).

II. Comments and Questions

Williamson argues that advertisements are one of the major factors influencing our culture today, in addition to being the major cultural mirror “reflecting our life today” (188). Advertising is so pervasive in our culture because of its status as “a vast superstructure with an apparently autonomous existence and an immense influence” (188). You cannot easily counteract a force that is so rooted and ingrained in our culture that most people do not even recognize it for what it is. Williamson clarifies that her purpose is not to measure the influence of advertising but rather to analyze “what can be seen in advertisements” (188). She continues to explain that while part of advertising’s obvious function “is to sell things to us,” it also functions as a modern day replacement for art and religion in that it “creates structures of meaning” (188).

Advertising creates meaning through its ability to “translate statements from the world of things […] into a form that means something in terms of people” (189). Williamson gives two examples of automobile advertisements. If a company is trying to sell a car that gets good gas mileage, they might portray the buyer of such a car as economical or eco-conscious. If they were trying to sell a car with low gas mileage, they might portray the buyer as someone who is too cool and wealthy to care about something like gas mileage. Advertising takes the product and creates a relatable story or meaning that we, the consumer, can connect to. Williamson points out that this aspect of advertising shows that advertising is not a “single ‘language’ ” (189). Instead, advertising can be seen as “capable of transforming the language of objects to that of people” (189). One set of advertisements that comes to mind is the new “healthy” McDonald’s campaign. They have these commercials with a hip, young mom and her beautiful toddler spending a wonderful day together – and then they finish the day by having a healthy meal at McDonald’s. The mom gets her salad (with Paul Newman dressing, natch), and the kid gets all white-meat chicken nuggets with milk and apple slices. Mmmmmm. Now you can eat Fast Food Nation style and presumably not get cancer. Of course, this whole campaign has nothing to do with McDonald’s actually caring about the food they serve – they just know that this is a great opportunity to capitalize on the whole organic, Whole-Foods movement.

Advertising does not always reduce “people to the status of things,” but it happens quite frequently when both the object and the person “are used symbolically” (189). This happens when the object becomes interchangeable with the person or human act – the object becomes a physical stand-in for emotion or human connection. Williamson uses the example of how diamond rings have become the ubiquitous symbol for true and enduring love. The diamond isn’t just associated with love – it is love. This immediately reminded me of the engagement ring ads for Scott Kay. Their slogan is, “Never compromise when asking someone to spend the rest of their life with you,” indicating that no matter how heart-felt or genuine the proposal, it just won’t mean anything without a Scott Kay diamond. The word “compromise” holds two meanings for me in this ad. The more obvious connotation is that the person who proposes without a Scott Kay diamond would be striking a compromise between cost/benefit. They have compromised and decided to not spring for the giant, platinum-set diamond. The other, more striking, meaning is that the person who proposes without a Scott Kay diamond would be compromising their relationship. They would be sending the message that the receiver of the ring means little to the giver. There is no love without a Scott Kay diamond. Williamson summarizes this phenomenon by pointing out that these kinds of ads “are selling us something else besides consumer goods: in providing us with a structure in which we, and those goods, are interchangeable, they are selling us ourselves” (190).

People are no longer “identified with what they produce” in a culture where advertising invokes “false categories” of class in order to “obscure the real structure of society by replacing class with the distinctions made by the consumption of particular goods” (190). We are no longer associated by what we can create, produce, and contribute; we become what we consume. Our identity and class status becomes inextricably linked to “what we are able to buy” (190). I remember one time reading this article where they were interviewing the marketing executives at Pottery Barn. They were commenting that while it is true that a lot of people can’t afford a $5,000 sofa, a lot of people can afford $20 Egyptian cotton towels. They are still purchasing a luxury item, but it is an affordable luxury that makes them feel like they are participating in a higher level of consumer culture. It makes them feel like they belong in that social class. That’s why you can now spend $20 on Kate Spade branded pencils. You might not be able to afford one of her purses, but if you use the pencils, everyone will think that you can.

Williamson concludes by pointing out that advertising can be elusive because while it “speaks to us in a language we can recognize,” it uses “a voice we can never identify” (190). This is due to the fact that “advertising has no ‘subject’ ” (190). There are people that produce these advertisements, but the ad never comes out and says, “This is Bill Jones, senior advertising executive, and I am here to sell you…” This leaves “a space, a gap left where the speaker should be” (190). As consumer, we are “drawn in to fill that gap” (190). Advertising sets up the social structure and meaning for us, and we are left to consume and distribute that meaning. Williamson reasons that if we could take back the “relationship and human meaning appropriated by advertising,” we “could radically change the society we live in” (191).

III. Key Terms and Links

Advertisements
Structures of meaning

http://www.mcdonalds.com/usa/eat/moms.html

http://www.scottkay.com/bridal/index.aspx

http://elizabethslittleblog.wordpress.com/2007/01/14/may-a-curse-fall-upon-the-house-of-pottery-barn-trying-to-want-less/

Meaning and Ideology abstract

2007-10-23T12:44:00.000-06:00

I. Summary

"Meaning and Ideology" by Judith Williamson deconstructs the meaning-making of the advertising world. The main tenet of her argument is that the advertising world does not operate within the static confines of a 'language,' but rather, molds a structure through which it can transform "the language of objects to that of people"(189). Advertisers create links between certain objects and certain characteristics of people and then those objects take on a symbolic nature. This was apparent in our discussion of the many sub-cultures that are a part of Boise--each culture was represented by the objects that are consumed within that culture.

A couple of my favorite lines that incapsulate Williamson's argument: "Advertisements are selling us something else besides consumer goods: in providing us with a structure in which we, and those goods, are interchangeable, they are selling us ourselves"(190).

"Thus instead of being identified by what they produce, people are made to identify themselves with what they consume"(190).

"Advertising gives goods a social meaning so that two needs are crossed, and neither is adequately filled."

I had never considered before Williamson's ingenious commentary that in the world of advertising there is "a gap left where the speaker should be" and so "we are drawn in to fill that gap, so that we become both listener and speaker, subject and object"(190). In other words, the authority of advertising comes from ourselves! We consume the symbolic objects that best typify the 'social place' we wish to find ourselves in, or the social attributes we believe we possess or wish to possess.

II. Analysis

A class structure of social place based on consumption rather than production is an interesting phenomenon. What about knock-offs? Products that try to offer the same symbolic resonance of an object at a more affordable price to the masses? Do they in fact have the same results? What about those who believe they can see past the advertising hype--that they are not "consumerists"? Are they complicite (sp?) in the system in another way?

It is my perception that Williamson believes the structure of the advertising world to be a reality independent of any one group of people. I don't know if I buy this. Obviously in our capitalist society there are more products and advertisements than any one person can control, but I wonder if there is not a nucleus of people that sort of determines the direction of trends in the advertising world--and profits thereby.

III. Question

Why does Williamson say that material and non-material needs are crossed, neither is adequately filled? I agree that a material object does not have the power to fulfil a non-material need, but can't that object at least satisfy the material need?

Jameson's "Postmodernism and Consumer Society"

2007-10-23T12:39:00.000-06:00

Bill Schnupp

Abstract: “Postmodernism and Consumer Society”

I. Summary

Jameson opens his piece with an admission of the ambiguity that surrounds postmodernism, a concept that encompasses many forms of media: literature, visual and plastic arts, architecture, music, film, and “theoretical discourse,” that interdisciplinary and amorphous mode of inquiry popularized by Foucault and others. Jameson elaborates that postmodernism is a reaction against high modernism, forms of expression found irreverent and vulgar by the preceding generation, but which are now the “standard” against which the current generation rails. Similar to the ideas of Raymond Williams, Jameson cites a lack of division between high and low culture.

The author proceeds to offer two concepts that, for him, link postmodernism to late capitalism: pastiche and schizophrenia. Pastiche is essentially parody without the comic element, a form of “blank parody.” The idea of pastiche leads to a discussion of the death of the subject, which has two distinct perspectives: first, that in the ascension of the bourgeoisie as the hegemonic social class, individualism may have existed, but is no more in contemporary, homogenous society; second, that individualism is not only dead, but instead never existed—it is a myth. The conclusion Jameson leads to from this discussion is that modern art is dead; there is no originality, only perpetual copies of pre-existing elements and forms, or, pastiche, “to speak through the masks and with the voices of the styles in the imaginary museum” (196).

A prominent example of pastiche is the “nostalgia film,” films about the past and generational moments of that past. In a discussion that ranges from American Graffiti and Star Wars to Raiders of the Lost Ark and Chinatown, Jameson points out that nostalgia films are often less about the past and more about a false realism in which the past is sought through pop images and stereotypes of the past, with the original perpetually unattainable through our “incapability of achieving aesthetic representations of our current experience” (198).

Jameson then shifts his focus from nostalgia film to architecture,

a mutation in built space itself. . .the human subjects who happen into this new space, have not kept
pace with that evolution. . .we do not as yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new
hyperspace, as I will call it, in part because our perceptual habits were formed in that older kind of space
I have called the space of high modernism (198)

The specific example is the Bonaventure Hotel, a space that seeks to speak the sign system (Barthes anyone?) of the surrounding urban area. The Bonaventure is a total and enclosed space, with a reflective, disjunctive exterior and escalators/elevators that not only replace movement but serve as reflexive signs of movement. Jameson ends this discussion with a return to his definition of architecture, and uses it as a metaphor for the way human beings are caught in the “global and decentered communicational network.”

The piece concludes with the idea that postmodernism is necessary because it chronologically traces the break from a prior form. This break is not so much the emergence of new ideas, but rather a restructuring of preexisting elements; this displacement of the dominant by the secondary is important in the postmodern context because it has become the center of cultural production. Contemporary society finds little scandalous or repellent, central to high modernism. Moreover, what high modernists would have found repellent enjoys commercial success. Postmodernism is a product of post WWII capitalism, and a part of this production is the function of the media to relegate experience into the past as quickly as possible, as well as an open-ended questioning about the place and value of post-modern art.

II. Analysis

Let me start by saying that I find Jameson’s discussion of the two conceptions of the death of the subject to be incredibly depressing. There is no way that all possible combinations of elements and media have been used and are only recycled. I take his point to be more that operating within the hegemonic code may yield a finite limitation of elements and forms (though even that seems doubtful). What about Hall’s idea of the oppositional code, or the notion of infinite readings of a text we encountered in Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture? Conversely, I do find myself agreeing with Jameson’s idea of pastiche and nostalgia films—I’d wager we have all let our minds wander back to some over-idealized notion of our past at the behest of some particular film

I find myself questioning why we are so accepting of media forms that would have offended the previous generation. If we play along with Jameson’s definition of postmodernism as a restructuring of preexisting elements (reminds me a little of Johnson’s discussion of the breaks), it seems to me the reason postmodern society is so accepting of previously offensive forms of media seems obvious: they are not new, only old elements juxtaposed. It makes sense, but makes me question boundaries. How far can the limits be pushed? Or, if everything is only a matter of restructuring elements, has the boundary already been reached?

Honestly, I’m having some difficulty settling on what qualifies as Jameson’s discussion of his concept of schizophrenia: is it that we are so disjointed in out perception of time, either in the case of the nostalgia film, or our media’s contribution to our loss of past? Or, is it the great divergence in media forms that fall under the postmodern label? Can anybody help me here?

I also find Jameson’s choice of examples interesting, as he makes some interesting leaps; this rhetorical decision seems to effectively echo his assertion about the ambiguity and resistance surrounding postmodernism’s multi-media form.

III. Questions and Further Reading

1. How do you respond to Jameson’s two perspectives on the death of the subject?

2. Why do you think postmodern society is so much more tolerant of traditionally offensive media forms?

3. How do you respond to Jameson’s idea that the postmodern era is rooted in post WWII capitalism?

Links:

http://www.philosophynow.org/issue58/58kirby.htm

http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/jameson.htm

"Postmodernism and consumer society" By Fredric Jameson

2007-10-22T23:09:00.000-06:00

“Postmodernism and consumer society” by Fredric Jameson
Abstract by Patricia Little

Description

The essay entitled “Postmodernism and consumer society” by Fredric Jameson, attempts to clarify the concept of postmodernism. Jameson’s goal in this essay is to show how postmodernism is opposed to modernism in not just themes of art and literature, but also how these differences show themselves in the general culture.

For Jameson the postmodern has two main characteristics. Firstly, he believes that the postmodern is directly influenced by the negation of its previous epoch, modernism. In order for something to be postmodern it, “Emerge[s] as specific reaction against established forms of high modernism…This means that there will be as many different forms of postmodernism as there were high modernisms in place, since the former are at least initially specific and local reactions against those models” (192). And secondly, a key feature of postmodernism is that the lines between high and popular culture are gone or at least beginning to fade. This incorporation of high and mass culture can also be seen in other areas of discourse from philosophy to literature, where normal discourse theory has been replaced by “a kind of writing simply called ‘theory’ which is all or none of those things at once” (193). Jameson considers this phenomenon (which he calls ‘theoretical discourse’) to be a sign of postmodernism and an example of the merging culture.

In order to clarify his point he says he will discuss two examples that he labels “pastiche” and “schizophrenia”. He first undertakes to clarify the term pastiche from its closely related cousin parody. He plainly explains their difference as such, “Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a particular or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language; but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody’s ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists something normal compared to which what is being imitated is rather comic” (195).

Pastiche reflects postmodernism and our current social atmosphere by examining “death of the subject”, which is what Jameson refers to in his definition of pastiche being a humorless imitation of dead language. He explains that the modernists felt like they were doing something new, something individual. Jameson states, and he says many agree with him, that this sense of the individual in the postmodern is gone. This theory, that there is no longer individualism, has two main positions. First, because we are in an age of corporate capitalism, the “older bourgeois individual subject no longer exists” (195). This is in contrast with competitive capitalism that allowed for a sense of individualism in the modernist era. The second position is that the idea of individuality didn’t even exist in the past or in the modern era, it in fact never existed at all. The idea of the individual “is merely a philosophical and cultural mystification which sought to persuade people that they ‘had’ individual subjects and possessed this unique personal identity” (195).

Jameson feels that these two positions are beside the point. Regardless of these positions, if there is no longer individualism, then, Jameson feels, “it is no longer clear what artists and writers of the present period are supposed to be doing”(196). Everything that can be said has already been said. Artists today must only comment or reproduce past art. This will inevitably be a bad time for art, or as he puts it, “the failure of the new, the imprisonment in the past” (196).

To further his point he gives examples in film. He wants to make it clear that he is not just talking about high culture being dead, but also mass culture. To do this, he talks about nostalgia film, which he sees as remaking the past, namely pastiche. This is not only represented in what we would consider historical-type films. He gives the example of Star Wars, explaining that this is pastiche because the general construct of the film is directly mimicking the plots and provoking the same emotions of older films and TV shows of the 1930’s-1950’s.

Jameson further explains that this nostalgia/pastiche, as a representation of postmodernism, reflects a problem with the current cultures inability to represent their own time. We cannot see and feel our current existence for what it is, but are only able to relate to it through the past. Jameson says, “If there is any realism left here it is a ‘realism’ which springs from the shock of grasping that confinement and of realizing that, for whatever peculiar reasons, we seem condemned to seek the historical past through our own pop images and stereotypes about the past, which itself remains forever out of reach” (198).

From the discussion of pastiche and his film examples, Jameson moves to a critique of postmodern buildings. He is here trying to show that the same inability to feel the present as represented in nostalgia films, can be shown in our inability to relate to postmodern architecture.

As a result of our not being able to move into our new era, Jameson believes we are unable to match the “originality of postmodernist space” (198). The ability to have anything original in the postmodern era seems to contrast his previous point. However, Jameson makes his point, stating, “My implication is that we ourselves, the human subjects who happen into this new space, have not kept pace with that evolution; there has been a mutation in the object, unaccompanied as yet by any equivalent mutation in the subject; we do not yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace, as I will call it, in part because our perceptual habits were formed in that older kind of space I have called the space of high modernism” (198).

He illustrates this point with the example of the Bonaventure Hotel. Using the example of this ultra post-modern space he explains the various complexities and comments on how we just don’t get it. The result of this inability to understand the space results in it being changed, “recently, colour coding and directional signals have been added in a pitiful and revealing, rather desperate attempt to restore the coordinates of an older space” (201), one in which we would be more able to understand.

Jameson next moves to what he calls the new machine. In this example he uses the novel Dispatches by Michael Herr. He remarks that the novel, being highly innovative, remains postmodern. He uses this novel to explain a different space, postmodern warfare, that is equally innovative, and possibly we are to assume as misunderstood, as Portman’s building. His conclusion is, “In this new machine (shown in a Dispatches text example), which does not, like the older modernist machinery of the locomotive or the airplane, represent motion, but which can only be represented in motion something of the mystery of the new postmodernist space is concentrated” (203).

In conclusion, Jameson tries to tie all of his ideas of modernism and postmodernism to cultural production and consumer society. In his conclusion he argues that the main components that made modernism what it was, was that it was outwardly dismissed and hated by the masses. It was not part of the mass culture and was therefore able to be honest and real and showcase the individual. He seems to be saying that because current culture is marketed to the masses, this type of realism is not longer attainable. He says, “I believe that the emergence of postmodernism is closely related to the emergence of this new moment of late, consumer or multinational capitalism” (204). He is clearly dissatisfied with current culture and its constant obliging to the masses. Modernism was described as “critical, negative, contestatory, subversive, oppositional and the like” (205). Jameson wonders, and really hopes, that post modernism can find a way to do the same. If the current cultural trends were more subversive, it might allow for more individualism.

Comments

The definition that Jameson is able to construct of postmodernism is a very interesting one. This seems to be a time of various ideas of postmodernism, so it is nice to read an article that tries to both explain the concept and relate it to the general society. While it is nice get a theory, this one is definitely depressing. To actually believe that there is no original thought in our own era is incredibly depressing. While I am trying to fight this definition, while reading this essay and writing this abstract, I was not really able to think of anything current that could not be considered a remake or had it’s origin in the past. I am not giving up! While I may be entirely wrong, there just has to be some hope or some example of original thought. Can we think of any?

The essay itself is a bit difficult to understand and follow. I believe the reason for this is shown in the first endnote, “The present text combines elements of two previously published essays” (205). I don’t really know if the author put this together himself, or if it was done for him. However, after having read this note, the obvious structural problems of the essay seem to make more sense. The essay is generally hard to follow after “The nostalgia mode” section. Also, at the end of the first section he promises to give the description of his topic using two key features, pastiche and schizophrenia. We hear a lot of pastiche, but that is the last time we see the word schizophrenia.

Questions
Did anyone else find the structure or his examples a little difficult to understand under his general thesis?
Do we buy the idea that the postmodern can be basically described as not having an individual voice?
Does the problem really lie in the fact that our current culture seems to be permissive of about anything? That there not being a real point of contesting is the main problem?

Between holy text and moral void

2007-10-17T13:09:00.000-06:00

Abstract of “Between holy text and moral void” by Bhikhu Parekh

Abstract by Jenny Lowry

I. Description of Article

Bhikhu Parekh describes Salman Rushdie’s The satanic verses as a battleground between cultures. He begins by stating that non Bombayite persons will have a difficult time understanding the text, as will many readers familiar with its cultural background. In order to understand the text is must be read through Muslim eyes (140). It is a controversial text that greatly offends most Muslims because of its highly graphic and vulgar descriptions of sacred persons and traditions. Parekh argues that two chapters in the text are “fantasized history [because the stories] are fantasies, but fantasies relating to, deeply embedded in and severely hedged in by, history” (140). In other words, Rushdie is taking truth and weaving into fiction.

II. Comments and Questions

Parekh ties the novel to immigrants (I am assuming in Britain), particularly Muslim immigrants, whose “central life” is highly embedded “with the sacred” (141). He argues that the immigrant is “mocked” by the country they are living in and their sacred lives are stripped of dignity. It seems that Rushdie’s novel is essentially doing the same thing by mocking Muslim religious beliefs.

In order to cope with their situation the immigrants use “different strategies of physical and moral survival” (141). One strategy is cynicism in which the immigrant views everything negatively. The second strategy is a “retreat to the familiar certainties of the past” (141), usually their sacred beliefs. Parekh believes that all immigrants hold some level of these beliefs and Rushdie is no exception. This tension explains the controversial nature of The satanic verses. Rushdie is torn between two extreme emotions, which is why he lashes out at the Muslim religion in his text. It seems at this point in the article, that Parekh is arguing for Rushdie’s interpretation of the Muslim religion. He seems to support him in his quest for a “literary truth” even though he clearly defines the The satanic verses as a “fantasized history.” I am not sure what literary truth Parekh has found in the text, particularly since the next section of his article he focuses on two chapters which even he argues are especially offensive.

The two chapters are obviously belittling the Muslim religion. Parekh gives examples from the text (like the twelve wives of Muhammad as prostitutes) that are insulting to Muslims (as well as most other people I would think) and states that they are clearly vulgar and offensive. Even though Parekh argues that the text is disgusting and often times comes too close to describing real people in harmful ways, he still contends that the text is a “legitimate literary inquiry” and that “the offence caused to Muslims could therefore be ignored in the larger interests of truth” (143). Parekh even questions whether the text has provoked racism against Muslim immigrants and states that “religion requires a greater degree of sensitivity” (145), yet he still contends that the text has a “literary purpose” that must be explored. He argues that it is a writer’s responsibility to explain himself and his words, but at the end of the article he states that Rushdie should be left alone.

Parekh seems to be contradictory in his feelings about The satanic verses. Perhaps he is torn between cynicism and his sacred beliefs as he argues Rushdie is. The contradictory nature of this article in which he begins to seemingly support the text, then proceeds to rip it apart, then goes on to defend the author is distressful and confusing. It appears that Rushdie is helping to oppress his own people by mocking their religious and sacred beliefs through his text. The fact that Parekh is arguing for the texts “literary truth” seems to me that he agrees with Rushdie and is in a way acting to support this oppression. Parekh states that even though the Muslims “had no friends [and] felt intensely lonely and helpless” (146) due to the oppression caused by The satanic verses, they should step down and “leave Rushdie alone to ponder over it in peace and security, and hope that he will one day provide an answer that reconciles a creative writer’s right to freedom of thought and expression with other people’s right to respect and dignity” (146). I’m sorry, but that is a complete contradiction to Parekh’s previous statement that “[Rushdie] owed [the Muslims, his own people] an obligation to understand their feelings, to explain his position, to argue with them, to do all in his power to mollify and hopefully win them over to his point of view” (145).

While I have not read The satanic verses I can definitely see how it caused controversy. From what I have read in Parekh’s article it seems that Rushdie is, at the least, guilty of providing ammunition to oppress his own people. And in my opinion, Parekh seems to support this in light of seeking a “literary truth.”

Is Rushdie participating in the oppression of his people?
Is “literary truth” always worth the consequences?

Links

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Satanic_Verses_(novel)
http://muhammadanism.org/Quran/SatanicVerses.htm
http://www.answering-islam.org/Hahn/satanicverses.htm

“Subcultural Conflict and Working-class Community”

2007-10-16T12:34:00.000-06:00

Abstract of “Subcultural Conflict and Working-class Community” by Phil Cohen

Abstract by Diane Neu

I. Description of Article

Cohen discusses the issue of urban blight and re-population in urban London. He briefly contrasts this issue with the process and impact of gentrification in sought-after urban neighborhoods (think Boise’s North End). Cohen argues that the loss of desirable working-class housing was intimately tied to a loss of skilled working-class jobs. This loss of jobs and housing led to a loss of community and collective power in the East End. This loss of a unifying culture eventually led to a distancing of the youth culture from their parent culture. Cohen details some of these youth subcultures and ends by arguing that youth subcultures are a way for youth to retrieve “the solidarities of the traditional neighborhood, destroyed by redevelopment” (103).

II. Comments and Questions (note: I made up my own subtitles)

Redevelopment

Cohen begins by describing the impact that rapid development in the fifties had on urban neighborhoods. Cohen describes the scene as follows: the poorest families were relocated to these fringe neighborhoods, and the areas they left behind were taken up by immigrants who transformed the neighborhoods to suit their own culture. What is interesting is that Cohen sees the migration to the suburbs including two opposite ends of the spectrum – both the “families from the worst slums” and the “long-resident working-class families” fled the city for the suburbs (95). Two key urban neighborhoods were left in this wake: 1) the mostly run-down rental neighborhood with little community investment and 2) the posh, gentrified neighborhood typically composed of historical homes that housed hipsters/young professionals.

After seeing the migration of working-class families, the “planning authorities decided to reverse their policy,” and they began to focus on transforming the former “slum sites” (96). This transformation took the form of high-rise developments meant to house working-class families. This redevelopment led to “the impoverishment of working-class culture” (96). The high-rises were built without any consideration for quality of life or community interaction. As such, the buildings were purely built as spaces for storage, eating, sleeping, private time with family, etc. There was no outward social discourse. The second largest impact of the redevelopment was the destruction of the “matrilocal residence” (96). (Side note: I’m not so sure I would call that a bad thing – there is no way I would want to live with my mother now). Nuclear families no longer lived with or near their extended family, and the lack of a neighborhood community meant that nuclear families were isolated units. Cohen uses housebound mothers to demonstrate the impact of severed community ties. With little social interaction and no one to turn to, the mother becomes a bit like a caged animal, lashing out “on those nearest and dearest” (97). I would have personally liked some more specific statistics and/or personal anecdotes to round out this section. Cohen talks a lot about impact, but he never really gives specifics.

Redevelopment’s Economic Impact

The late fifties saw Britain recovering from WWII. During this time, they began to apply technologies developed during wartime to private sectors of the economy. Emphasis was placed on helping those industries that had suffered or stalled in previous years. This change in the blue-collar economy meant that “the small-scale family business was no longer a viable unit” (97). Jobs in the craft industry and other skilled working-class jobs were rapidly diminishing. The family business could not contend with the larger factories and large-scale box stores. Cohen points out that even if a small store was lucky enough to be able to compete with the larger businesses in terms of customer base, they could normally not afford the higher rents that came with bigger businesses moving into the neighborhood. The youth (I find that when Cohen says “youth,” he typically means male youth) just coming onto the job market had the hardest time adjusting – they could no longer find a job and work at it for their whole lives like their fathers had. As such, many of these youth were forced to move out of the community in order to find work. The only area of the East End economy that remained relatively untouched was dockland.

Cohen explains that the attempt to modernize life in the East End was “such a disaster” because of the larger “political, ideological, and economic framework” that was in place (98). The best pieces of land had to be sold to commercial interests in order to fund the housing developments. This, in turn, led to the small family businesses being forced out, which led to a loss of jobs and community industry. The necessity of selling land to commercial interests also cut out any “non-essential services” (98). Open green space, playgrounds, community centers, etc. were sacrificed in order to bring in more money. When this same situation presented itself in the nineteenth century, a large opposition voiced their concerns over these “tower” developments. However, this community voice was lacking when the same situation presented itself in the fifties and sixties because the “labour aristocracy, the traditional source of leadership” was now gone (99). When the skilled working-class jobs left, the people’s power left as well.

Class Structures and Other Social Matters

The loss of jobs and of a community voice had far-reaching social ramifications as well. Workers lost their power in a market controlled by the “new automated techniques” (99). Skilled laborers could no longer take satisfaction from their work since there was little work to be had, and their low economic status prevented them from participating in the new commercial enterprises that were springing up around their old neighborhoods. The group that felt this shift the most strongly was again the youth just entering adulthood. Young adults began to marry at an earlier age since this was the only way to escape the confines of nuclear family isolation. At this time, there was also an “emergence of specific youth subcultures in opposition to the parent culture” (100). These young adults found themselves struggling against the culture their parents had always lived and worked in. Although, it seems to me that it wasn’t so much a rebellion as an inevitable outcome. Their parent’s culture was essentially gone, so rebelling against it wouldn’t really make that big of a statement. I don’t really see it as an oppositional subculture but as a natural progression and evolution of the social structure. The main point that Cohen seems to want to make is that these subcultures of “mods, parkers, skinheads, crombies” developed because the youth were seeking to “retrieve some of the socially cohesive elements destroyed in their parent culture” (100).

Cohen specifies that “subcultures are symbolic structures, and must not be confused with the actual kids who are their bearers and symbols” (100). I’m not actually sure what he means by that. Is the subculture not something tangible and real? He seems to be saying that the subculture itself is more of an idea or symbol for larger issues at work and that the kids who participate in the subculture are merely actors. He further articulates that “a given lifestyle is actually made up of a number of symbolic subsystems, and it is the way these are articulated in the total lifestyle which constitutes its distinctiveness” (100). I’m pretty sure that there is something to do with Barthes and the whole signification/signified/signifier/sign process here. Cohen later says that “no real analysis of subculture is complete” without “a structural or semiotic analysis of the subsystems and the way they are articulated” (101). Somebody please figure out that equation for me. I understand the concept, but I have difficult putting the labels in the right places. Cohen specifies four distinct subsystems:

1. Dress
2. Music
3. Argot (slang/jargon)
4. Ritual

Cohen gives specific examples of how these subsystems worked in specific youth subcultures. He begins with the mods and moves through the parkers and scooter boys, skindheads, hippies, and crombies in chronological order. The process of developing subcultures is described as “circular,” and Cohen reasons that this is because the subculture can never entirely break away from the parent culture (101). The youth culture merely uses the subculture as a replacement form of their parent culture. The conflict between different subcultures “serves as a displacement of generational conflict, both at a cultural level, and at an interpersonal level within the family” (102). By participating in a subculture, the youth delay “real” adulthood for as long as possible while also trying to capture the solidarity that they have found missing in their parent culture.

III. Key Terms and Links

Development/redevelopment
Planning blight
Matrilocal residence
Social class/social structure/social mobility
Subculture
Parent culture

http://www.britannia.com/travel/london/cockney/index.html

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/East_End_of_London

http://www.towerhamlets.gov.uk/templates/index.cfm?CFID=11290757&CFTOKEN=13426026

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brick_Lane

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Borough_of_Tower_Hamlets

http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50054331?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casuals

"The Television Discourse - Encoding and Decoding"

2007-10-11T09:25:00.000-06:00

Abstract of “The Television Discourse – Encoding and Decoding” by Stuart Hall

Abstract by Diane Neu

I. Description of Article

Hall discusses the role of encoding and decoding from the vantage point of television production. He discusses the process of television production as a series of codes and signs that are constructed in order to relay specific messages. He also discusses the role that television production plays in encouraging a “preferred meaning or reading,” and he also discusses the issue of misreading signs. Hall ends by discussing three types of codes and how they affect the viewer’s connotative meaning. The codes are: dominant or hegemonic, professional, and negotiated.

II. Comments and Questions

Hall argues that television is structured to produce a specific message – this message is organized and transmitted through “the operation of codes” (28). These codes are structured to relay a certain message while adhering to the “rules” of language. The successful transmission of this message requires the traditional materials of television production – film, cameras, etc. Hall refers to these materials as “substratum,” and I am not entirely sure what he means by that. Is he saying that the message that these materials transmit replace the actual transmitter? The transmitter no longer exists – only the message matters? Or is the material merely transforming the message – the message is no longer pure because it must be transmitted through another material? I am not saying that I don’t necessarily agree with all that – I’m just not sure that’s what he is saying.

Hall explains encoding as the process where an event becomes a story – essentially, by being turned into “televisual language” the “raw historical event” becomes different because of the signs and rules of language that are now imposed on it. I think he’s trying to say something about the difference between watching a newscast of an event and watching the TV version – like Band of Brothers or something. I’m really not sure what the argument is here. I have a lot of trouble following the process of encoding. What are these rules that he is talking about?

The communicative exchange (in television) is described as a sort of linear, closed circuit process where the broadcasting organizations, who already have rigid “institutional structures and networks of production” organize certain “routines and technical infrastructures” (29). These routines and infrastructures are necessary “to produce the programme” (29). I’m not sure if Hall means “programme” as just a 30-minute television program or in the method sense of the word – like a program of study or a program of events. Maybe both. The production process initiates the message that the program is broadcasting. Hall is clear that “production and the reception of the television message are not identical, but they are related” (29). He further explains that while production and reception are linked, they are still separate parts of the communicative process. Hall uses the formulaic TV Western to explain how certain discourses are heavily encoding with certain rules, content expectations, etc. The Western is a good example of a televisual language where the message being decoded by the viewer is likely to be “highly symmetrical to that in which it had been encoded” (29). It is a more straightforward discourse where the expectations of the view are inline with the intentions of the producers.

Visual Sign

Is a picture of a cow the same as an actual cow? Is it an actual urinal or a sculpture of a urinal? That’s the complex nature of visual signs. Every visual sign is encoded with numerous amounts of information – the “fundamental perceptual codes which all culture-members share” (31). Visual signs are more universal. While it can be easy to think that visual signs, because of their universality, are simple and straightforward, they can actually lead to misreadings because they appear so transparent and easy to read. We assume that the image is only saying one thing – we oversimplify the decoding process by assuming that the visual sign is empty of connotative meaning.

Connotative Sign

Visual signs are also connotative signs. The connotative sign of the visual sign is the “point where the denoted sign intersects with the deep semantic structures of a culture, and takes on an ideological dimension” (31). The connotative sign represents that point in culture where the word means something else on its own because of the perceptual codes that the word represents. Hall uses advertising as an example of a visual sign that is nearly void of denotative communication. The visual signs in advertising are full of connotative communication. Every aspect of the ad “ ‘connotes’ a quality, situation, value, or inference” (31). Hall then describes three different kinds of connotative reading: dominant or hegemonic code, professional code, and negotiated code.

Dominant or Hegemonic Code

The viewer is operating within the dominant or hegemonic code when they take the message “full and straight” (32). They read the message entirely as the maker intended it.

Professional Code

The viewer is operating within the professional code when they receive the message transmitted by a broadcasting professional. This message may be highly similar to the dominant code, but it may also contradict it is some ways. The professional code is highly linked to the dominant code, and while “the professional code is ‘relatively independent’ of the dominant code,” it still “operates within the ‘hegemony’ of the dominant code” (32). The professional code is tied to the dominant code since the controllers of the dominant code also control the news reporters, producers, etc. However, these broadcasting professionals are still able to spin the dominant code if they so choose. I think a good example of this would be when the Bush administration sends out a press release, brief, etc. Taking that message “full and straight” would be to read it as a dominant code. Some broadcasting professionals (Fox news) may deliver the message as almost identical to the dominant code, whereas other news professionals may take a different spin on it – entering the professional code. At least that’s what I think he’s saying.

Negotiated Code

The viewer is operating within a negotiated code when they acknowledge some aspects of the dominant code (usually those aspects that are removed from their immediate community), while also disagreeing with aspects of the dominant code that might negatively impact them personally. Hall gives the example of a worker agreeing that a bill to restrict union rights might make sense from a national economics viewpoint. However, that doesn’t mean that the worker won’t ardently oppose the ramifications the bill when it impacts his own salary and working conditions.

III. Key Terms and Links

Message
Substratum
Encoding
Decoding
Communicative event
Preferred Meaning
Connotative sign
Dominant or hegemonic code
Professional Code
Negotiated Code

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substratum

If this link doesn’t work, search for “linguistic substratum” on JSTOR. It’s the first article that comes up: “Linguistic Substrata of American English” by E. C. Hills I couldn’t figure out how to hyperlink to a subscription based service.
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.boisestate.edu/view/00031283/ap020212/02a00030/0?currentResult=00031283%2bap020212%2b02a00030%2b0%2c0F&searchUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fsearch%2FBasicResults%3Fhp%3D25%26si%3D1%26gw%3Djtx%26jtxsi%3D1%26jcpsi%3D1%26artsi%3D1%26Query%3Dlinguistic%2Bsubstratum%26wc%3Don

At one point Hall quotes Gerbner – I’m guessing he was talking about this guy: http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2881)

This is from the computer side of things:
http://www.sitepoint.com/article/guide-web-character-encoding

Williams' "Culture is Ordinary"

2007-10-08T22:25:00.000-06:00

Bill Schnupp

Abstract: Raymond Williams’ “Culture is Ordinary”

I. Summary

Williams opens his piece with a short account of revisiting his childhood home in Wales, accompanied by a brief recollection of his personal history—a rhetorical strategy he employs with frequency in the piece, and not unlike what we saw in Miller’s work. From here, Williams presents us with the notion that a society is forged from its members’ formation of common meanings and directions, its growth actively debated under the pressures of experience, contact, and discovery. This definition serves as segue into the main idea, that culture is ordinary, composed of two distinct parts: “the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested” (6).

To further his point, the author delivers and refutes two conceptions of culture he has encountered: I call them “down-the-nose,” and “bad-mouthing.” Those in the first example (teashop culture) are committed to the notion that the only culture is high culture—art, music, literature, etc. Williams rejects this notion for what it is, a means of maintaining a power division between cultivated and common folk, and adds that he has encountered fine examples of art in the company of so-called common people. Williams’ second rejected notion of culture is at the opposite end of the spectrum. The bad-mouthers, like those in the teashop, perceive (and are threatened by) culture as solely high culture, and label such work that of do-gooders and highbrows.

From here, Williams transitions into a brief discussion of some of the ideas of Marx and Leavis that have come to shape his own thinking. From the Marxists, Williams extracts three principles, only the first of which he accepts: culture must be interpreted through its underlying systems of production; education and hence power are restricted to those in power; and new systems of production create new culture, thought, and art. Willams refutes the second notion by stating that the working class are not restricted, but are instead gaining access to institutions of learning (as Williams himself did) and developing there own culture. English bourgeois culture has no elitist monopoly on culture, and in fact, future cultural development could do no better than to emphasize working class values neighbourhood, mutual obligation, and common betterment. The final Marxist idea is rejected on the premise that a culture is a tapestry of individual and collective meanings, of personal and social experience, and as such are living and ever-changing, impossible to dictate through a change in systems of production.

Williams then moves on to Leavis, whose idea, that as England has became industrialized and vulgar, art and thinking have suffered, Williams also rejects (though with difficulty). The basis of the rejection is in Williams’ working class roots: he and his family view the technological advances and easing of labor from industrialization as an advantage, a newly acquired from of power. This leads Williams to his suggestion of how we can move into an age of economic abundance and productive common culture: by disproving two false equations, one false analogy, and one false proposition.

The proposition is that ugliness and pollution are a price all cultures must pay for the economic power that comes from industrialization. Williams posits cleaner, less-abrasive technology and responsible industry as a solution.

The equations are that popular education gives rise to commerical culture, and that consumption of popular culture bespeaks a flawed character. Williams interprets both equations as essentially a flaw in perception. The over-crowding of industrialization, coupled with mass communication, led to the construction of “the masses,” a threat for its unfamiliarity. According to Williams, then, there are no masses, only ways of constructing people as such. This manner of thinking is what imbued popular education, and popular culture—the culture of the threatening masses—with its stigma. Along with this comes the discussion of the false analogy, which is that bad culture will drive out good culture. Williams cites rising instances of literature, quality periodicals, and literacy to debunk this idea. The author ends the piece with the idea that culture and its inherent elements are expanding, and that this phenomenon must be studied.

II. Analysis

This piece seems to me less a description of the idea of a common culture and more an account of how Williams formed this idea through the rejection of many of the ideas of Marx and Leavis. However, the oddly altruistic manner in which Williams refutes these ideas is interesting: he does not characterize them as useless simply because he disagrees with them, but instead closes his work with emphasis on how important the ideas are, how they have come to shape his own inquiry into the expansion of culture. It’s strange: the ideas he has no use for are those that have served to most powerfully shape his thinking. His idea of common culture is compelling, and echoes other readings from this semester—culture is not elitist and compartmentalized, but a continual negotiation of power via interactions, texts, and ideas.

I’m a little confused about the page 9 rejection of the Marxist notion that altering systems of production spawns new culture and thought. I may just be misreading the text, but if we accept Williams’ notion of culture—negotiations of meanings and directions, both known and unknown—then the change that came about from the industrialization (change in production from the rural and agricultural) of the author’s village in Wales does seem to have produced cultural change, as it delivered “the gift of power that is everything to men who have worked with their hands” (10). New meanings, ideas, possibly even art can’t help but arise from that kind of drastic change. Maybe someone can help me out?

I also respond to Williams’ use of the personal in this piece. He constantly emphasizes his working class roots (I enjoy it) to establish his ability to make use of both this perspective, and that of the academic, sort of a dual expert voice. There are places, however, where I question if he relies too much on the personal to stand as evidence (on page 13 he disproves the deleterious effects of popular culture by talking with family members). Above all, I think he draws on the personal, on his “common roots,” to distance himself from the bourgeois class, of which he is, in many places, disdainful. I wonder a little at how incongruous this is with his assertion that culture is common, ordinary, and shared. Why emphasize the division in light of this idea? If we all share a common culture, can there be a division?

Making another attempt at Bathes here: does anyone else feel that Williams two-part model of culture “the known meanings and directions, which its members are trained to; the new observations and meanings, which are offered and tested” (6), seems to qualify as linguistic/denotative (accepted/known) and mythological/connotative (new observations and meanings)?

III. Questions and Further Reading

1.What do you make of Willams’ definition of culture?

2. How do you respond to Williams’ treatment of the ideas of Marx and Leavis?

3. Is Williams rhetorical decision to employ the personal effective? Why or why not?

Links:

http://www.raymondwilliams.co.uk/

http://www.museum.tv/archives/etv/W/htmlW/williamsray/williamsray.htm

http://pubpages.unh.edu/~dml3/880williams.htm

Raymond Williams: “Culture is Ordinary”

2007-10-08T21:39:00.000-06:00

by Mike Peterson

DESCRIPTION

In this essay, Williams takes us to his roots, his rural Welsh home, to give us an understanding of why he dislikes current (as of 1958) interpretations of culture. Williams believes that culture should be defined as both (rather than distinguished between) a whole way of life with its common meanings, as well as the processes of discovery and creativity in the arts and learning.

The two prevailing senses of culture that Williams dislikes are what he loosely labels as Teashop culture, and Drinking-hole culture.
1. Teashop culture: “The outward and emphatically visible sign of a special kind of…cultivated people” (7).
2. Drinking-hole culture: The folks who exclude the ethical content of culture and emphasize the purely technical standard—the new cheapjack who uses “scraps of linguistics, psychology and sociology to influence what he thinks of as the mass mind” (7).

Williams says that while he respects Leavis and the Marxists, he must disagree with their views of culture. Williams discusses the three Marxist ideas that “matter” in the discussion of culture:
1. That culture must be interpreted by its underlying system of production,
2. That the masses are considered “ignorant,”
3. And that for socialism to succeed, a person must write, think and learn in “certain prescribed ways” (9).

Williams goes on to say that Leavis knows more about “real relations between art and experience” than the Marxists. Williams, however, doesn’t like the dichotomy that Leavis places on pre and post industrial-revolution culture: old vs. new, valuable vs. cheap, pure vs. vulgar. Williams defends these advances in culture and technology by asking how such things are bad for society. He doesn’t imagine anyone who has ever done without these things (e.g. aspirin or electricity) would ever go back to the old ways. It is a myth of simpler times.

But then William asks, if we can defend these “good” advances, how do we answer the problem of the “new cultural vulgarity” of strip newspapers, cheapjacks, and raucous triviality? (11). To answer this question, he says, we must first debunk the legacy left by cultural critics, specifically the legacy of 2 false equations, 1 false analogy, and 1 false proposition:

False proposition: Ugliness is the price we pay for new sources of power, production, transportation, and communication.
Defense: These new sources of power may be ugly at first, but they will eventually “make England clean and pleasant again” (11).

False equation one: Popular education is responsible for the new commercial culture (11).
Defense: “There are in fact no masses, but only ways of seeing people as masses” (11).
Defense: The assumption that popular education and commercial culture are cause and effect is based on Northcliffe’s correlation of the Education Act of 1870 and the rise of the “new cheap and nasty (popular) press”—the latter, Williams argues, comes from the “social chaos of industrialism” and not the masses becoming literate—there were, after all, already more than enough literate people before the Education Act to have sustained a popular press (12).

False equation two: Popular culture accurately reflects the mind, feeling, and quality of living of its consumers (12).
Defense: his observation of folks who consume popular culture indicated that one doesn’t reflect the other.

False Analogy: “Just as bad money will drive out good, so bad culture will drive out good” (13).
Defense: The increase in bad culture doesn’t mean a decrease in good culture. Culture expands, and with it all its elements.

Williams concludes that this is a starting point. The ideas of Leavis and the Marxists need to be radically revised, and it is time to start asking the real questions about the social and economic problems raised by culture’s relative rate of expansion.

KEY TERMS:

Putropia: The characteristic 20th-century “opposite” of a Utopian romance: the stories of a future secular hell. Zamyatin's We, Huxley's Brave New World, Orwell's 1984, and Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451 are the most famous examples. Putropia, however, stops a little short of Doomsday. Doomsday is the immensely popular genre which, with considerable ingenuity and variety, disposes of life altogether. (Definition culled from an essay found at http://www.depauw.edu/sfs/documents/williams.htm).

Cheapjack: peddler of cheap, low-taste goods (for more info, visit www.walmart.com).

COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS

Favorite line: “So when the Marxists say that we live in a dying culture, and that the masses are ignorant, I have to ask them, as I asked them then, where on earth they have lived” (9).
I haven’t thought of it in these terms, but when I studied Marxism in the past (not the Terry Eagleton variety, but the yawn-inducing essays from my Political Ideologies course), I had a hard time envisioning who these ignorant masses were. They certainly weren’t to be found in my daily adventures. Ignorant people abound, but it hardly seemed accurate to pigeonhole an entire “mass” that way.

I liked reading about the false equation number two: that popular culture is an accurate reflection of the consumer. I think this is an important debate still going on today, especially when it comes to censorship. Wayne Booth, in his book The Company we Keep brought up this idea in his argument against censorship: just because a person reads about violent events, that doesn’t mean she will turn around and mimic those events, nor does it mean that the book is a reflection of her inner desires or vulgarities. A person can read Huck Finn, he says, without feeling the slightest inclination to walk away and use the word nigger, nor would seeing the word in print over a hundred times make him any more of a racist than he was before. It made me think of a well-spoken, educated, respectful business man turning on his I-Pod and listening to Snoop-Dog on his way to work, or a bored mom turning on Grand Theft Auto to take her mind off things. I’m sure the psychoanalysts would have plenty to say about this, but I bet their conclusion would be similar to Williams: you can hardly define a person by what they consume. Or would they say that’s the only way you can define a person?

When Williams talks about the two senses of culture in the beginning, I understand the first group, the teashop culturists, but the second group is a little fuzzy to me. Is the distinction between the groups the same as distinguishing between intellectuals vs. anti-intellectuals? Or high vs. low culture?

Humphreys Abstract

2007-10-02T11:44:00.000-06:00

Abstract of Sal Humphreys “Productive Players: Online Computer Games’ Challenge to Conventional Media Forms”
2005

by Tyson Livingston

Description of Article
In this article, Humphreys attempts to articulate the online computer game, specifically the Massive Multiplayer Online Game (MMOG) EverQuest, as a new form of interactive media. She indicates that because players act as producers within the game, it creates an ever-evolving text, with multiple versions being created simultaneously based on the input of players across a vast world and variety of servers. She also indicates that production on the part of the players is composed not only of text, but of relationships and community. She feels that our current laws and structure of copyright and intellectual property are not sufficient to regulate this type of producer/consumer relationship. In addition, she explores the power relations inherent within the MMOG, both between players and publisher, and between players and players, as well as the ethics of the commodification of these online communities.

The article is composed of several sections: the unlabeled introduction; What is New about EverQuest and its Genre?; Productive Players, Implications: Intellectual Property, Regulation, Commerce, and Culture; How Far can Intellectual Property Take Us?; The Regulation of Social Space; Power and Free Labour; and Conclusion.

Key Terms
MMOG (Massive Multi-Player Online Game): EverQuest would probably now be classified as a MMORPG (Massive Multi-Player Online Role-Playing Game)
Intellectual Property (Not to be confused with Internet Protocol. In discussions of technology the abbreviation of IP often refers Internet Protocol Address. This caused me a brief moment of confusion when she started talking about IP in terms of the EULA)
EULA (End User License Agreement)
Community
Avatar
Consumption
Production
Player Investment
Guild

Comments and Questions:

The first two sections of the piece, the introduction and What is New about EverQuest and its Genre didn’t really stir up too many questions for me. My only real main problem here was one of definition. As a player of EverQuest, and someone who has obviously invested themselves heavily in the game, Humphreys has a tendency to use “game” terms liberally with little definition, i.e. trade skills, mob, guild, etc. While she provides enough definition and explanation of the game in general to get a grasp on the subject matter, I don’t think that the average reader that does not already possess some knowledge of these type of games would feel the resonance with these terms that Humphrey is trying to evoke, and obviously feels herself. In addition, it took me a while to get a real concrete idea of what she meant when she referred to the productivity of the players. After reading several pages, I came across the statement that, “Players are creators of the text; community and networks of relationships, systems of governance and norms; relationships with other players; and characters” (41). This seemed to sum up the most important part of what Humphreys is concerned about, although it still fails to include other aspects she has spoken of such as websites, and snap-in or secondary applications designed to assist players “in-game.”

My real problems with her argument begin to arise when she starts discussing the problems inherent in creating a community within a private sphere (42). She makes it sound as if this type of situation is a new thing. Communities within private spheres have always existed and often share a symbiotic relationship with their texts, even if they do not have the “real-time” response of Internet communication. Religious communities often have a private nature with rules that govern behavior and “production.” They also have texts, some of which are contemporary and are influenced by the leaders, and congregations of their particular sphere. Professional organizations form a similar situation, some of which are sponsored by corporations and have as their goal the generation of continuous “text” which is reactionary and developmental to their particular field. These organizations have dues and oftentimes generate revenue for the sponsoring organization. Microsoft is a prime example of this with their certification and professional programs.

Many other examples of this type of relationship exist. Talk radio has had a very similar relationship, with a host and production company acting as the publisher, and callers as the user/producers. Oftentimes a sense of community develops around different talk shows as regular callers and listeners begin to appear. In addition, the pen and paper-based role-playing community has been embroiled with these issues for over twenty years, with questions of community-generated intellectual property as the subject of lawsuits and debate.

Her generalization that “This is not an online chat room or email list community. The game adds specific layers of rules, governance, fantasy, goals, and constraints” (42) is also somewhat of a fallacy. Most chat or email distribution list communities have strict rules, goals, and constraints, just like an online game. Humphreys continues to stress this issue by pointing out the existence of the EULA, and the power given to the publisher to close accounts and block access if a player does not conform to the guidelines and usages stipulated by the game company. However, even though she mentions that players willingly play the game and follow the rules, she downplays the reality that the license agreement is essentially a contract. EULAs exist in a variety of contexts to govern the legal use of software and the generation of intellectual property. For example, Microsoft’s MSDNAA program allows universities (the community) to obtain certain software packages (the text) for free. This promotes the use of the software in industry (hence the economic benefit), but Microsoft puts strict guidelines on how the MSDNAA software can be used and what can be produced with it, and essentially place restrictions on intellectual property. This situation is similar to that argued by Humphreys. Furthermore, if Humphreys wants to compare game players to unpaid laborers (45), then the EULA becomes the contract of their employment, just as it would for any volunteer employee of a corporation or organization.

Overall, I believe that the points Humphrey’s brings up regarding the interaction between community, media, and commerce to be interesting, as well as her questions regarding the power relations between the game players and the publisher and between each other. However, I think that her insistence that these relationships are a wholly new construct resulting from the MMOG is inaccurate. I believe it would be better described as an evolution, or perhaps even a culmination, of these relationships and power structures in a new media. Furthermore, I believe that her analysis needs further exploration of how copyright laws specifically treat computer code and applications, as well as ownership of Internet resources, both virtual and physical.

Abstract on Humphreys

2007-10-02T00:08:00.000-06:00

Abstract of Sal Humphreys’s “Productive Players: Online Computer Games’ Challenge to Conventional Media Forms” 2005
By Bridgett VanDerwalker
Description of Article:
Humphreys begins the article by discussing how online games are part of the genre of interactive media. As such, the terms intellectual property and copyright material should be broaden to fit both the player’s rights and those of those of the producers of the online games. Humphreys discusses the complex nature of the time, labor, and social connections that players’ commit to the game that results in the blurry line between production and consumption.
In the latter half of the article she raises the question of whether players have a right to sell their characters for profit when the producers provide all the resources to build those characters. Humphreys concludes the article with the statement that interactive media needs to be researched more so we can better understand the relationship between gamers/producers and the line between where consumption and manufacturing ends in such a complex environment.
Key terms:
Massive Multiplayer Online Games: (MMOG)
Regulation
Production
Intellectual Property
Comments and Questions:
Humphreys starts by telling the audience her purposes of writing the article starting with the need of study in interactive media. She notes that new methods need to be employed to study such complex relationships and that the games are changed and manipulated by those who play the games unlike traditional media forms. Gamers are allowed to established social connections with one another, which the players have a “configurative role,” and the “producer/consumer trajectory” is very complex and complicated. This last sentiment leads to the main discussion that being the “disruption in the areas of Intellectual Property, content, regulation, and the relationship between commerce and culture” (38).
The most interesting observation that Humphreys makes is that the gamers using the product by their very actions are creating it also. She also says that the gaming environment is a present-medium and it is for this reason perhaps that the environment is constantly being created by the players themselves. Juul says that “the player is the performer and the game evaluates the performance (and adapts to it)”(38). I agree with this statement as a person who lives with two heavy game players of WOW (World of War craft) I see the game adapt itself and see the relationships my roommates have with other gamers in the gaming environment.
It is interesting that within the virtual environment that players have goals that they hone such as killing monsters, developing trades, and gaining weapons, money, or magic. One issue that Humphreys fails to mention is that these players are playing these games not only for social relationships but for entertainment, in particular, escaping reality. I think this is an important point in why these players play the game and why it is so popular in the first place. The idea that raids are set up by using social networking skills is fascinating and encouraging in that these people are meeting people all around the world and contributing to the ongoing process of globalization.
Humphreys states that “The trajectory of gameplay is thus contingent upon the particular dynamics and action generated by shifting combinations of players” (40). She goes on to name these contributions such as money to play the game, time, and social connections with others. She goes on to describe how these games spawn other websites that give hints to new players or act as forums to organize guilds or plan raids.
Humphreys turns her attention to the sponsors that own these games. She talks about how publishers want to keep these games going so they gain revenue. These publishers have no personal investment in these games outside the financial gains and it seems to be once the game is initially released it is up to the players to build the gaming environment and keep it going and evolving. Based on this point alone I think Humphreys has a point that perhaps the players themselves should have more rights especially in the realm of Intellectual property. Without their continued efforts the game would fail and thus both the gamers and the publishers would lose. She poses a good question. “Can corporations own people’s relationships and communities? Who has what forms of power in this configuration of a media space?” (42). I don’t see where she reaches a definitive answer to these questions but I don’t think are easy answers to these questions either.
Humphreys talks about how players by agreeing to play and pay for their rights to play the game give up ownership rights and IP rights. She makes the point that perhaps this is not fair for this new media because there are no clear lines of where production begins and ends and where consumerism begins or ends as the players develop the game as they play it. She sees that these corporations are perhaps being exploitive of the players’ emotions and in essence owning their social relations. I think Humphreys does a really good job in covering the issue from multiple viewpoints and how she remains impartial for the most part. I think she does a good job in saying that the boundaries of production and consumerism needed to be reexamined in light of this new media.
Humphreys closes the essay by saying: “Protections need to be provided in a manner that ensures the rights of participates are not infringed by corporate practices, at the same time recognizing the needs of companies to facilitate engaging and healthy communities” (49). As new technologies emerge these questions will need to be addressed and it is up to the users to bring their insights and concerns to the attention of the publishers or produces of such products or resources. We are only now exploring how the Internet is impacting our social relationships and I think as the years progress it will be increasingly important to research the many intricacies that this media hold not only culturally but academicallyalso.

Seemed appropriate

2007-10-01T22:34:00.000-06:00

A link to NPR's coverage of the 50th anniversary of West Side Story. I don't know if this will add anything to your reading of the Miller piece, but I thought it was interesting either way.

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14732874&ps=bb4

Abstract of "Seeing Beyond Believing"

2007-09-27T12:25:00.000-06:00

Abstract of “Seeing Beyond Belief: Cultural Studies as an Approach to Analysing the Visual” by Martin Lister and Liz Wells

Abstract by Diane Neu

I. Description of Article

Lister and Wells divide their article up into the following five sections: “Introduction,” “Analysis,” “Looking: Form and Meaning,” “Looking: Recognition and Identity,” and “Conclusion.”

Lister and Wells begin by describing what Cultural Studies is before moving into a more detailed analysis of photographs. They describe their process for analyzing photographs and their reasons for analyzing photographs. The importance of asking certain questions about the photograph is stressed. After analyzing photographs from a more social angle, Lister and Wells attempt to look at photographs as more isolated images. The question of what an image means by itself is raised. They then discuss the role of the viewer in greater detail. The viewer can be seen as voyeuristic, and the creator of the image can be seen as catering to that voyeurism in order to send a specific message or to evoke a certain feeling. Lister and Wells conclude by remarking that “the photographic image, is, then, a complex and curious object” (90). Using methods of Cultural Studies can only help one in the process of analysis.

II. Comments and Questions

Introduction:

The introduction begins by describing what exactly Cultural Studies is. According to Lister and Wells, Cultural Studies analyzes “the forms and practices of culture” (61). They take care to note that this study looks at more than just obvious artifacts of culture – it also studies the relationship and power dynamic that these “forms and practices” have in relation to society. They also note that the “culture” in Cultural Studies refers to “everyday symbolic and expressive practices” (61). It is not merely concerned with the study of high culture. Essentially, Cultural Studies must look at society and culture as a whole in order to understand it. Relationships must be studied, understanding the role of institutions is key, and attempting “to separate the cultures of everyday life from practices of representation, visual or otherwise” is futile (61).

After explaining the timeframe which Cultural Studies mainly concerns itself with (“mainly those of the late eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries”), the article explains that one of the main features of Cultural Studies is “the search to understand the relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and meaning, to social processes and institutions” (61). Looking at how everything in culture is intricately connected and how those connections lead to distributions of power is a key component of Cultural Studies. Cultural Studies also seeks to challenge the idea that those distributions of power are something that just naturally exists. There is no “just because” or “that’s just how it is naturally” in Cultural Studies.

Lister and Wells talk about two areas of study related to Cultural Studies: Media Studies and Visual Cultural Studies. “The study of advertising, popular cinema and television” are all examples of Media Studies, while Visual Cultural Studies seems to be primarily interested in the study of images (photographs) and how these images relate to everyday life and experience (62). This actually confused me a little, since the two seemed so similar and linked. In some ways, Visual Cultural Studies and Media Studies seem like the exact same thing, especially since media today is so visual. It was hard for me to discern the exact differences as Lister and Wells don’t go into the methodology of Media Studies in great detail. Media Studies is apparently more concerned with the Communication Studies aspect of thing.

They were also very clear that while Media Studies and Visual Cultural Studies are related to Cultural Studies, they are not just sub-fields of Cultural Studies. They are their own distinct fields of study. This also kind of confused me sine I felt that the Cultural Studies that they described on the first page of the article could easy be an umbrella for these other two fields of study. I’m not sure if I agree that Visual Cultural Studies in particular is wholly separate from Cultural Studies. Later on in the article they refer to Cultural Studies and Media Studies as a “compound field” (63). That is, the two are interdisciplinary and related. So, which is it? Are they separate or are they merged? Are they just related like how anthropology and sociology are related or are they part of the same field like mechanical engineering and civil engineering?

Lister and Wells then explain the methodology that they will be using to analyze photographs in the rest of the essay. They seek to analyze the photographs “without separating them from social processes” (64). They then provide a list of the seven main features that they will employ in their analysis (I will not repeat it here). These main features of their analysis serve to clarify their interest in the photograph and the methods they will use in studying the photograph. Many of the points are “recognition” points. Essentially, they are recognizing the human element of their research. They can never be entirely neutral or without bias.

Analysis:

When looking at an image, we must first ask the location of the image. Answering this question “will tell us much about how we meet or encounter the image” (65). We must then ask why the photograph is being looked at. What is the viewer seeking to get out of the viewing process? Lister and Wells use an example of a Marlboro cigarette advertisement. The advertisement exists in two forms: on a billboard and as a smaller ad in magazines and newspapers. This change of format impacts the viewing experience of the ad. The billboard is forced upon them, while the viewer selects the magazine ad (via them selecting the magazine). There are different questions to be asked in both contexts. I understood the basic concept here, but I disagreed with it a little. I don’t necessarily see the magazine ad as being “selected” by the viewer. They have no control over the ad material in the magazine. On the same side, you could argue that the billboard viewers could simply decide to not drive past the billboard. Of course, all this brings us back to questions of structuralism. Can we just decide to not look at the billboard or not read the magazine? I’m not sure that we can.

The production of the photograph must also be analyzed. How the image arrived at its location is a question that must be asked. Was the photo staged? Candid? What was the motive behind placing it in its current location? The Marlboro ad is clearly part of “the Philip Morris company’s wider marketing and advertising strategies” as this ad is “a response to the early 1990s ban on advertising cigarettes on British television” (69). So part of analyzing the photograph or advertisement entails understanding the process behind the photograph. What kinds of strategies have been employed? What shifts in cultural understanding is the photograph addressing?

Looking: Form and Meaning:

In this section, Lister and Wells address the issue of looking at an image by itself – without thinking about where it came from, etc. What does the image say on its own? Lister and Wells admit that attempting to do this can raise “difficult and vexed questions about the boundaries of an image” (70). Interestingly, at this point the image is also referred to as a “text.” They then explain five main ways of looking at a photograph unto itself that they refer to as types of conventions:

1. Pictorial conventions
2. Semiotics and codes
3. Photographic conventions
4. Social conventions
5. Power and photographic conventions

I didn’t really see these conventions and codes as being distinct from each other (and Lister and Wells don’t seem to intend them to be), but rather as building upon and relating to one another.

Looking: Recognition and Identity:

This section discusses looking from the viewer’s perspective. How has the artist cued the viewer to look at the image? Where is the viewer in relation to the image? Lister and Wells posit that in photography these visual cues are given through the use of camera techniques, different lenses, etc. They create the viewing experience for the viewer. These photographic techniques were “developed and adjusted in order to take on perspectival conventions already established within Western art” (83). Lister and Wells then go on to discuss some of these techniques in greater detail. The role of the viewer as voyeur is also discussed. What kind of pleasure does the viewer derive from the viewing experience? Was that pleasure intended on the part of the creator? I personally found this to be really interesting. I think that a lot of people tend to think of photography as a more “pure” art form. They think of it as a true representation of an image occurring in real life, but photography is capable of cultural distortion. We see it everyday in magazines and advertisements. There is no such thing as “what you see is what you get” in photography. For instance, the photograph of the biscuit-cutter sheep may be trying to appeal to “those of use who draw rural England into our sense of national identity” (88). The creator of the image may be trying to appeal to the viewer’s personal memories, sense of things lost, appreciate for rural landscape, etc. It’s the British meets Betty Crocker version of the Paris Match cover.

Conclusion:

Lister and Wells call on Barthes in their conclusion. They credit Barthes with drawing “our attention to the fleeting nature of the moment captured in the photograph” (89). Therefore, we must acknowledge that the photograph does not tell the whole story. The picture is not complete. We must aim to thoroughly analyze the photograph in the aforementioned ways in order to gain a greater understanding of the image. The essay then ends with a sort of defense of Cultural Studies. They admit that Cultural Studies is a field that borrows liberally from other fields, but they argue that while this is “a point of criticism,” it is “simultaneously its strength” (90). I didn’t really understand the point of begging their case again at the end, since I felt they had done that pretty thoroughly in the introduction.

III. Key Terms

Cultural Studies
Media Studies
Visual Cultural Studies
Convention(s)
Gaze
Voyeur/voyeurism
Viewing position

Abstract of "Seeing Beyond Belief"

2007-09-27T10:54:00.000-06:00

Description of Article
I really enjoy this article because of its straightforward approach of explaining cultural studies as applied to visual artifacts. To begin with, Lister and Wells offer a definition of Cultural Studies in general: "...an academic field [...] interested in the enabling and regulating institutions, and less formal social arrangements, in and through which culture is produced, enacted and consumed" (61). I am surprised that this definition doesn't include mention of the artifacts themselves that are objects or conveyors of "culture." The authors elaborate by saying that "a distinctive feature of Cultural Studies is the search to understand the relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and meaning, to social processes and institutions"(61). The rest of the article breaks down that definition by applying it to the study of visual media.
Researchers are interested in various elements of an image. These include: 1)the image's "social life and history"
2)it's "cycle of production, circulation, and consumption" and
3)it's "specific material properties"(64).
The analysis of the image is broken into two parts: the context of viewing and the context of production. Within the context of viewing we should ask certain questions:
1)Where is the image?
2)Why is the viewer looking at the photograph?
(Is it idle or purposeful looking?)
Within the context of production, we should another question:
1)How did the image get there?
The authors then go on to talk about ways of analyzing the "specific material properties" of a piece. If I am understanding correctly, they refer to these properties as originating from conventions within the visual format, and say that these conventions have sociological, literary, and art historical roots. Interestingly, the authors bring the idea of pictorial conventions back to the concept of signification, pointing out that often signs are arbitrary-- that the signifier or physical symbol or a thing may not bear much resemblance to the signified (what the thing stands for). I thought of the typical clip-art version of a tree as I was reading this. I have never seen a tree that looks like that signifier and yet I know exactly what is signified when I see that symbol. These conventions exist within every art medium--these authors spend a lot of time addressing the conventions within the world of photography.
Some of the impotant conventional operations in photography are:
1)framing (of the subject)--the "edges or boundaries of the picture"
2)gaze (of the subject)--are we viewer voyeurs or is the subject looking back at us?
There is a very interesting tangent to this piece, in which the authors show how the voyeuristic gaze (seeing but not being seen) can tend to make the viewer "objectify" the subject.
3)camera position
4)physical proximity (to the subject) and the viewer's position in relation to the subject's position(88).
5)lighting--it's quality, what it highlights and obscures
6)context
7)the depth of the field--how much of the scene is in sharp focus.
In treating the subject of a photograph, the fotographer relies on the viewer's knowledge of social conventions to understand the significance of the piece. We learn these conventions through our lived experience with the world. For example, we need to be able to understand the feelings of the subjects by observing their body language and facial expressions.
The analysis of these conventions shows us that photographs can be "complexely coded cultural artifacts"(89). Barthes identified this coded meaning as "the rhetoric of the image"(90).
Comments and Questions
As I am writing this abstract, I realize I am confused by the term "conventions" because I think of "conventional"--in other words, to me, conventions are the traditional and recognized way of doing things. So to say that photographers follow conventions means to me that they stick to an ordered process of photography. On page 74 the authors say that "the use of conventions by photographers is a matter of assimilated 'know-how', a trained sense of 'this is how to do it' gained 'on the job' and by observing what does and does not 'work' in concrete situations." However, the photographs that most catch our eye are the ones that break certain conventional models of photography. For example, Mapplethorpe's "Portrait of Clifton" is so jarring because it doesn't follow traditional methods---the proximity of the subject, the use of lighting, the subject's gaze--all of these are untraditional and therefore, call the viewer's attention.

Some Links

2007-09-25T11:53:00.000-06:00

I was particularly intrigued by Van Leeuwen's mention of "golliwog" dolls since I had never seen or heard of them before. Here are some links that I found with a quick Google search. I thought it was pretty interesting how many people deal and collect these dolls. I understand collecting them for their historical significance, but the graphics on some of the pages were pretty offensive - more cherishing the dolls than studying them, if that makes sense.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golliwog

http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/golliwog/

http://www.geocities.com/~gipsytoo/golliwogs.html

http://golliwogs.com/history/

http://www.geocities.com/~gipsytoo/golliwogcollectables.html

A personal blog that talks about golliwogs - I thought it interesting that the person writing seems so grateful that "our culture had moved past such horrible displays of racial intolerance and misunderstanding" by the time they grew up in the 80's. I'm not so sure about that.

http://www.threadbared.com/2005/05/golliblog.html

My personal favorite (note the sarcasm) - a "Save our Golliwoggs" page. Wow.

http://www.sterlingtimes.co.uk/golliwog.htm

The Guardian has a lot of articles on golliwogs, although their archives don't go far back enough to find the one referenced in the article. However, I thought this one was pretty interesting because of the political ramifications.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/racism/Story/0,,547562,00.html

Semiotics and Iconography

2007-09-24T20:32:00.000-06:00

Semiotics and Iconography
By Theo van Leeuwen
Abstract by Patricia Little

Summary

In the chapter entitled “Semiotics and Iconography” in the book Handbook of Visual Analysis, Theo van Leeuwen distinguishes the differences between semiotics and iconography. He specifically refers to Roland Barthes visual semiotics in this discussion. Van Leeuwen immediately begins by describing their basic differences, “But where Barthian visual semiotics studies only the image itself, and treats cultural meanings as a given currency which is shared by everyone who is at all acculturated to contemporary popular culture, and which can then be activated by the style and content of the image, iconography also pays attention to the context in which the image is produced and circulated, and to how and why cultural meanings and their visual expressions come about historically” (92).
Van Leeuwen begins by describing denotation in semiotics. He explains, while this is the literal phase, viewers of the image can still see what they want to see. In order to rectify this and make viewers see just what the producers of the image want them to see, they use a few different techniques. These techniques include categorization, groups vs. individuals, distancing, and surrounding text.
Connotation is taken up next and is described as what the denoted images stand for. He explains that this is myth according to Barthes. An interesting note that van Leeuwen points out is what the visual images are doing (their actual literal poses) has meaning. Posing people or objects in a certain way will mean something specific to most people. He uses, for example, President Kennedy’s pose with his hands clasped, looking up. This is a general pose that makes the viewer feel they are looking at, “youthfulness, spirituality, and purity” (97).
Van Leeuwen then moves to iconography. His first topic in this section is representational meaning. He asks, “How does iconography establish that a particular image represents a particular (kind of) person (or object or place)?” (102). He lists several ways that an image can be particularized. These ways include a title, background research, identity through research, and on the basis of verbal descriptions. One amusing aside, clearly not intended by the author, is when he describes identity established through reference to other pictures. He explains that many popular images do not need to be titled because they are common. It is after time has passed that these once common names become forgotten. He states, “No ‘title’ is needed for the recognition of runner Nellie Cooman in an advertisement” (106). He is clearly right about fading recognition because I have never heard of Nellie Cooman!
He next moves to iconographical symbolism. This type of symbolism has two main subgroups; abstract and figurative symbolism. Abstract symbols have “abstract shapes with symbolic value, for example the cross” and figurative symbols “represent people, places, and things with symbolic value” (107). However, what is of more interest in this section is the difference between open symbolism and disguised symbolism.
To explain this difference he refers to Renaissance painting. He states, “A motif is an open symbol of something when it is not represented naturalistically… a disguised symbol when it is represented naturalistically” (109). Seems slightly vague, but he continues with a more current explanation. Disguised symbolism is an interesting problem for the contemporary artist. He writes “When artists draw on unconscious inspiration rather than on consciously known symbolic traditions symbolism will be repressed on a conscious level. When critics then nevertheless give a symbolic interpretation of such works, the artist will often contest it” (109-110). This point is made very clear in Amy Tan’s memoir The Opposite of Faith: Memoirs of a Writing Life. Tan is often surprised when readers and critics place symbolic significance in practically every page of her book, where she never had intended it. While this is not the type of art van Leeuwen is referring to, it remains a valid example of disguised symbolism.
Van Leeuwen finally moves on to his last section, iconological symbolism. This move from iconographical to iconological has to do with discussing the identification of these symbols to interpreting them. He states, “Iconological analysis, then, draws together the iconographical symbols and stylistic features of an image or a representational tradition into a coherent interpretation which provides the ‘why’ behind the representations analyzed” (116).
In conclusion, van Leeuwen sums up the differences between semiotics and iconography. These differences are two fold and are; first, a “difference between the two methods…art works of the past versus media images of the present” (117). And secondly, “visual semiotics remains restricted to textual arguments…whereas iconography also uses arguments based on intertextual comparison and archival background research” (117).

Some Analysis

There does not seem to be much analysis needed for this work. Van Leeuwen is extremely exact with his explanation of the given material. One note, however, that I find interesting is the space and the way in which he discusses the given topic. His explanation of semiotics is clear and concise. Examples are given, when needed, and then he quickly moves on to the next topic. When van Leeuwen finally moves on to iconography the reader gets a sense that this is where he really wants to be. It is in this material that we get the best of the author. He uses more exciting and interesting examples and litters the text with pictures to better describe what he is talking about. It is interesting to note when he uses the example of President Kennedy’s pose he fails to supply the reader with a picture. However, when discussing African-Americans in relation to racist images with fruit, he gives the reader ample proof. It does not seem that he has anything in particular against semiotics, but it is clear that he believes iconography is a more useful and full system.

Edwards: Echoes of Camelot

2007-09-21T14:53:00.001-06:00

Bill Schnupp

Abstract: Janis Edwards’ “Echoes of Camelot”

I. Summary

Edwards opens his piece with the argument that images disseminated by the mass media in connection with noteworthy social events became inextricably linked with those events in the form of “cultural remembering.” Essentially, the image encapsulates a particular historical or social moment—along with the associations that accompany such moments—and embeds it in the collective consciousness, easily retained and recalled. The poignancy of these images is found in the way they “express particulars to evoke the universal” (179). As an example, Edwards cites Joe Rosenthal’s World War II image of the flag raising at the battle of Iwo Jima—a very specific image that imparts (at least in one potential reading) ideas of patriotism, victory, and collective effort. Edwards expands on this example to demonstrate the longevity of the flag image by linking it to a similar image of firefighters raising a flag over the ruins of the WTC in 2002. The ideas present in the depiction of the flag raising at Iwo Jima are called forth in the image with the firefighters, and subsequently expanded on, thus granting the image a greater and more immediate potency.

Edwards next moves into a more illustrative example: the assassination of John F. Kennedy, particularly the photograph of a 3 year-old JFK Jr. saluting his father’s funeral procession. The author posits that this photograph is an instance of depictive rhetoric, an image that lives in the collective consciousness. The image of the lonely child, his father stolen away, paralleled the “national grief”: a country dispossessed of its innocence, leaderless. This and other photos of the Kennedy family served to forge a parasocial relationship (a one-sided relationship between the public and those represented by the mass media).

Edwards later expands on the “salute” image in a discussion of JFK Jr.’s own death in 1999: his plane crash was remote and isolated; not under media scrutiny until after the fact. Consequently, the image of the salute was widely and effectively used by the media to convey a sense of loss and mourning similar to that created in the photograph’s original context. Indeed the feelings were equally as poignant, and further reveal the depth of the parasocial relationship: “the salute photograph functions to engender outrage—not simply the outrage that accompanies a premature and (apparently) avoidable accident, but the outrage that this can be happening again—to the Kennedy’s, to us. The salute photograph connects the past and the present through its symbolic twin expressions of outrage and regret” (185). This stems into the ideas of an image’s truth value (meaning) and its symbolic value (accompanying connotations and ideas).

The author then offers eleven qualities common to such iconic/outrage-provoking photographs:
1. Celebrity
2. Prominence
3. Frequency
4. Profit
5. Instantaneousness
6. Fame of Subjects
7. Transposability
8. Importance of Events
9. Metonymy
10. Primordiality and/or Cultural Resonance
11. Striking Composition

The piece then moves to a notation of how depictive rhetorics and iconic images are appropriated by cartoonists and the mass media (sometimes inappropriately). Edwards’ closing thoughts are particularly engaging: “The invocation of the mythic narrative of the Kennedy promise and end of that promise prompted a mourning that was directed inward. As a nation, we mourned our own destiny, remembered through media images that returned us to that earlier time. . .the use of such images connects two messages, from now and then, linking together the “truth value” of a photograph and its symbolic value in harmonious resonance” (193).

II. Analysis

I think Edwards controlling idea here--that events of social gravity stick in our collective memory to be applied not only to their initial circumstances, but to successive events as well--is very compelling (and accurate). For example, I don't think it would be possible to ask someone about 9/11 and receive nothing in return: the image of the WTC smoking and tumbling lives in the American collective consciousness. What I find even more interesting though, is the way Edwards describes how an event can serve as the impetus for us to turn in upon ourselves. I think of it as a kind of frame of reference: it begins wide, on a social event of mass significance, but then tightens to each individual and causes them to refelct on themselves, to focus on their problem, their loss.

Fresh from Barthes, I also find myself attempting interpretation of Edwards’ idea through a semiotic/mythic lens; I think the parallels are definitely present. The image of the young Kennedy saluting holds the truth value of a child, formally dressed for a funeral or other somber occasion. The symbolic value, however, are the ideas of national grief and the loss of both innocence and a leader. To me, this feels like the movement between the linguistic and semiotic systems: in the linguistic scheme, there is photo of a boy in formal dress saluting as a funeral procession passes; the meaning is clear, a somber occasion, personal loss, etc. This filters into the mythic narrative, and the boy is no longer a boy, but a nation bereft of leadership. Edwards’ final remarks about the harmonious union of truth and symbolism also suggest the fluid relationship of meaning and form, of linguistics and semiotics to achieve meaning.

That said, I don’t think a completely pure version of Barthes’ ideas can be applied to this reading, as I believe Edwards definitely employs some iconographical ideas (despite the fact that iconography seems more centered on classic/antiquated art). For instance, at one point in her discussion, she writes that “the news media poses a situation that requires a distinction between how a photograph was understood at the time and how it might be understood in the current day” (184). If I read Barthes correctly, texts are severed from their historical context in their interpretation, as the role of the semiologist/mythologist is to stop the fluid movement between the linguistic and mythologic systems. A large part of Edwards argument, however, is that images are encapsulated in their historic context; this quality is what allows for the layered meaning that results from re-presenting a past image in contemporary times. This idea clearly conforms to Van Leeuwens’ “Semiotics and iconography” when he writes that “iconography also uses arguments based on intertextual comparison[a past image recalled to the present] and archival background research[ inclusion of historical context]” (117).

It is in my attempt to apply and understand Van Leeuwens’ ideas that I find myself a bit confused about a part of Edwards’ piece. I understand that the salute photograph is a myth of sorts, and that it consequently holds a meaning beyond that of a little boy saluting. Edwards frequently calls the photo an iconic image. I can’t decide if this image is an example of iconographical or iconological symbolism, as Van Leeuwen distinguishes them in the following way:

“Iconographical symbolism. . .denote[s] a particular person, thing or place, but also the ideas or
concepts attached to it. . .iconographical symbolism is apprehended by realizing that a male figure with a
knife represents St. Bartholomew. . .” (100-1).

“Iconological symbolism is what, in another context, would be called ideological meaning. . .to ascertain
those underlying principles which reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a period, a class, a religious or
philosophical persuasion” (101).

The two ideas seem almost indistinguishable to me. In each case, the iconic symbol is accompanied by associations, concepts, and idea. At first, I thought the fact that Van Leeuwen explicitly mentions nations in his discussion of iconological symbolism made it clear, but now I’m not so sure. Iconographical also denotes a symbol that evokes more than just itself. Perhaps I’m reading to much into this; maybe someone can straighten it out for me?

III. Questions, Key Terms, and Further Reading

1. What do you make of Edwards’ closing thought—that the symbolic meanings of images spark a self-reflexive
impulse?

2. What ideas do you feel this piece is more informed by: Semiotics? Iconography? Both?

Key Terms:
Visual rhetoric
Depictive Rhetoric
Parasocial Relationship
Truth Value
Symbolic Value
Iconic
Cultural Remembering/Collective Memory

Links:
http://www.participations.org/volume%203/issue%201/3_01_hortonwohl.htm
http://www.sagepub.com/journalsProdDesc.nav?prodId=Journal201459
http://www.tc.umn.edu/~prope002/visualRhet.htm

The World of Wrestling

2007-09-17T16:44:00.000-06:00

Abstract of Roland Barthes’ “The World of Wrestling” (1957)
By Jennifer Lowry

Description of Article

The whole of Barthes’ essay examines wrestling in light of the theatre, and wrestling being a theatrical act. Like theatre, wrestling is based upon a sign system. Each element of wrestling, whether the wrestler’s physique or his gestures indicate an “absolute clarity, since [the spectator] must always understand everything on the spot” (16). In the theatre, the private becomes public; in wrestling this “Exhibition of Suffering […] is the very aim of the fight” (19). Like the theatre, the public watches wrestling for the “great spectacle of Suffering, Defeat, and Justice. As in the theatre, “wrestling presents man’s suffering with all the amplification of tragic masks” (19).

The comparisons to theatre continue as Barthes argues that wrestling (and I am thinking of the WWF type wrestling) is not a sport but a spectacle (15) one in which the audience is not concerned with “what it thinks but what it sees” (15). He compares wrestling to boxing and judo, which he considers sports, but unlike sports, wrestling, has no winner (16). It is not the function of the wrestler to win, “it is to go through the motions which are expected of him” (16).

The bastard or villain is usually the sufferer in wrestling. Barthes describes how the body of the bastard sums up all of his “actions, his treacheries, cruelties and acts of cowardice” (17). “The physique of the wrestlers therefore constitutes a basic sign, which like a seed contains the whole fight” (18). The costumes, like those of the theatre, represent the tragic play of wrestling.

According to Barthes, Defeat and Justice go hand in hand. Defeat is not an “outcome”, but a “display” (21). Defeat of the bastard “is a purely moral concept: that of justice” (21). The defeated must deserve the punishment (21) which is why the “crowd is jubilant at seeing the rules broken” (21) as long as it is just. “In wrestling, nothing exists except in the absolute, there is not symbol, no allusion, everything is presented exhaustively” (25). Again, as compared, there is no question of truth, the spectator just accepts what is presented to them as the way it is and should be.

Comments and Questions

This article does not lend much to commenting and is more of a summary… and my own personal thoughts.

Barthes begins his essay by arguing that wrestling is not a sport because there are no winners – at least that is not the point of the fight. He states:
The public is completely uninterested in knowing whether the contest is rigged or not, and rightly so; it abandons itself to the primary virtue of the spectacle, which is to abolish all motives and all consequences: what matters is not what it thinks but what it sees. (15)
While I have not experienced wrestling in France during this period I have watched wrestling on television (and I am quite sure that it is the kind of theatrical wrestling Barthes is discussing). I think it is pompous of him to assume that no one is interested in whether the contest is rigged. I also think there are many that would argue that wrestling is a sport. There are winners and losers and the winners are not always the good guys.

I do understand his contention that wrestling is like the theatre. Clearly, this type of wrestling is much more dramatic than that of the “sporting” kind. The use of costume and masks separate wrestling from recognized sporting competitions and do represent a theatrical appeal. Barthes argues in “Myth Today” that “myth is a system of communication, that it is a message” (109). He is clearly trying to get this point across in his examination of wrestling. Everything about the wrestler carries a message. The body of the wrestler, Barthes argues, carries the first message. The repulsiveness of the wrestler, his ugliness and the crowd’s reaction to that reflect on the characteristics of the wrestler. Even the wrestler’s commentary reflects upon his character, the gestures he engages in only further represent the character he is meant (assigned) to be.

What really strikes me as important is Barthes idea that the private is publicly displayed through wrestling as it is in the theatre. Using wrestling, spectators are able to identify with the characters and inflict the punishment that they feel is deserved. It seems to me that the caricatures of wrestling are exaggerations of real life. But by portraying them in exaggeration, the spectator is able to separate himself from the feelings associated.

Barthes argues that French and American wrestling are different in that the “heroes in French wrestling […are] based on ethics and not on politics” (23). He also states the American wrestling is based on “a sort of mythological fight between Good and Evil” (23) with the bad wrestler always some sort of Communist (which I don’t really think is always the case). But at the end of his essay he states:

In the ring, and even in the depths of their voluntary ignominy, wrestlers remain gods because they are, for a few moments, the key which opens Nature, the pure gesture which separates Good from Evil, and unveils the form of a Justice which is at last intelligible. (25)

I understand that he is probably using these references to “Good and Evil” in different contexts, but isn’t it possible that some Americans actually do view Communism as Evil? This clearly explains to me why they would portray the villain as a Communist.

I don’t really have any questions… the only thing that really struck me was my defensiveness at his comparison between American and French wrestling. Of course, only being familiar with the one and not the other doesn’t really give me much of a foot to stand on. I am curious as to why he even felt he had to throw in this comparison of French and American wrestling, as I don’t really see it necessary to his argument.

Barthes: Intro, Signifier and Signified, Denotation and Connotation

2007-09-14T17:58:00.000-06:00

Author: Bill Schnupp

Abstract: Elements of Semiology: Intro., Signifier and Signified, Denotation and Connotation.

I. Summary

A. Introduction

In this section, Barthes introduces readers to semiology, tempering his definition with the ideas of Ferdinand de Saussure to characterize the as yet undeveloped discipline as “a science of signs. . .[and] systems of signification” (9). These systems can encompass objects, music, public entertainment, and myriad other possibilities.

Barthes stresses that at the time he is writing, semiology is a very underdeveloped area of study, “a tentative science.” In this science, no system can signify autonomously—language must, at some level, be present. In this sense semiology is a sub-discipline of linguistics: “it is semiology which is a part of linguistics. . .it is that part covering the great signifying unities of discourse” (11). Barthes closes by highlighting the four divisions of semiology he perceives and later discusses: Language and Speech, Signified and Signifier, Syntagm and System, and Denotation and Connotation.

B. Signifier and Signified

Perhaps the first thing that should be said about this section is that it is a continual parallel between linguistics and semiology, as the latter was, at this time, a rather raw and undeveloped mode of inquiry. Barthes draws continually on linguistics as the forbearer of semiology to inform his discussion in places where semiological thought is not yet fully articulated.

Barthes opens this section with the concept of the sign, a signifying relationship (or meaning, as I read it) which is essentially the union of the components signifier (a term) and the signified (its concept or relation.) Ideas of content and expression are inextricable from this process.

signifier+signified=sign

At the same time, readers are reminded that the sign is more complex than this basic formula: indeed, it is more than “the mere correlation of a signifier and a signified, but perhaps more essentially an act of simultaneously cutting out two amorphous masses” (56). Every element in the semiological relationship has more than one meaning. Like a sheaf of paper, each possesses a reverse image. Signs, particularly those with utilitarian, functional origins, are known as sign-functions. The idea I draw from this from this is that reality and meaning are based on use and function: “there is no reality except when it is intelligible” (42).

The signified in the relationship Barthes imposes is defined as “the mental representation of a thing. . .a concept” (42-3). It incorporates such elements as practices, techniques, and ideologies. It is this component of the triadic relationship which triggers Barthes’ discussion of metalanguages (languages about languages—that is, a discourse employed to make sense of another discourse.)

The signifier is a mediator to handle the words, images, and objects in the sign equation. It is the initial element triggers the process of investing meaning and thus making a sign. The union of the signifier and signified is termed signification. This process of making meaning is, according to Barthes’ interpretation of Saussure, arbitrary, a product of social convention. The sign can be interpreted as the value of the expression, and is a product of exchange and comparison among dissimilar words and ideas. Barthes closes with an estimate of where he believes semiology is headed: toward existence as a discipline concerned with the production of reality, fused with taxonomy—termed arthrology, a science of apportionment.

C. Denotation and Connotation

In this discussion, Barthes revisits the relationship between signifier, signified and sign. However, in this section, the relation is approached in a new way, in the relation (R) between expression (E) and content (C), expressed as ERC. The focus here is on staggered systems of signification, or those systems in which one or more of the components in the relation (ERC) is expressed by a relation all its own.

Ex. (ERC) RC, where E=(ERC). The first system lies in the plane of denotation, and the second (collective), in the plane of connotation; it is wider and encompasses all the elements. The way I read this (and if I'm wrong somebody please correct me), denotation stands for the collectively agreed upon meaning of an image or text--comparable to the signifier-- and connotation represents the accompanying ideas and concepts--much like the signified and the ensuing process of signification.

Barthes uses the discussion of denotation and connotation to branch off and further explore metalanguages, those discourses employed to speak about and analyze discourses. In this model, a language (in the linguistic sense) is a first-order language, and the ensuing metalanguage is a second-order language. The role of the semiologist, then, is to decipher the first-order language through the lens of the second, but in doing so there is a danger: just as connotation served as an extension of denotation in the system above, so too can each subsequent metalanguage serve as a segue into another and another, a self-sustaining and destructive cycle. As each language rises, another takes its place, “a diachrony of metalanguages, and each science, including of course semiology, would contain the seeds of its own death, in the shape of the language destined to speak it" (93).

II. Analysis

I’ll start by saying that a great deal of this was tough to grasp the first time around. I’ve tried to bring out some of the main ideas (or what I perceived as the main ideas) in this section.

Clearly, the roots of Semiology stem from linguistics—“there is no meaning which is not designated, and the world of signifieds is none other than that of language” (Barthes 10)—but for me the two diverge in their scope: linguistics is dedicated solely to the study of languages and the various forms and processes encompassed therein; semiology, on the other hand, is devoted not only to the verbal, but to all other means of making meaning that intersect the verbal realm. In some additional reading, I even found that there are branches of semiotics that study animal behavior (zoosemiotics), human body language (kinsemics and proxemics), and one variety that examines communication by olfactory signs. Semiology seems a literal embodiment of the connotation Barthes is so enamored of (there is more to meaning than meets the eye; it goes beyond language to engage the public and the personal to include things like music, gestures objects, events, etc.)

It is not difficult to perceive how the ideas of Barthes tie in with the ideas we have encountered in class to this point. Semiology is concerned with the interpretation of various cultural texts, and though the discipline is clearly very structuralist, I’m not sure it falls entirely under that paradigm. The meaning that arises from the triadic relationship between signifier/signified/sign is essentially arbitrary, an idea Barthes touches on—“the only link between signifier and signified, is a fairly arbitrary (although inevitable) abstraction” (54). This suggests that the meaning someone invests in a sign is largely socially dictated—a word means something because we collectively allow it to do so. Thus, our experience is dictated by the pre-approved structure. A good example can be found in Daniel Chandler’s discussion of semiotics, in which he gives the example of an open sign in a shop window. In this scenario, a passerby would likely invest meaning in the following way: the signifier, the word ‘open,’ is mentally combined with the accompanying signified concept that the shop is open for business, and these two combine to form the resulting sign, a shop with an ‘open’ sign in the window is prepared to exchange with consumers.

?My question here concerns the different meanings people may construct. Say someone outside is wearing a sweater. When I see this, I would see the signifier, sweater, combined with the signified concept that it is cold outside, and the sign, that someone is wearing a long-sleeved, heavily woven garment because it is cold outside. Perhaps, though, it isn’t cold. Maybe it’s a hot July day and the person wears the sweater because their office air-conditioner is too efficient. Maybe the sweater was a gift from a loved one no longer living and the wearer dons the sweater for sentimental reasons. Maybe the wearer’s friend made a bet that the wearer couldn’t go an entire July day wearing a wool sweater. There could be many variations in this story. My point is simply this: many of the myriad meanings for the wearing of the sweater are not socially configured; as such, personal experience seems to motivate the wearing of the sweater, and thus experience here is no effect, but a driving force. Isn’t this culturalist influence?

?I'm also still working on the idea of the metalanguage and its destructive potential. The way I read it, a metalangauge is a discourse used to discuss another discourse and is thereby its destroyer (for example, myth is a metalanguage for the language in which the myth originates.) So, couldn't, say, cultural studies be considered a metalanguage because it 's used as a means to interpret cultural texts? If this is the case, then isn't the discipline simultaneously studying and destroying its object of inquiry?

Barthes ideas, though at times a bit difficult, nonetheless fascinate me. By-and-large, his work seems motivated by the relationship between language (and other modes of signification) and thought, and how the two combine to make meaning. It unites questions of culture, psychology, reality, and many others.

III. Questions and Further Reading.

1. For you, does semiology seem more aligned with structuralism or culturalism?

2. After reading Barthes, what do you make of this statement: the limits of my language are the limits of my
world?

3. How do you respond to Barthes’ idea of the destructive cycle of metalanguages?

It always helps me to have other readings to draw on. I found some very accessible readings online at:

http://www.aber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/sem02.html
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/french/as-sa/index.html
http://www.percepp.com/semiosis.htm

Chapter 8: Globalization and Popular Culture

2007-09-11T12:00:00.000-06:00

Storey begins this chapter by offering a definition of globalization. He calls it "the establishment of a capitalist world economy" and also a "time-space compression [...] in which the world appears to be getting smaller" (152). This information helps to situate his arguments against the view of globalization as "cultural americanisation," or in other words, the imposition of American culture onto "weaker" cultures through American media and products. Storey finds fault with this view of globalization for four reasons:
1) The model "assumes that economic success is the same as cultural imposition" (154). I like John Tomlinson's comment that this is a "rather impoverished concept of culture--one that reduces culture to its material goods" (qtd. on 154).
2)The model "claim[s] that commodities have inherent values and singular meanings, which can be imposed on passive consumers"(155). To debunk this myth, Storey refers to a study conducted in which several culturally diverse groups were shown the same American TV program and asked to discuss it. The response and analysis of the show varied widely and depended on the cultural lens through which the participant viewed the program.
3)The model "assumes that America is the only global power"(159).
4)The model is based on the assumption that "American culture is monolithic"--that it is a prepackaged, one-size-fits-all homogenous entity that is injected into other countries when we export our products there.

I appreciate Storey ability to expose and critique these long-held assumptions of American globalization. We need only look at the meteoric progress of China to recognize that America is certainly not the only global power. Also, as was confirmed in our own class as we shared our cultural artifacts, American culture is certainly not monolithic. Like other cultures, it is "hybrid, heterogeneous, extraordinarily differentiated, and unmonolithic"(Said qtd. in 162).

Storey concludes by arguing that there has never been a culture in any part of the world that has stayed pristine and pure, without variation. Rather, every culture evolves as it negotiates and incorporates the influences it is exposed to over time.

As I read this chapter, the visual that kept coming to my head was the idea of the McDonalds in Argentina. While it is true that material goods are not the only component of culture, or that American culture is ingested along with a Big Mac in Argentina, it is also true that the influx of American products and conveniences seems to be changing the daily routines of Argentines, which is having an effect on their culture. For example, it is an age-old custom to sit around and share a drink called Mate with friends and family after dinner in Argentina. This is a time to be close and share and build relationships, and it is a huge indicator of the type of hospitable culture the Argentines are known for. Of course, Argentines that eat out at McDonalds forego that tradition at least for that meal. They trade the tradition of family togetherness for the comfort of convenience...it is interesting for me to reflect on that example as I evaluate Storey's arguments in this chapter.

2007-09-11T10:19:00.000-06:00

Summary of "Globalisation and Popular Culture"
by Tom Peele

Summary
No one who read this entire collection will be surprised to learn that Storey takes an oppositional stance to the concept of globalisation. By oppositional, I mean that he doesn't buy the concept that America is by degrees turning the world into a clone of itself. Let me let Storey (at least as I read him) explain.

Usefully, Storey defines globalisation: "the establishment of a capitalist world economy [I wrote and then corrected "world order." Are you familiar with Bush the First's justification for the first gulf war: establishing a "new world order" and something about 1,000 points of light. Where are they now?] in which national borders are becoming less and less important as transnational corporations, existing everywhere and nowhere, do business in a global market" (152). This sense of globalisation, he writes, can be experienced by going anywhere and doing anything -- clothes and food from around the world are available far from their origins. He also defines globalisation as "time-space compression," a world in which people travel more and are more digitally wired (and thus more often and more rapidly in communication with each other) than before. The final definition he provides concerns the increasing migration of the labor force.

Storey's beef has to do with "globalisation as cultural Americanisation" (153). He's not concerned about this because, as he emphasized throughout the book, culture is made locally; it happens when cultural artifacts are consumed. The meanings of those artifacts are not pre-determined, but rather made in the process of consumption. This is a point with which both Matthew and Jenny might take issue. If the range of products is predetermined, then how is meaning made locally?

To defend his claim, Storey points out that "commodities are [not] the same as culture" (154). By this, he means that individuals make meaning from commodities; it is this process of meaning making where culture resides. Instead of assuming that meaning remains stable, we need instead to consider how commodities are read (155-57).

Storey provides many examples of how culture is appropriated then moves to a useful discussion of "hybridization" (161). One can only imagine, he claims, that culture can be penetrated and overwhelmed only if one imagines that cultures are monolithic and static. Instead, what occurs is hybridization, which results in "Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam, Asian rap in London, Irish bagels, Chinese tacos" and other cultural manifestations (161). The difficulty, Storey, following Said, claims, "was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly exclusively, White, or Black, or Western, or Oriental" (162).

How, then, do we think of ourselves? How is identity shaped? How do we (should we?) stop thinking of ourselves as primarily one thing or another? If commodity consumption allows us to create our own identities, how have these come to be the identities we create? Commodity consumption is just one avenue of the creation of culture -- that culture is created in so many ways, from so many sources (Ideological State Apparatuses come to mind) suggests that as we pursue cultural studies we consider, or acknowledge that we will not be considering, various forms of cultural production.

It is telling that Storey ends the book with a discussion of hegemony: "popular culture is neither an 'authentic' subordinate culture, nor a culture imposed by the culture industries, but a 'compromise equilibrium' (Gramsci) between the two; a contradictory mix of forces from both 'below' and 'above'; both 'commercial' and authentic'; marked by 'resistance' and 'incorporation', involving both 'structure' and 'agency'" (163).

Chapter 3 Fiction

2007-09-11T10:02:00.000-06:00

In the 3rd chapter, on fiction, Storey describes the four main methods for studying popular fiction. These four main approaches are: symptomatic reading, reception theory, reading formations, and feminism and romance reading.

Ideology and Symptomatic Reading- The real basic overview of this section is all meaning is found in the text, if you look hard enough everything that can be found will be found there.

Storey begins with the ideas of Louis Althusser. He believes that “ideological discourse is a closed system” (37). What we are to understand from the text comes from both what the text says and what the text does not say. To gain all the information possible from a given text we must deconstruct it. We deconstruct in two main ways. First we read the text for what is obvious, then we do a second reading, recording all that was not said, for what is left unsaid is also very much a part of the text according to Althusser.
Pierre Macherey, a user of this method, is much more clear when describing what he means by deconstruction of the text. Macherey believes that “the view that a text has a single meaning which it is the task of criticism to uncover” (38) is false. He believes that a given text will have multiple meanings, depending on what is deconstructed and how far you go. He also puts forth the theory that a fictional text is “decentered”. Storey explains “his point is that all fictional texts are ‘decentered’ (not centered on an authorial intention) in the specific sense that they consist of a confrontation between several discourses: explicit, implicit, silent and absent” (38). Basically, Macherey says, “in order for something to be said, other things must be left unsaid” (39).

Reception Theory- The real basic overview of this section is that all meaning that is taken from a given text depends entirely on who is reading the text.

Storey gives it right to us when he starts with Hans-Georg Gadamer. It is very clear when Storey states Gadamer’s argument as, “an understanding of a cultural text is always from the perspective of the person who understands” (41).
This theory states that every time someone picks up a novel they are not starting that novel blank. The reader brings to the text all of their experiences and these individual experiences shape the meaning that is derived from the text. Storey explains, “a text is always read with preconceptions or prejudices; it is never encountered in a state of virginal purity, untouched by the knowledge with which, or the context in which, it is read” (42).
Another literary theorist Wolfgang Iser feels that not only does the reader make his own meaning of the text but that this process is an ‘act of production’. This in effect gives the reader all control over meaning because Iser states “as a literary text can only produce a response when it is read, it is virtually impossible to describe this response without also analyzing the reading process…the text represents a potential effect that is realized in the reading process…the meaning of the text is something that [the reader] has to assemble” (43).

Reading Formations- This section in a nutshell has to do with what happens when readers of a text are predisposed to read it in a specific way, it shows that specific historical and situational points affect the reading of a text.

Storey explains this theory with the help of John Bennett and Janet Woollacott’s study of the ever-shifting meaning of the character James Bond. They do not agree that all meaning in a text is already there. Their main point is that “popular fiction is a specific space, with its own ideological economy, making available a historically variable, complex and contradictory range of ideological discourses and counter discourses to be activated in particular conditions of reading” (50).
To further their point they look at the ever-changing view of James Bond. They contest that given the particular era, what Bond films have been out, and the appearance of the Bond girls, all have an effect on how one will read the books. For example, if you watch a Bond movie in the 50’s you will read more into the text about a Cold-war hero, and if you watch the movie in the 70’s you might read more into the text about sexual liberation.

Feminism and Romance Reading

In this section Storey quotes Tania Modleski, who says there are three ways women critics write about romance stories, with “dismissiveness; hostility – tending unfortunately to be aimed at the consumers of the narrative; or, most frequently, a flippant kind of mockery” (60).
Janice Radway conducted a famous study to try and figure out romance reading. She did research on forty-two women in the town of ‘Smithton’. Her first conclusion was “that romantic fantasy is a form of regression in which the reader is imaginatively and emotionally transported to a time ‘when she was the center of the profoundly nurturing individual’s attention’” (62). Having come to this conclusion, Radway feels that “romance reading can be viewed as a means by which women can vicariously, though the hero-heroine relationship, experience the emotional succor which they themselves are expected to provide to others without adequate reciprocation for themselves in their normal day-to-day existence” (62).
However, Storey points out that some do not fully agree with Radway’s findings. Critic Ien Ang feels that Radway is perhaps being a little one-sided. She feels that Radway, being a feminist, isn’t seeing beyond her political agenda. Ang feels that feminists can read Romance as pleasure for pleasures sake. Ang, along with Alison Light, feel that Radway made a lot of interesting discoveries with her work but that it is important not to go too overboard into a ‘book-burning legislature’ (68).

Chapter Five Summary

2007-09-11T00:38:00.000-06:00

Chapter Five: Newspapers and Magazines
From: Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture, by John Storey
Summary by: Diane Neu

General Overview

Storey outlines various approaches to understanding cultural studies within three separate contexts of newspapers and magazines: “The Popular Press,” “Magazines for Women and Girls,’ and “Reading Visual Culture.”

The Popular Press

Storey begins his explanation of the role that the popular press plays in cultural studies by quoting from Jostein Gripsrud that while we do not need to come to the defense of the press “in any simplistic populist or ‘anti-elitist’ manner,” we should strive to understand it and the way it functions (87). He then moves into discussing four different cultural studies approaches to the popular press:

Peter Dahlgreen: For Dahlgreen, storytelling is the “ ‘key link’ ” “between tabloid journalism and popular culture” (87). Storytelling is “one of the two basic modes of knowing and making sense of the world, the other being the analytic mode” (87). While the analytic mode is made up of facts, logic, and navigational information, the storytelling mode makes sense of the world through narrative accounts. Though journalism may aim for the analytic mode with straightforward facts, it is “the storytelling mode which is most often brought into play” (87). Dahlgreen sees a “ ‘storytelling continuum’ ” existing “ ‘between serious and tabloid news, between fact and fiction’ ” (87).

Colin Sparks: Sparks contends that the “key difference” between “quality” journalism and the popular press is the use, by the popular press, of “an explanatory network” (88). While the “quality” press may prefer to present a strict timeline of events and facts and leave inference up to the reader, the popular press decides to bridge that gap for the reader. The reader does not need to create human-interest stories to go along with the news – the popular press will create it for them.

John Fiske: Fiske maintains that while the popular press is “ ‘not radical,’ ” it is often “ ‘potentially, and often actually, progressive’ ” (89). Fiske explains that the popular press “ ‘may be progressive in that they can encourage the production of meanings that work to change or destabilize the social order, but they can never be radical in the sense that they can never oppose head on or overthrow that order” (89). While the official press serves as the mouthpiece “of the prevailing structures of power,” the popular press “is full of utopian fantasies of another way of understanding the world which challenges the normalizing “reality” of the power-bloc” (89-90). The popular press functions as a way for “the people” to enter into conversation with the official news through a process where this official news is “ ‘re-informed’ ” in order to “ ‘be made relevant to everyday life’ ” (91).

Ian Connell: Connell focuses in on the ways in which the popular press devotes its pages to detailing the lives of the rich and famous. Connell argues that readers are simultaneously “ ‘engaged by the stories,’ ” imagining themselves as one of the mega-wealthy while also
“ ‘mount[ing] a populist challenge on privilege’ ” (92). At the heart of these stories of the wealthy is an articulation of “a moral economy in which the world is divided between those with power and privilege and those without power and privilege” (93).

Magazines for Women and Girls

Storey skips the lead-in quote here, and begins right away by discussing one of the three approaches to looking at magazines created for women and girls:

Angela McRobbie: McRobbie begins by dissecting the role of magazines in the lives of women and girls through the 1970s magazine Jackie. She posits that magazines like Jackie strive “ ‘to win and shape the consent of the readers to a particular set of values’ ” (94). These magazines do so by appealing to its readers through four “ ‘subcodes’ ” which serve to define these areas of the reader’s life (94):
1. The code of romance: Girls must fight each other over men. Girls cannot trust other girls. Heterosexual romance is the only path to happiness (94).
2. The code of personal/domestic life: The values from the other codes must be instilled into the everyday workings of a girls personal life as well. The magazine uses its “problem page” to send “explicit messages to girls about what is right and expected of them (95).
3. The code of fashion and beauty: Wearing make-up and dressing nicely should be “ ‘of paramount importance’ ” to a girl (95).
4. The code of pop music: Pop stars (male, I presume) are a suitable release for young, female emotions. You can look and listen – but do not touch (95).
McRobbie “welcomes the fading popularity of Jackie, and other magazines like it” while welcoming magazines like Just Seventeen and Mizz as examples of magazines for girls that have been “influenced by the success and circulation of feminist ideas” (95).

Janice Winship: Winship contends that we cannot “ ‘simply dismiss women’s magazines’ ” because to do so would be “ ‘to dismiss the lives of millions of women who read and enjoyed them each week’ ” (96). Winship desires to explain why women enjoy these magazines so much, and she does this by explaining the ways in which these magazines directly appeal to their demographic (96-7). These appeals, according to Winship, are organized around different “ ‘fictions.’ ” These fictions are essentially the stories the magazines creates through its articles and advertising, in order to draw the reader “into a world of consumption “ where they will be sold on the idea of “pleasurable femininity” (97).

Joke Hermes: Hermes’s approach is similar to Winship’s in that she finds fault with those that simply criticize the women who read the magazines written for them. She rebels against the idea of feminists who think that the readers of such magazines must be saved and enlightened away from their choice of reading material (99). Instead, she advocates for an “ ‘appreciation that readers are producers of meaning rather than the cultural dupes of the media institutions’ ” (99). Hermes is more interested in the meaning that readers construct from the text for themselves as opposed to the message that the text may or may not be trying to impose on them. After conducting interviews with readers of women’s magazines, Hermes identifies the four main meanings that readers constructed, which she refers to as “repertoires.” They are:
1. “ ‘easily put down’ ”
2. “ ‘relaxation’ ”
3. “ ‘practical knowledge’ ”
4. “ ‘emotional learning and connected knowing’ ” (101)

Reading Visual Culture

In this section, Storey only focuses on Roland Barthes’s approach to reading visual culture, as Storey sees the “foundational work” of Barthes to be some of “the most influential work on popular visual culture within cultural studies” (103).

Roland Barthes: Each visual image is involved in a process of “ ‘signification’ ” (103). In this process, there is both a “primary signification (denotation)” and a secondary signification (connotation)” (105). Barthes uses the example of a cover of Paris Match magazine. On the cover is a “black soldier saluting the French flag.” This is the primary signification – the surface level picture. However, the secondary signifier is that of “Paris Match’s attempt to produce a positive image of French imperialism” (105). However, there are several things to consider before coming to a conclusion about an image’s secondary signifier. The context of the photo is extremely important to making meaning of the secondary signifier. If the same photo had been placed “on the cover of a socialist magazine, its connotative meaning(s) would have been very different” (105). In such a context, the reader would have likely looked for humor and irony. As photos “rarely appear without the accompaniment of a linguistic text of one kind or another,” each photo is carefully placed within a context and can be removed from one context and then reused in another context through the use of new text, layout, etc. Barthes calls this process anchorage (107-8). Ultimately, what makes the reader able to jump from the level of primary signification to that of secondary signification is “the store of social knowledge (a cultural repertoire) upon which the reader is able to draw when he or she read the image. Without access to this shared code (conscious or unconscious), the operations of connotations would not be possible” (108).

2007-09-10T17:37:00.000-06:00

Abstract of Chapter 5: Newspapers and Magazines
by Mike Peterson

Description of Article
In this chapter, John Storey outlines four approaches to understanding the “popular press,” two approaches for analyzing “magazines for women and girls,” and one approach to “reading visual culture.”

THE POPULAR PRESS
Peter Dahlgren: The connection between tabloid journalism and popular culture is storytelling. While journalism is committed to the analytic mode, it often still uses the mode of storytelling, and the difference between “serious” and “tabloid” news, therefore, isn’t really that different (75).

Colin Sparks: The difference between serious and tabloid (what he calls quality and popular) press, is the marked reliance of popular press on the “personal” as an explanatory framework (76). This reliance, he argues, makes it nearly impossible for the popular press to engage in “popular productivity,” but will, instead, usually fall in the realm of the “reactionary popular,” which can only “speak of their concerns, joys and discontents within the limits set for it by the existing structures of society” (76).

John Fiske: “Popular culture is potentially, and often actually, progressive (though not radical)” (77). Fiske lumps the types of press into three categories: popular, official, and alternative (though nothing more is said in this chapter about the alternative press). The official press represents the interests of the power-bloc in a “top-down flow of information” and ensures the “maintenance of the prevailing structures of society” (77). The popular press, on the other hand, takes a tone of “skeptical laughter” and sees through the power-bloc. One such way this happens is through the popular press’s utopian fantasies, which challenge the “normalising ‘reality’ of the power-bloc” (78). The official press, Fiske argues, would have its readers “deciphering” its texts—subjecting themselves to its “truths,” whereas the popular press would have its readers “reading” its texts—actively participating in the production of the text’s relevance.

Ian Connell: The popular press is somewhat ineffective for social change because it merely produces resentment for those in the stories (celebrities, politicians, etc.) but not resistance to them (80). In other words, in the clash of the “haves” and “have-nots,” the popular press merely causes the “have-nots” to want to be a member of the “haves,” rather than questioning why there are “haves” and “have-nots” to begin with. The popular press has three players: the characters (the haves), the narrator (who writes about the haves but isn’t necessarily one himself), and the powerless readers (presumably the have-nots) (81).

MAGAZINES FOR WOMEN AND GIRLS
Angela McRobbie: There has been a satisfying shift in how feminity is portrayed for teenage girls between Jackie of the seventies and Just Seventeen and Mizz of today. All of Jackie’s articles, ads, and columns center around one or more of four strategies: the code of romance, the code of personal/domestic life, the code of fashion and beauty, and the code of pop music—all of which function “to map and, ultimately, to limit the feminine sphere” (83). The newer magazines talk about love and sex and boys, but not in the “conventionally coded meta-narrative of romance which…could only create a neurotically dependent female” (84).

Janice Winship: Feminists shouldn’t simply dismiss women’s magazines. Instead, they should “critically consider its limitations and potential for change” (84). All women’s magazines, she argues, follow the same formula regardless of politics: they operate as survival manuals through a combination of entertainment and useful advice (85). Each magazine works to draw the reader into a world of consumption, but this isn’t necessarily bad. Advertisements, for example, can be aesthetically and emotionally pleasing, letting readers “vicariously indulge…in the fictions they create” without necessarily duping or fooling the reader (85). The problem with the magazines is that they are survival manuals for the “mythical individual woman” which encourages woman to “do alone what they can only do together” in fighting “powerful social and cultural structures and constraints” (85, 87).

READING VISUAL CULTURES
Roland Barthes: In the process of signification, the secondary signification, or connotation, is where myth is created. A myth, according to Barthes, is an “ideology understood as a body of ideas and practices which defend and actively promote the values and interests of the dominant groups in society” (88). Barthes uses the example of the image in Paris Match: a picture of a black man in a French uniform saluting the French flag. At the level of connotation, there are considerations that go into reading the visual: the context of the publication is paramount in this example. As we understand the role of semiology in the construction of connotative readings, we can go beyond being innocent consumers of myth (90). Images rarely appear without text, and Barthes argues that “the image does not illustrate the text; it is the text which amplifies the connotative potential of the image” (91). The text helps readers pin down the denotative meaning as well as limit the connotative interpretations. It is important to remember that how an image/text is read depends on the “location of the text, the historical moment and the formation of the reader” (92).

Ch. 7 Consumption in Everyday Life

2007-09-09T21:30:00.000-06:00

Before I get started I just want to point out that in my 'Storey book' (the new version), the title has the word 'EVERYDAY' spelled as one word and in the page headings that follow in the chapter the, 'EVERYDAY' is split into, 'EVERY' and 'DAY'. As much as my entry could be about this Derridean moment, I'll reserve it for another discussion maybe.

Consumption in Everyday Life : Abstract
by Matt Dewey

The chapter on consumption stems from the the overall conception of a culture as having a material base and is located in a sense of consumables and the processes of consumption as texts. Given that Storey positions all things cultural as texts allows him to then discuss consumption of texts on the level of a tension between objective (political) and subjective (theoretical) interpretations. He states that cultural studies is concerned with consumption for two reasons: a) the plurality of meanings of a text as it is negotiated over time and use (theoretical); b) that these texts are made and remade by consumers in the practices of the ‘everyday’ (political).

In response to what Storey calls the, ‘pessimistic elitism’, of more critical and structuralist cultural studies, culture in his mind should view texts and their consumption as “production in use” (pg. 133), that there is no set place for the actual meaning of a text to be found but that it should be studied as a process and in its processes of continual meaning formation. Storey goes on to discuss the duality in consumption through studies on youth subcultures, fan cultures and shopping.

Subcultural Consumption

Through an analysis of studies of youth subcultures in working class areas of London (Cohen) Storey, states that youth in subcultures are searching for a unity in affluence promised by their parents working class ethic, and an acceptance from the very consumer based society that rejects them. Therefore, in practice, subcultures like, punks and mods, are an example of , “...consumption at its most discriminating. Through a process of ‘bricolage’, subcultures appropriate for their own purposes and meanings the commodities commercially provided... commodities are rearticulated to produce oppositional meanings “ (pg. 135). By a process of essentially reinventing the meaning of texts, subcultures resist the generalization and assimilation that constitutes mass consumption. It is this negotiation, between positions in society(class) and the rewriting of cultural products that embodies the importance of Storey’s two reasons to the study of consumption.

Fan Culture

Storey goes on the analyze fan culture. While subculture youths rewrite texts to embody their conceptual displacement outside of popular culture, fan culture practices embrace particular texts in order to create additional, supplemental, or intensified versions of those texts. Fan cultures surrounding a TV show would engage in consumption, creation, and recreation of different aspects of text, be it characters, themes, genres, in order to develop specialized and hypostatized understandings of the original or related text. The significance of Fan culture is the process of production and appropriation that lead to readings/ consumptions(141) that are entirely separate text. Fans, not unlike subcultural youths, create communities of people who share a common interest in recreating alternative understandings and uses of the ‘popular’ or generally accepted meaning of products.

Shopping

Storey suggests that in looking at shopping from a cultural studies perspective we would find that it is not simply an activity that culminates in the purchasing of a product. Though phenomena such as the department store once served the submissive tastes of the bourgeois, today the act of shopping can serve a number of different social functions such as exercise, interaction with others, employment, and immediate and temporary shelter for the weather stricken or homeless.

To conclude the article description, Storey in general seems to want us to not automatically assume that we are all mindlessly consuming products because of some unseen productive evil. Though we should not forget that there are motive behind advertising and 2-for-one sales, consumption is more nuanced and creative in culture than merely supportive for economic systems. It is a way to share interests and create new ones.

Analysis

“... the problem of capitalism is not production, but consumption”
- Sut Jhally, Advertising and the End of the World (1998)

Although I appreciate Storey’s insistence on the theoretical and political implications in the study of consumption I can’t help but wonder if Storey's two reasons are actual the same, or so incorporated and constitutive of each other that their separation is merely academic. I do, I admit, have problems with seeing how plurality of meanings of texts are separate from the process of creation and recreation of those meanings. It could be as well that my misunderstanding doesn’t even matter or that the two reasons were never placed in dialectical opposition. Storey does though seem to disconnect conceptually another issue of consumption by implying that in order to determine the extent of social control, “requires vigilance and attention to details of the active relations between production and consumption”(133). I thought at first I was making too big a deal out of it but as I read on, it seems particularly important for Storey that the idea of consumption lie evenly outside the process of production (structural) as it does inside in order for his two reasons to be separately considered. I’m not so sure that his analysis frees consumption from structure as much as he aims to.

Though of course the processes of producing a product are mechanically different from the act of buying the product in a store, they are bound intrinsically and inseperably, specifically the United States, to the narrative of capitalism. The relationship between production and consumption is not arbitrary but explicit. The idea that subcultural youth negotiate class issues through recreating the meaning of the products they consume suggest a non- negotiation, or an essential acceptance and adherence, to the logic and promise of consumption. Whether one is ‘discriminately consuming’ or consuming through depression the orientation to material is still complete. This leads me to ask as I was reading the chapter at what point in the discussion of texts and their negotiation is there not a reinforcement or apology for the structure that guides it? Where then, does the power that causes class struggle or forms the hegemony of a mass culture suddenly become innocuous?

If consumption was arbitrary, if for most people it was a leisure activity of whim, as it seems to be for the ‘fan culture’, we could insist that it be studied from a purely humanistic interactive perspective. But this sort of consuming is privileged; Walmart does so well not because it is a cultural mecca of fashion, but because its demographic is the poor and middle class which make up a majority of the population. Consumption is specifically class oriented and class is specifically structural.

The underline idea Storey is discussing in the negotiation of consumption is the negotiation of identity or the formation of it. The idea of identity in consumer goods is a specific articulation of advertising but has its historical roots in the separation of classes. Those who can afford to be discriminating have the ability to pick and choose, have access to this market or that, wear purple instead of green; access and accumulation to such goods defined the bourgeois ethic. To return to the discussion of youth subcultures, punk lost its identity or negotiation with popular culture when specific stores or agents began to cater to their ‘style’ (the idea of 'Style' being an ‘acceptance of’ or ‘hierarchy’ according Stuart Ewen in All Consuming Images, 1988). It is in this idea of identity that consumption is acutely structural as well.

I understand that this places me specifically in the structuralist camp. It could also be my educational background in the study of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas (The Frankfurt School), that has made me acute to accusation of elitism that they have often received. I believe Storey short cuts the importance of the Frankfurt School's influence in the shaping of his own analysis and in the Birmingham experience in general. For instance, his discussion of appropriation he takes from Hebdige (born in 1951), is the same discussion Adorno and Horkheimer had in the, Dialectic of Enlightenment , printed in 1944. Of course this discussion could be traced through Marx and beyond. Adorno (from Marx) reinforces the analysis that it is capitalism that breeds class struggle and that through the logic of the market, or in the problem of consumption, laws, policies, suburbs and educations are created and used to negotiate meaning.

Of course this is not an effort to decide who said what first, but to show for instance that the analysis that comes from the Frankfurt School comes specifically out of resistance to Nazi fascism. If there is an aura of elitism in discussions of the power of culture and structure, those accusation must be in an involved historical perspective. It may seem just as hierarchical to place cultural welfare in the hands of ‘discriminating consumers’.

We may now have to acknowledge, given the extent and speed of global capital, the interminable existence of a consumptive based society. As out-sourcing continues, we will soon no longer produce anything in this country we consume. This separation is not negotiated (in public) but structural. I myself consume many things that would be considered privileged in another context (such as Darfur). I consume free range and recyclables because I can afford to (at the beginning of the month) and can choose to blur the distinctions between negotiated meanings of consumables as art or identity. But this is an affordance of structure and not negotiation.

But this discussion is not to say that Storey is not aware of his privilege either. His effort I believe is to find the particular moments in culture where we are, conceptually at least, free to self actuate. If we are always and continually victims of structure our actualization is always in service of the state or multinational corporation. His discussion of how fan cultures “rereading” (146) of texts frees their attention from ‘what will happen’ to ‘ how things happen’ is particularly convincing for what it may bring to the pedagogy of media literacy, even for the possibilities of media production.

Chapter Two: Summary

2007-09-09T20:25:00.000-06:00

Chapter Two: Television
From: Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture, by John Storey
By: Bridgett Vanderwalker
Summary:
Storey states that “Television is the popular cultural form of the twenty-first century” (9). Storey divides the chapter into four specific theories of how television functions in cultural studies and their various aspects.
Encoding And Decoding Television Discourse
Storey starts with Hall’s ideas presented in his work ‘Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse.’ First media produces a raw event on television which wants to carry across a dominant viewpoint. The media producers have a certain motive in their work but once it leaves their hands it will be absorbed based on the audiences’ preconceived notions that may be different than was intended. The second process is once the product is produced it can then be process and may produce public discourse. The third process involves decoding the message if it meaningful it will open the “market for more consumption if not consumption will end and so will any discussion. Storey stresses that meanings and messages cannot be transmitted but produced and those messages are based in a certain context and time. Misunderstandings are always possible with the intention of the program because it may be too difficult or too strange to the domestic context of outside the dominant code”(12). When an audience is in concord with the program they are operating within dominate and professional code. A second option for audiences is the ‘negotiated code or position.’ “It accords the privileged position to the dominant definitions of events while reserving the right to make a more negotiated application to ‘local conditions’, to its own corporate positions”(13). The third position Hall indentifies is that of “the oppositional code.” This is where the viewer recognizes the preferred message but chooses an alternative meaning. Hall stages how individuals interpret television programs within a social position.
1. The production of a meaningful message in the TV discourse is always problematic ‘work’. Translation: Any message can be interpret in several ways
2. The message in social communication is always complex in structure and form.
3. Messages encoded one way can always be read in a different way.(14)
Hall makes a good point when he says decoding of messages are not exclusive to what social position one holds. He says it is class plus “particular discourse positions produce specific readings”.(15) Hall goes on to say that not all messages hold the same level and this based on the context one finds themselves.
Television Talk
Morely another theorist says “the domestic context of TV viewing,[ ] is constitutive of its meaning”(18). Morely takes a much more individualistic viewpoint in that it is individuals who interrupt television programs. He makes an excellent point in pointing out that watching television is a social act which promotes social relationships and unites people where otherwise certain social groups would not normally associate with each other. Hobson makes a point to point out that people watch different programs for different reasons. The viewers bring many different ideas and feelings to a program and thus they are able to make their own interpretations. Hobson says: “New contexts will bring about the enactment of new significances; a narrative [in this case a soap opera] seemingly discarded seems suddenly to have a new relevance and a new utility”(21). “Hobson insists that viewers ‘work with the text and add their own experiences and opinions to the stories in the programme’”(22). Hobson also comments on that one storyline may have different meanings it is how the individual interprets it that the text comes alive. Hobson says that a text has a material structure which has a variety of interpretations. Viewers view programs from social and discursive and thus a there are limits to the text. In conclusion a program is a stepping stone for discussion of wider social groups that see generalizations that apply to humanity as a whole.
Television And ‘The Ideology Of Mass Culture’
The Dutch theorist, Ien Ang, states that “realism is an illusion created by the extent to which a text can successfully conceal its constructiveness”(26). Essentially, viewing a program is decoding and constructing meaning by intermingling ourselves in the narrative itself so even the most unrealistic texts can have meaning if the viewer is engaged in the text. As long as a show has cultural or individualistic relevance in the human sphere it can be seen as discussion of human issues. Ang say that while some may like or dislike a show it is based on if they are engaging with the text and whether they see the show as a product of mass media. Ang makes a valid point when she says: “fantasy and fiction does not function in place of, but besides, other dimensions of life (social practice, moral or political consciousness)”(31).
The Two Economies Of Television
John Fishe says that “the power of the audience-as-producers in the cultural economy is considerable”(32). Fishe believes cultural commodities such as television and films revolve around two economies financial and cultural. Financial revolves around exchange value while cultural is concerned with meanings, pleasures, and social identities. If TV producers can’t predict what audiences want they will fail to sell their product. In this viewpoint popular culture is seen as ‘a site of struggle’ where both economic and aesthetic concerns are competing for balance.
Questions
1. What American studies have been done recently on the two economies of television where it seems particularly relevant to see the financial side and viewer side and how functions in American society.

Chapter Four: Film

2007-09-09T16:05:00.000-06:00

From: Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture, John Storey
Chapter Four: Film
By: Tyson Livingston

Summary:

For the chapter on film, Storey indicates that his aim is to “discuss key moments in the discussion of film and cultural studies” rather than discuss the most recent developments in this area of the field. He divides the chapter into the following sections: Structuralism and Film, Visual Pleasure in Film, and Cultural Studies and Film.

Structuralism and Film

Storey notes two major works in film cultural studies that occurred in 1975: Sixguns and Society, by Will Wright, and ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’, by Laura Mulvey. This first section examines Sixguns and Society, which was classically structuralist in its treatment.

Storey begins by discussing the ideas of Ferdiand de Saussure from which much of structuralist theory is derived. He discussed language as a “system of contrasts and opposites... [that] constructs our access to reality” (74). He indicated that language was divided into two parts which produced a third. These are the signifier, which is the inscription of a word, the signified, which is the mental image initiated by that word, and these two come together to produce the sign. Because of the ways these parts interact, “the way in which we ultimately conceptualize the world is ultimately dependent on the language that we speak and, by analogy, the culture that we inhabit” (74). His ideas also include his concept of Language and Parole, where language refers to the structures and rules, and Parole refers to individual utterance. Storey finishes his discussion of Saussure by indicating that, following structuralism, it is the job of the culturist to show how rules and conventions determine the meaning of a given text. He then refers to Levi-Strauss and his example of myth, and how it works like language.

After discussing Levi-Strauss’s example of myth, he then turns directly to Sixguns and Society and indicates how Wright analyzed the Hollywood Western as American myth. By using binary relations and other structuralist techniques, Wright explored how the interaction of the hero, society, and the villain conceptualized American social beliefs and the myth of the American Dream. He also demonstrated how the evolution of the Western through three different periods reflected the change in those social beliefs and the changing perceptions of how to obtain the American Dream based on those beliefs.

Visual Pleasure in Film

In the second section, Storey discusses Laura Mulvey’s ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.’ Mulvey seemed to focus on “the male gaze” in cinema, which posited that in film women are viewed as objects of male desire, and also represent the threat of castration.

The first part of this idea seems pretty straightforward, that the woman functions as an object of erotic desire, both for the hero and for the male spectator in the audience. I admit, however, that I am still a little fuzzy on the ins and outs of the second part. Mulvey indicates that when viewing the female form the absence of a penis implies the threat of castration, and that this ‘look’ can only be countered through one of two methods. The first is by investigating the original moment of trauma and then eventually devaluing, punishing, or saving the guilty object. The second is to fetishize the woman so that she becomes a thing of beauty in and of herself, a pure erotic spectacle (78-79). I admit that I am still a little fuzzy on how we get from point A to point B to point C on this part.

Mulvey ultimately argued that this pleasure in the cinema had to be eliminated to free women from ‘the male gaze’. Her work was quite influential, so much so that others have explored and further defined and refined her ideas. For example, examining if the male gaze is always present or just dominate over a ‘female gaze.’ The question has also been raised that her theory doesn’t take into account the possibility of the audience being more than a passive spectator, when in fact the audience would negotiate with the film based on its own experiences and discourse.

Cultural Studies and Film

The last section focuses primarily on the research of Christine Gledhill and Jackie Stacey. Gledhill recognized the act of negotiation between the spectator and the film. She indicated that “meaning is neither imposed, nor passively imbibed, but arises out of a struggle or negotiation between competing frames of reference, motivation, and experience” (80). She further indicated that this negotiation could be studied on three different levels: audience, texts, and institutions.

Stacey elaborates on this approach based on her research from the end of the 1980s where she surveyed women in their 60s who were avid movie-goers in the 40s and 50s. This way she was able to study the actual consumption of the film. Three areas were addressed in her study. The first, escapism was one of the primary reasons her subjects went to the cinema. She determined that this escapism manifested not only from the film itself, but from the environment of the theater, and the community of movie-goers. It also provided a means of escape not only to the utopian vision of the Hollywood screen, but from the hardships of wartime Britain.

The second, identification, indicated that women shared a fluidity of identity with the women onscreen and were able to identify with the actors because of some shared quality or trait, such as hair color. This sharing of identity would often extend beyond he film experience, leaving the spectators with a fantasy of a more powerful and confident self that could ultimately act as a form of resistance.

The third area, consumption, was defined by Stacey as “a site of negotiated meanings, resistance, and of appropriation as well as of subject and exploitation” (84). She gave the example that the fashions of hollywood stars went against the more restricted ideas of british femininity. Therefore the consumption of these films by women were a resistance to extend and negotiate those standards.

Chapter Two - Television, John Storey

2007-09-09T13:54:00.000-06:00

Summary: John Storey’s Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture, “Chapter 2, Television.”
By Jennifer Lowry

Storey begins this chapter by stating: “Television is the popular culture form of the twenty-first century” (9). He breaks the chapter up into four parts: “Encoding and Decoding Televisual Discourse,” “Television Talk,” “Television and ‘The Ideology of Mass Culture’,” and “The Two Economies of Television”.

Encoding and Decoding Televisual Discourse
In the first section he describes Stuart Hall’s “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse.” Hall argues that there are three moments that televisual discourse must pass through in order to make meaning (9). The first moment is the point at which the media professionals portray a “’raw’ social event” (10). At this point the media professionals have the power because they are in control of “how the ‘raw’ social event will be encoded in discourse” (10). The second moment occurs after the “’raw’ social event” is in the “form of televisual discourse” and the “formal rules of language and discourse are ‘in dominance’” (11). Essentially, the event has been produced in a discourse (encoded), presented in television and now is in the hands of the viewer to interpret its meaning (decoded). This is where the third moment occurs, in the process of the audience decoding the message (‘raw’ social event). “If the event is to become ‘meaningful’ to the audience, it must decode and make sense of the discourse” (11) but the information that is decoded is not always what was encoded. This is where the concepts of dominant or preferred code take place. If the audience is not privy to the dominant code, the decoding of the message will not take on the meaning intended.

Television Talk
David Morley in ‘The Nationwide Audience” tested Hall’s model “to see how individual interpretations of televisual texts relate to ‘social position’” (14). Morley broke decoding into three categories: dominant, negotiated, and oppositional. He determined that social position determines access to different discourses and therefore, social class position is not the only determinant of decoding. Experience also influences interpretation of text; Morley argues that television viewing is a domestic activity, which inevitably plays a role in the interpretation process.
Since television viewing is a social act, television leads to social conversation as evidenced by Dorothy Hobson’s research in Crossroads: The Drama of a Soap Opera. Hobson argues that television interpretation is also influenced by culture and experience, the message changes depending on the viewer’s culture or prior experiences. Television and real life can merge through interpretation, “viewers are able to use events within television narratives to explore issues in their own lives; issues that might otherwise remain too painful to speak about openly in public” (23). Television allows people to distance themselves from the problem by speaking about it in the form of a fictional character or story (25). Hobson argues that women especially use television as a means for social interaction.

Television and ‘The Ideology of Mass Culture’
Dutch Cultural critic Ien Ang came to similar conclusions in her research about the prime time soap opera Dallas. She found that viewers went through a “selective process, reading across the text from denotation to connotation, weaving our sense of self in and out of the narrative” (26). While the viewers may not have everything in common with the characters of a television show, they are able to recognize “fundamental things in common: relationships and broken relationships, happiness and sadness, illness and health” (26). Based upon the information gathered in her research, the viewers are separated into four “reading positions” which Ang calls “the ideology of mass culture” (28).
Mass culture:
Popular culture is the result of capitalist commodity production and is therefore subject to the laws of the capitalist market economy; the result of which is the seemingly endless circulation of degraded commodities, whose only real significance is that they make a profit for their producers (28).

The first group is those who dislike the programme: since the programme is mass culture, the group dislikes it. The second group is those who like the show and still “subscribe to the ideology of mass culture (28). But in order to do so, these viewers read the show through irony. The third group is the fans who “find it necessary to locate their pleasure in relation to the ideology of mass culture; they ‘internalise’ the ideology; they ‘negotiate’ with the ideology; they use ’surface irony’ to defend their pleasure against the withering dismissal of the ideology” (29-30). The final group is “informed by the ideology of populism. The core of this ideology is the belief that one person’s taste is of equal value to another person’s taste” (30), meaning that it is open to individualism and that judgments should not be made against others.

The Two Economies of Television
The final section of this chapter discusses John Fiske’s idea that “cultural commodities – including television – from which popular culture is made circulate in simultaneous economies: the financial and cultural” (32).
Financial economy: “concerned with exchange value”
Cultural economy: “primarily focused on use – ‘meanings, pleasures, and social identities’” (32).
Fiske uses the example of the show Hill Street Blues that was sold to NBC and sponsored by Mercedes Benz.
In the cultural economy, the series changed form a cultural commodity (to be sold to NBC) to a site for the production of meanings and pleasures for its audience. In the same way, the audience changed from commodity (to be sold to Mercedes Benz) to a producer of meanings and pleasures (32).
In this context the audience has power since the production of meaning and pleasure is more difficult to come by than the production of wealth. The producers of television are not always able to predict what will sell (32) giving the consumer the power. Different cultures will also view the same program in different ways, often using it to its own purpose. Fiske uses “the example of the Russian Jews watching Dallas in Israel and reading it as ‘capitalism’s self criticism’” (33).
According to Fiske, “resistance to the power of the powerful by those without power in Western societies takes two forms: semiotic and social” (33).
Semiotic resistance: concerned with meanings, pleasures and social identities
Social resistance: concerned with transformations of the socio-economic system (33).
Popular culture is a “site of struggle” operating mostly in semiotic power (33). “Semiotic resistance – in which the dominant meanings are challenged by subordinate meanings – has the effect of undermining capitalism’s attempt at ideological homogeneity” (33).

Question:

Who really has the power in the reading of television? While the audience obviously holds the power in interpretation, the producers are the ones who determine what is on television in the first place. Is what we interpret really our choice?

Storey, CH 2

2007-09-06T20:57:00.000-06:00

Bill Schnupp

Abstract: John Storey’s Cultural Studies and the Study of Popular Culture

Summary: Chapter 2: Television

I. The Cycle of Televisual Discourse

The widespread popularity of television as a cultural form led to Stuart Hall’s “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,” a piece in which the author posits a three-part model of televisual communication:

1. Media professionals convert a “raw” social event into televisual discourse

2. Once the event has taken the form of televisual discourse, formal rules of language and discourse are in play.

3. The audience must decode not the actual event, but the media’s translation. The act of decoding—of making meaning from the translation—is itself a social act, open to encoding in another distinct discourse, This begets a cycle in which production moves to consumption, and back to production, a self-perpetuating cycle that feeds upon itself.

Main ideas: “The circuit starts in the social and ends, to begin again, in the social.”
-“Meanings and messages are not simply transmitted, they are always produced” (11).

II. Decoding and Misunderstandings

Hall assumes two difficulties in the decoding process: first, “misunderstandings of a literal kind. . .[in which] the viewer does not know the terms employed, cannot follow the complex logic of argument or exposition. . .but more often, broadcasters are concerned. . .that viewers are not operating within the dominant of preferred code” (12). Hall’s primary concern is with this second type of misunderstanding, an occurrence directly linked with the engagement of formal language and discourse structures that form the second stage in his model of televisual discourse.

Hall outlines three primary decoding positions:

1. Dominant-hegemonic position, in which the viewer interprets the message
within the confines of the power structure and professional code out forth by the
broadcaster.

2. Negotiated code or position, likely the most common, in which viewers
recognize the authority and legitimacy of the broadcast discourse, but blend often
oppositional elements that have more direct bearing on their personal life.

3.Oppositional code, adopted by viewers who recognize the validity of the
discursive mode, but nonetheless chooses to operated from an opposing frame of
reference.

Hall’s hypothetical decoding positions sparked David Morley’s Nationwide Audience project, an undertaking concerned with how social class influenced decoding, and explored such ideas as:

1. “how and why certain production practices and structures tend to produce certain
messages, which embody their meanings in certain recurring forms”

2. “The message in social communication is always complex in structure and form. It
always contains more than one potential reading”

3. “Messages encoded in one way can always be read in a different way” (14).

In his project, Morley’s population was a collection of twenty-nine different groups, socially stratified to include students, apprentices, schoolboys, shop stewards, middle-class bank managers, and public officials. Each was asked to watch two episodes of the BBC’s Nationwide news program. Morley analyzed each group’s reading, confirming many of Hall’s prior ideas. Morley’s ultimate findings, however, indicated that “decodings are not determined directly from social class position. Rather, it is always a question of how social position plus particular discourse positions produce specific readings; readings which are structured because the structure of access to different discourses is determined by social position” (15).

Main ideas: “When we are interpellated by a text, this is always in a context of other
interpellations”(16).

-“The text reader encounter does not occur in a moment isolated from other discourses, but always in a field of many discourses, some in harmony with the text, some of which are in contradiction with it”(16).

-“decodings are not determined directly from social class position. Rather, it is always a question of how social position plus particular discourse positions produce specific readings; readings which are structured because the structure of access to different discourses is determined by social position” (15).

III. Television and Family

Morley’s Nationwide endeavor led to his Family Television project, an undertaking limited by a lack of time and money, but nonetheless concerned with television practices within the home. Practice—though perhaps not an obvious choice of terms—is accurate regardless, as Morley concern here was “how television is interpreted (literary/semiological approaches) and how television is used (sociological approaches)” (18). Issues of audience decoding and choice as they relate to family leisure were paramount here. In this context, television is a social practice—both a means of interaction and isolation, as well as a valuable and common discursive currency in everyday cultural economy.

Morley’s ideas led to Dorothy Hobson’s Crossroads: The Drama of a Soap Opera. In her study, Hobson viewed the program Crossroads, and conducted open-ended follow-up interviews with, participants (predominantly women). Though light on theory, Hobson’s ethnographic study nonetheless provided some interesting observations.

1. The circumstances of viewing are highly varied: Some viewers sit and watch the program,
while many conduct daily domestic activities.

2. The interpretation—the reading—of the program is ongoing and adaptive, stretching far
beyond the initial moment of consumption.

3. The program serves as a platform for social interaction; a place from which viewers could
actively transition from “program discourse” to personal, domestic, and professional
discourse.

4. Viewers rely on their own experience to judge events on television programs.

5. Soap operas allow viewers a means of interpreting and coping with their problems, shared
both by actual people, as well as characters on the program. Thus, Hobson posits that
innumerable interpretations of a program exist.

6. Discussion of events in a program leads to discussion of events in viewers’ lives, events
otherwise too painful to speak about elsewhere.

7. Interweaving actual events with program fiction leads to the creation of a culture of
viewers.

On the fifth point, Storey disagrees, arguing that that are definite material and contextual limitations on the possible number of interpretations of a specific program. On the final point, however, Mary Ellen Brown echoes Hobson’s point, and furthers it with the contention that viewers undertake a “carnivalesque sense of play in the crossing opf boundaries between fiction and reality. Furthermore, Brown maintains that women’s talk about soap operas is best understood as a fundamental part of the long tradition of women’s oral culture” (24).

Tamar Liebs and Elihu Katz further this strand of argument, and put forth that
soap operas are not escapist, but are instead a forum for social, family, political, and other discussions, as a result of the agenda set between program producers and consumers.

Main ideas: “television talk provides cultural studies with an important bridge between the social and the textual” (25).

-television is a social practice—both a means of interaction and isolation, as well as a valuable and common discursive currency in everyday cultural economy.

-soap operas are not escapist, but are instead a forum for social, family, political, and other discussions, as a result of the agenda set between program producers and consumers.

-the interpretation—the reading—of the program is ongoing and adaptive, stretching far beyond the initial moment of consumption.

-the program serves as a platform for social interaction; a place from which viewers could actively transition from “program discourse” to personal and professional discourse.

-discussion of events in a program leads to discussion of events in viewers’ lives, events otherwise too painful to speak about elsewhere.

-interweaving actual events with program fiction leads to the creation of a culture of viewers.

IV. Television and Mass Culture

Dutch cultural critic Ien Ang took up the soap opera idea in a study in which she placed an add in a popular magazine soliciting viewer opinion about the television series Dallas. Forty-two responses, both from critics and supporters of the program led Ang to the conclusion that the program was popular for its “emotional realism,” and that the degree to which viewers found Dallas good or bad was based on their perception of its realism (good) or lack of authenticity (bad). Interestingly, Ang found that elements of Dallas that were unreal and regarded as such at the denotative level were not considered unrealistic at the connotative level.

Much of the program’s popularity was based on the ease with which viewers could transition between the fiction of the program and the everyday lives. It gives rise to the “melodramatic imagination.” Essentially, Ang found that Dallas “is not a compensation for the presumed drabness of everyday life, nor a flight from it, but a dimension of it” (27).

From these findings, Ang posits “the ideology of mass culture,” the idea that “popular culture is the result of capitalist commodity production and is therefore subject to the laws of the capitalist market economy; the result of which is the seemingly endless circulation of degraded commodities, whose only real significance is that they make a profit for their producers” (28). This theory enabled Ang to lump viewers into four categories: those who strongly dislike the program because it is an example of mass culture; those who give the program an ironical viewing, in which the program is mocked for its melodrama and transformed into a comedic program—the pleasure of viewing results from the fact that the program is, in fact, bad and worthy of mockery; fans, who internalize the ideology of mass culture and appreciate the program for what it is; and the populist, who views with the contention that it is pointless to pass aesthetic judgment on the tastes of others. The first three positions signify an unequal struggle between those who argue from within the security of mass culture, and those who resist it.

Ang concludes that the popularity of such programs lie in their ability to “construct imaginary solutions for real contradictions. . .which in their fictional simplicity and their simple fictionality step outside the tedious complexity of social relations of dominance and subordination” (31).

Main ideas: “popular culture is the result of capitalist commodity production and is therefore subject to the laws of the capitalist market economy; the result of which is the seemingly endless circulation of degraded commodities, whose only real significance is that they make a profit for their producers” (28).

-there is an unequal struggle between those who argue from within the security of mass culture, and those who resist it.

- the popularity of such programs lie in their ability to “construct imaginary solutions for real contradictions. . .which in their fictional simplicity and their simple fictionality step outside the tedious complexity of social relations of dominance and subordination” (31).

V. Fiske’s Two Economies

Chapter two concludes with John Fiske’s argument that television inhabits two economies: financial, concerned with exchange values; and cultural, centered around “meanings, pleasures, and social identities” (32). Resistance to the power of the powerful in Western societies takes two forms: semiotic, concerned with meanings, pleasures and social identities; and social, dealing with transformations of the socio-economic system. The concepts are related, though autonomous. Popular culture is thus involved in the struggle between consensus and conflict, a place where the “hegemonic forces of homogeneity are always met by the resistance of heterogeneity” (33)

Fiske recognizes popular culture as a site of struggle between dominant forces, and diverts attention to how theses forces are coped with, resisted, or evaded.

Main ideas: Resistance to the power of the powerful in Western societies takes two forms: semiotic, concerned with meanings, pleasures and social identities; and social, dealing with transformations of the socio-economic system. The concepts are related, though autonomous.

- Popular culture is thus involved in the struggle between consensus and conflict, a place where the “hegemonic forces of homogeneity are always met by the resistance of heterogeneity” (33).

Key Terms:

Ideology of Mass Culture
Cultural Economy
Discourse
Encoding
Decoding:
Dominant-hegemonic
Negotiated
Oppositional

People:

John Storey
Stuart Hall
David Morley
Dorothy Hobson
Mary Ellen Brown
Tamar Liebs
Elihu Katz
Ien Ang
John Fiske

Questions:

1. What do you make of Storey’s objection to Hobson’s notion of infinite readings? (23)

2. Do you agree with Hobson’s idea that television programs can lead to discussion of events in viewers’ lives, events otherwise too painful to speak about elsewhere? Why or why not?

Hall article abstract

2007-09-05T22:16:00.000-06:00

Abstract of Stuart Hall article, “Cultural Studies: two paradigms (1980).
By Matt Dewey

Description

As the title of article suggests, Hall attempts to describe two types of approaches to the study of culture. Hall presents the differences between the two paradigms as based on conceptions of the process and purpose of culture, the importance or place of experience, and the positioning or hierarchy of levels of abstraction such as the existence of dialectical relationships between conditions and consciousness and the function of ideology. The two tendencies of cultural study are characterized specifically by Hall through their overarching basis of a, ‘theory of culture’; one being a culturalist approach, the other a structuralist approach.

Hall describes the culturalist guiding definition of ‘culture’ as, “the sum of the available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their common experiences” (33). This he suggests has ‘democratized’ culture from an elite status, one comprised of the ‘best’ or ‘privileged’ in access, to a framework that involves the common or ordinary; that all things (art, commodity, ideas, process, etc.) create by community (everyone regardless of status) possess the ability to define and redefine (represent) meaning that permeates throughout community process. This approach opens up all cultural phenomena to criticism and dissolves the traditional modernist distinction of high/low culture.

The second paradigm Hall discusses, as if regarding it as a dialectical in itself to culturalism, is the structuralist approach. The study of culture, to the structuralist, is not in the sum of cultural phenomena but in the relationships between and the organization underlying those elements or phenomena and how those patterns are lived an experienced as a whole (34). The term ‘structural’ itself gives the idea of culture a more rigid, determinative, and subjectlessness that the culturalist approach tends to resist.

Because Hall divides the study into two particular approaches his discussion continues in treating issues and phenomena of cultural studies through the perspectives and contradictions of each approach contending that the study of culture benefits from the interactions and conceptual conflicts of the two. Hall ends his discussion with presenting ‘alternative rallying points’ for ‘inadequacies’ of the paradigms that take into account develops of in both study and culture in general. These points further the processes of culture through the repositioning of the important of a ‘subject’ (the individual) in culture, a repositioning of the critic of the political economy of culture (Marx’s base/superstructure), and the idea of control in a decentralized, heterogeneity.

Comments and Questions

“Since our way of seeing things is literally our way of living, the process of communication is in fact the process of community: the sharing of common meanings, and thence common activities and purposes…”
-Raymond Williams as quoted by Stuart Hall (35)

“How we communicate determines how we relate, just as how we relate determines how we communicate”
– Hugh Duncan, (1967)

Halls two paradigms and the conceptual struggle between them are not so new in the sense that the particular descriptions of both amount to similar types of tensions related to pedagogy and, in my particular case, the study of communication in general. Given that I read Hall’s article through the perspective of communication study, a perspective that is itself a member of a dialectical in the study, I would like to start my discussion by relating the approach in hopes that it clarifies my attempt at making sense of not only Hall, but the concept of cultural studies in general.

The history of communication studies shares a residency in the classrooms of English departments and in the study rhetoric. World events (such as WWII) are as much responsible for the separation of communication study and English departments as the tendency for new forming sciences to push for legitimization through specialization, scientification, and the search for a unified theory.

As communication studies concrete escape from English departments after WWII, this process of rupture (what Kuhn suggests in 1970 as a process of revolution in sciences) continued internally and continues today, in communication departments across the world; a) communication study as one of recreating effective speech patterns (science and instrumentalization), and the study of communication for emancipation and understanding (arts and humanities). To put it another way, the split resides in ones orientation to skills training and theories of control and power. This tension materializes in studies of, on one side, speech giving, interpersonal and small group comm., audience analysis; and on the other, studies in perspective, ideology, critical mass comm. study, and theories of power in modern and postmodern contexts. One could also generalize this difference in the larger struggle between academics that apply directly to the business of business and those that are not so applicable or in capital ‘demand’.

Halls quote by Williams above would be a mantra of what I would consider the ideal reference for communication studies, and communication studies ideal and particularly pragmatic approach to cultural studies. Cultural studies, to avoid the formalization both Johnson and Hall resist, is more commonly known as critical communication studies and has its own similar dialectics or oppositions. Some communication theorist believe if one is not studying culture from a specific leftist perspective then they are simply reinforcing status quo formulations of relationships and power. Others believe it is important to study culture from an ‘as is’ context in order to keep research relevant and useful. But in all approaches, as in Halls two paradigms, the same significant questions should be asked and the same final analyses kept in view.

So why the time spent on the comparison? Its my impression that one approach cannot accurately identify or account for the phenomenon of culture, nor a recipe of both. I believe that both the Johnson and Hall articles develop, more than a difference in approaches, but a specific set of ends and conflicts for cultural studies. Drawing from teh different appraoches to communication studies, Hall implicitly, through the use of differences, asks us to decide in our attempts to study culture whether we are to study culture in an effort to explain it, exactly how it is, so others can regal a our intuitiveness, so the processes and research methods can be galvanized and repeated again and again, or are we to study culture for where it breaks down, causes interference and conflict in order to better guide the future? (Though I have taken liberties in my interpretation, I believe Hall tries to suggest a particular path for how to study culture without calling it "correct").

Experience

The most potent and communicatively familiar topic in Halls discussion is centered around the conception of the ontological ability or level of trust in the concept of experience. Hall suggests that though both perspectives acknowledge the importance of experience, where its significance in cultural meaning differs in where one place the power of the institution; where culturalists view experience as an interplay between ‘consciousness and conditions’; to structuralists, experience is merely a reflection of those conditions (40).

On this point I’m not sure I could position myself in either approach. Though I romantically distrust the idea that my experience is ‘structured’, I as well cannot think of a concept of experience (or consciousness) that is removed enough from ‘conditions’ to form a distinct dialectic of interaction as proposed by culturalist. From the perspective of communication studies this tension between structuralists and culturalist embodies the tension between modernist and postmodernist approaches to the age old individual/ community dualism or, to safely wrap up the discussion, the contemporary condition itself through which we must study a communication of emancipation.

There is a saying in comm. studies that suggests ‘one cannot separate the known from the knower’ (I think it was Thomas Kuhn again). This essential states a distrust of objectivity as well as recovers and appreciates the subjective, the human subject in knowledge. My impression of the article is that Hall, in presenting his two paradigms as centering around dialectics of consciousness/conditions, base/superstructure, culture/ideology, is as well suggesting that our approach to the study of culture be equally, if not sharply dialectical as well.

2007-09-05T12:48:00.000-06:00

Abstract of Stuart Hall's "Cultural Studies: Two Paradigms"
by Tom Peele

Description of Article
The two paradigms within Cultural Studies that form the basis of Hall's title are culturalism and structuralism. Culturalism claims that experience is the base of culture; structuralism claims that experience is an effect of culture, that culture is an unconscious manifestation, and that consciousness (self-determination) is merely another effect of unconsciousness.

Hall begins this article with a description of the foundational texts of Cultural Studies: Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy, and Williams' Culture and Society and The Long Revolution (31, 31-32). His purpose, here, is to demonstrate that though these scholars' ideas changed over time, the enduring and perhaps defining feature of their work is their insistence on experience as the basis of culture. Hall calls this a culturalist position.

He posits the culturalist position, with its reliance on experience, against a structuralist position, which claims that experience is itself merely an effect of culture; the concept of "genuine experience" is in fact the result of culture itself. Hall claims that Cultural Studies takes place in between these two broad and opposing concepts. The main strength of culturalism is that it insist on human agency and the relevance of individuality. The main strength of structuralism is that it insists that human agency must always be considered within the context of pre-existing conditions.

By happy coincidence, Hall maps two of the main directions we'll take in this course -- the study of Barthes and semiotics, and the study of Foucault and agency within pre-existing conditions.

Key Terms

base and superstructure
culturalist (below)
structuralist (below)
ideology (41)
over-determination (41, 44)
ideological state apparatus (42)

Comments and Questions
Hall tells us that in the history of ideas, what we find is an "untidy bu characteristic unevenness of development. What is important are the significant breaks - where old lines of thought are disrupted, older constellations displaced, and elements, old and new, are regrouped around a different set of premises and themes" (31). Clearly, here is the premise of this article.

Hall outlines the beginnings of what we currently call "cultural studies," and describes how the field itself emerges "from one such moment" in the form of three foundational texts: Hoggart's The Uses of Literacy, and Williams' Culture and Society and The Long Revolution (31, 31-32).

These texts were made possible by and were in response to British culture in the 1960's and 70's, was "roughly coterminous with what has been called the 'agenda' of the New Left. . . . [and] placed the 'politics of intellectual work' squarely at the centre of Cultural Studies from the beginning" (32, 33).

Like Johnson, Hall doesn't define "culture" or "cultural studies," but he does briefly "resume the characteristic stresses and emphases through which the concept has arrived at its present state of (in)-determinacy" (33).

Again following Williams in Revolution, Hall describes "two different ways of conceptualizing culture"; culture is the sum of the "available descriptions through which societies make sense of and reflect their common experiences" (33). Culture is ordinary, then; this concept constitutes a radical departure from earlier concepts of culture, even though is deals with the question of ideas. It thinks of ideas as all the ways of making meaning, and not just of high literary texts.

The second concept of culture is made up of social practices. This concept seems rather more abstract than ideas, and once I compare it with the concept of culture, it makes both seem abstract almost to the point of incomprehension. The "theory of culture," he writes, "is defined as 'the study of relationships between elements in a whole way of life'. Culture is not a practice. . . . It is threaded through all social practices and is the sum of their inter-relationships" (34). One was to study, then, all aspects of culture, and not separate our specific aspects.

My question here, then, is how do we separate a culture's ideas from its social practices? Isn't meaning making itself a social practice? Is that my view simply because of my profession?

For the next several pages, Hall describes the changes in the ways Williams and Thompson defined culture, but concludes that while these changes (and the differences in their ways of thinking) are significant, the key feature of their definitions of culture is that "in their tendency to reduce practices to praxis and to find common and homologous 'forms' underlying the most apparently differentiated areas, their movement is 'essentializing'. They have a particular way of understanding totailty. . . . They understand it 'expressively'" (39). This, then, is what Hall describes as the Culturalist tradition in cultural studies.

Hall then claims that the "'culturalist' strand in Cultural Studies was interrupted by the arrival on the intellectual scene of the 'structuralisms'" (39). Hall describes the difference between the culturalist and structuralist strands in cultural studies:

whereas the 'culturalist' paradigm can be defined without requiring a conceptual reference to the term 'ideology' . . . the 'structuralist' interventions have been largely articulated around the concept of 'ideology': . . . in keeping with its more impeccably Marxist lineage, 'culture' does not figure so prominently. (39)

These are the "two paradigms" to which Hall refers in his title. According the Hall, "it was Lévi-Strauss, and the early semiotics, which made the first break" (39).

On 39, Hall, following Lévi-Strauss, makes a distinction between "praxis" and "practices." I'm curious about this distinction, since the two seem more or less interchangeable to me. The difference, though, doesn't seem particularly important to Hall's argument.

Hall describes some of Lévi-Strauss's contributions to cultural studies (39-41) but summarizes the important distinction between culturalism and structuralism in the following paragraph:

despite their apparent overlaps, culturalism and structuralism were starkly counterposed. We can identify this counterposition at one of its sharpest points, precisely around the concept of 'experience,' and the rôle the term played in each perspective. Whereas, in 'culturalism,' experience was the ground - the terrain of 'the lived' -- where consciousness and conditions intersected, structuralism insisted that 'experience' could not, by definition, be the ground of anything, since one could only 'live' and experience one's conditions in and through the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture. These categories, however, did not arise from or in experience: rather, experience was their 'effect.'(41)

Here, then, seems to be the key definition of the two paradigms -- culturalism relies on the authenticity of experience, while structuralism claims that all experience is determined in advance by the culture in which one finds oneself. This seems to me to be more or less parallel to Johnson's discussion of consciousness and subjectivity, with consciousness being the culturalist position and subjectivity being the structuralist position. Hall, quoting Lévi-Strauss, uses the term consciousness:

Ideology is indeed a system of 'representations', but in the majority of cases these representations have nothing to do with 'consciousness' . . . " it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast majority of men, not via their 'consciousness' . . . it is within this ideological unconsciousness that men succeed in altering the 'lived' relations between them and the world and acquiring the new form of specific unconsciousness called 'consciousness'. (41-42)

Thus, consciousness itself is an effect of unconsciousness -- it is merely another form of unconsciousness.

Hall's take, though, is that neither concept is "adequate to the task of constructing the study of culture as a conceptually clarified and theoretically informed domain of study" (42).

The first strength of structuralism that Hall describes is that it stresses determinate conditions. Any cultural analysis must take economic and political conditions into account. Structuralism also offers us the opportunity for abstract thinking, for "movement between different levels of abstraction," as a way of making sense of culture (43). Would culturalism insist on the description of experience only? Would description of experience constitute cultural study? Hall claims that Cultural Studies has driven itself, or been driven into, a "Poverty of Theory" position (43).

Hall describes two more strengths of structuralism (44-45) then moves to a discussion of the strengths of culturalism (45). The first contribution of culturalism that Hall describes is that it insists that consciousness -- deliberate movement within particular constraints -- "properly restores the dialectic between the unconsciousness of cultural categories and the moment of of conscious organization: even if, in its characteristic movement, it has tended to match structuralism's over-emphasis on 'conditions' with an altogether too-inclusive emphasis on 'consciousness'" (45). This seems once again to echo Johnson; a cultural study moves between given conditions and human desire (consciousness).

Hall concludes by describing three other paradigms in cultural studies which he felt were not central but significant to the project of cultural studies--the reconstitution of the subject in structuralist models of cultural studies, a return to classical Marxism's economic model, and Foucault's suspension of "the nearly-insoluble problems of determination" which "has made possible a welcome return to the concrete analysis of particular ideological and discursive formation, and the sites of their elaboration" (47). I disagree, however, with the critique of Foucault in which he claims that the problem with Foucault is that he "so resolutely suspends judgment, and adopts so thoroughgoing a scepticism about any determinacy or relationship between practices, other than largely contingent, that we are entitled to see him . . . as deeply committed to the necessary non-correspondence of all practices to one another" (47). Following David Halperin in St. Foucault, I'll argue that Foucault does offer a very specific analysis of the relationship between practices.

What is Cultural Studies, Anyway? Richard Johnson.

2007-09-03T17:42:00.000-06:00

What is an Abstract, Anyway?
Text in Red represents elements of the abstract that I expect to see. The private purpose of the abstract is to help you understand the reading; the public purposes are to demonstrate how well you've done the reading and to provide a platform from which a discussion can begin/continue. You should anticipate that I and other members of the class will be responding to and questioning your abstract.

This abstract is probably considerably longer than most will be, but do not limit yourself. Johnson's article is extremely dense and complex, and I'm intrigued by a lot of his ideas. You might also notice that there are spelling and or grammatical errors. I've read through the piece a couple of times and I've run the spell-check, but I'd need another day or two to really polish it.

Article Title
Abstract of Richard Johnson's "What Is Cultural Studies, Anyway?" 1983

Author Name
by Tom Peele

Description of Article
Here, briefly summarize the main points and the trajectory of the article. When you answer this question, imagine that you are taking a comprehensive examination in which you are asked to describe the main point of this and fifty other articles as briefly and accurately as you can within a limited time frame. What would you say?
Notice here that you don't need to talk about whether you liked the article or not and you don't necessarily need to agree with or disagree with the author's ideas. There might be times when you want to reveal whether or not you are in accord with the author, but it's not required. You'll have more of an opportunity for that in the next section. Your goal here is to present the author's ideas as clearly as you can.
Johnson begins his article with a description of the goals of cultural studies (cs). The most inclusive of his insights is that "culture involves power and helps to produce asymmetries in the abilities of individuals and social groups to define and realise their needs" (76). In other words, cs aims to study (in various ways) how culture creates asymmetries of power. He moves on to claim that, among other definitions cs should be defined (to the extent that it should be defined at all) by "its characteristic objects of study" (78).

Before Johnson describes cs's "characteristic objects of study," he presents two key terms--consciousness (the characteristically human ability to desire and dream) and subjectivity (that we are to some extent produced by the culture in which we live)--and claims that for him "cultural studies is about the historical forms of consciousness or subjectivity" (80). He presents these terms because it is in the ambiguous space between--the play between the two--in which the study of culture takes place.

Johnson then presents a map of the "circuits of culture" which include the initial production of an object, the "text" of the object itself and the texts that surround that object, the readings that these texts encounter, and, closely related to the last point, the lived cultures of which those texts are a part. These circuits of culture are in every case influenced by the social conditions in which they are produced, including their political and economic contexts. It is these cultural forms, then--objects or indeed entire cultures as they travel through these circuits--that constitute cs's "characteristic objects of study." Those objects of study, then, or not necessarily things like movies or t.v. shows or student life, but rather how those things move through a circuit.

The map of the circuit of culture also offers Johnson a way to talk about the characteristic approaches to cultural studies--production studies, textual studies, and lived cultures--and the advantages and drawbacks to each method. He concludes by arguing that, to the extent possible, a cultural study should take advantage of all three approaches.

Comments and Questions
In this part of your abstract, you'll present the article as it moves through its main argument(s). You'll also comment on the claims and various constituent arguments that the author is making; this is where you agree, disagree, extend the argument, make further connections, and respond to the text. It's fine here to observe that an argument is poorly made, but then you'll have to demonstrate your reasons. It's also fine to tell us that an article is poorly written, but only insofar as the writing interferes with your understanding of the text. In general, take the tone that you would like someone else to take if they were analyzing your writing. Imagine that the author will read what you write.

In this section, you do not have to cover in detail every aspect of the article. As you'll see, I concentrated heavily on the beginning section of the article as this section seems the most difficult. I have also speculated about what he might be trying to say, and I have offered some examples. The part of the article in which Johnson describes the approaches and their drawbacks seems very clear to me; I didn't need to write about that section of the article in order to understand it.

Johnson breaks this articles into three parts. In the first, he considers "some of the arguments for and against the academic codification of cultural studies," and in the second, "he looks at some strategies of definition short of codification" (75). He concludes by offering some of his own "preferred definitions and arguments."

Codifying cultural studies by formalizing its study is itself against the project of cultural studies, which Johnson claims is a kind of process, a kind of alchemy for producing useful knowledge" (75).

On 76, Johnson notes "where cultural studies has been Marx-influenced." He makes three observations:

"cultural processes are intimately connected with social relations, especially with class relations and class formations, with sexual divisions, with the racial structuring of social relations and with age oppressions as a form of dependency."

The concept of cultural processes seems key here; what are cultural processes? How do we determine where they end, where they begin? Is it helpful to think about beginnings and endings of processes like these? For example, until the 1950s female beauty was exemplified by women like Marilyn Monroe. In the 60s, with the explosion of second wave feminism, the standard for female beauty could only be attained by painful self-punishment and was exemplified by actors like Catherine Deneuve and the model Twiggy.

Men's bodies, over the same time period, seem more or less unchanged:

Michael Caine

William Holden

Humphrey Bogart	Richard Burton

This is not to say that there aren't exceptions to this rule (or even that it's a rule) but rather just to emphasize that there are cultural processes at work and that when I look at them closely I'm not sure where they begin. Where do our cultural ideas/ideals originate? If Hollywood or the press, where do they get them? How are they manipulated and changed? The study of this process or movement is a fascinating, difficult aspect of cultural studies.

Johnson's second point is that

"culture involves power and helps to produce asymmetries in the abilities of individuals and social groups to define and realize their needs" (76).

This is why cultural studies is important, why it can have an impact on the way we live. Culture involves power; representations of people, distribution of labor, accepted ways of thinking, have a material impact on our lives; cultural studies function as a kind of intervention, or social criticism, that can interrupt the flow of the ordinary. How can we change the discourse of specific subjects? How do we interrupt received knowledges?

Johnson's final point is that

"culture is neither an autonomous nor an externally determined field, but a site of social differences and struggles" (76).

His point here is less clear to me than the other two. For me, points two and three are inextricable. I think of these two as "culture produces asymmetries, but does not exist outside of, independent of, that locations in which those asymmetries are produced." This to me is the key thing about the possibilities of cultural studies--we can change the way representations are deployed by intervening in that deployment, by talking and writing about them, by questioning. That seems to me the project of cultural studies.

Johnson then points out the successful, productive critiques of cultural studies "from the women's movement and the struggles against racism," and these critiques seem to me to exemplify the productive work of cultural studies (76-77).

What happens to this critique, Johnson asks, if we codify the project of cultural studies?

Strategies of Definition

Johnson writes that the aspect of a definition of cultural studies that most interests him is "its characteristic objects of study," but first he discusses other strategies of definition. For Johnson, the key terms of cultural studies are "consciousness and subjectivity, with the key problems now lying somewhere in the relation between the two" (80).

Consciousness, as Johnson describes is, is evidenced by the fact that "human beings are characterised by an ideal or imaginary life, where will is cultivated, dreams dreamt, and categories developed" (80). And how is this important to cultural studies?

Subjectivity: "the possibility, for example, the same elements or impulses are subjectively active--they move us--without being consciously known. . . . subjectivities are produced, not given, and are therefore the objects of inquiry, not the premises or starting-point" (81).

Johnson's point in this section seems to be that for him cultural studies takes place among and between these two concepts: consciousness and subjectivity. The interplay here is between consciousness: will, desire, volition; and subjectivity: the ways in which we move into and inhabit particular identities or cultural forms (student, dutiful son, father). This is a key point, as it insists that we are not wholly determined by the cultural conditions in which we find ourselves, but that we are also self-determining.

In cultural studies, then, we study the various forms by which we identify ourselves, "to abstract, describe and reconstitute in concrete studies forms through which human beings 'live' become conscious, sustain themselves subjectively" (81).

Johnson asks "Where are all the intermediate categories that would allow us to start to specify the subjective social forms and the different moments of their existence?" (82). He seems to be arguing, here, that for cultural studies to be effective it must be more nuanced than it had been; what are the subjective social forms as they move from one state to the next? What are the impulses that move them? While these concepts are fascinating to me, they sometimes seem so abstract as to be impossible to pin down. How, specifically, can this be done? Does Johnson shy away from telling me because CS should not be codified? We are looking, here, "for principles of movement" and to "see how tendencies are modified by the other social determinations, including those at work through material needs" (82).

I read this (perhaps incorrectly) as a study of representations of identity (however that identity is represented and apprehended: observation, interview, survey, and so on. As above, I broadly defined that change of representations of men and women over a 20 year span. Work I have done in the past addresses the representations of gay men and lesbians on television. At any given moment in time, what is the range of representations on a wide variety of programs, such as Will and Grace, Friends, Buffy the Vampire Slayer, Queer as Folk (British and American versions) and Six Feet Under. Where, in the history of representation of gay men and lesbians, do these forms fit? How do they break away from or reproduce earlier forms? How is non-normative sexual identity represented? Is it implied, or are there physical manifestations? What are the social and cultural conditions that allow these forms to be represented? How might these forms be read by various viewers, and what are the conditions for decoding these forms? Does reading itself produce the form?

Circuits of Capital - Circuits of Culture; Publication and Abstraction

Johnson describes the circuit and provides and example of the Mini. An interesting example given the resurgence of the Mini. In the next section, Johnson explains the abstract/universal and the concrete/particular categories; I understand these as the various influences on any cultural form, and that one cs approach (perhaps a part of any cultural study?) is to take these influences into account. The chart on page 84 functions in two ways. First, it provides a map of how artifacts of culture (and culture itself) are produced, from production to the final form. The second way in which this chart functions is to map various approaches to the study of culture: the (1) production (2) texts of various kinds (pictures, movies, books, social settings) (3) reader reception, and (4) lived cultures. Johnson goes on in the text to describe the various advantages and disadvantages to each of these approaches. It strikes me that one way of conceiving of a a cultural study is that it works in reverse of this: one begins with the form, then moves back into the conditions of production and the cultural influence that made the form possible. It also seems to me that these approaches are not necessarily discrete. A study that takes these influences and form as its object is in effect a study of the relations of power that Johnson described in the beginning of the article.

In the next couple of sections (Forms of Culture, Forms of Study; Publication and Power) Johnson describes the culturalist (an emphasis on the study of an entire culture, such as ethnography) and the structuralist (an emphasis on the study of particular artifacts of culture) split in cultural studies, and more or less resolves it by de-emphasizing it. No matter what its objects of study, "cultural studies is necessarily and deeply implicated in relations of power" (89).

In From to Perspective of Production and Limits of the Viewpoint of Production, Johnson critiques this approach to cultural studies. I know little about this approach to cs, which is understandable as Johnson writes that it is sociologists, social historians, and political economists who are most likely to take this approach. Johnson's example of the Mini serve as a model for how I think of production: much of it is invisible, hidden, and secret. Further, as I said above, I'm not sure where production begins. Even in his example of the Mini, where were these ideas circulating before they hit the minds of those in charge of the company that produced the Mini--how did smallness and efficiency become a part of the national discourse? The executives at British Leyland weren't working in a vacuum. I've concluded that I can only make tentative stabs at the conditions of production. I might be able to trace certain ideas and themes, but my analyses will always and forever be incomplete. Determining the conditions of production is like determining who started the current fashion trend of women wearing both pants and dress at the same time. Where did it come from?

Johnson's discussion of Text-Based Studies is useful for us since it seems likely that many of us will pursue such studies in this class. Johnson offers that in these studies we articulate the studies of texts (whatever those texts may be) to wider social/cultural narratives.

In The Importance of Being Formal, Johnson makes an argument for allowing formalism--cultural studies that follow particular forms of analysis, such as semiotics. Johnson writes that "we need to abstract forms in order to describe them carefully, clearly, noting the variations and combinations" (96). The formal analysis that Barthes' version of semiotics provides a means of analysis of cultural artifacts and remains useful (according to Johnson) even in the context of recognizing the meaning shifts and does not remain stable. Over the course of the semester we'll be reading some of Barthes' work and also a piece by D.A. Miller, Place for Us , which relies on semiotics as a method of analyzing culture.

Johnson's analysis of the term "text" in What is a Text, Anyway? opens the range of possibilities to include virtually any object of study, and also makes that comment that the "text is only a means in cultural study; strictly, perhaps, it is a raw material from which certain forms . . . may be abstracted. But the ultimate object of cultural studies is not, in my view, the text, but the social life of subjective forms at each moment of their circulation, including their textual embodiments" (97). Thus, the purpose for analyzing a text is not to fetishize it but rather to examine it as an artifact in the circulation of meaning.

In the remainder of the article, Johnson describes the drawbacks and advantage to the remaining form of cs analysis: reader based or lived-experience based studies. Johnson thus describes in some detail three kinds of cultural study: "production-based studies, text-based studies, and studies of lived cultures" (107). He concludes by offering that within reason a cultural study should not limit itself to one approach but that it should take advantage of all three.

Johnson thoughts

2007-09-02T18:56:00.000-06:00

Howdy-

This is not a discussion lead: I just like to jot down questions and ideas while they're still fresh, and what better way to get some practice with the blog?

I was engaged by Johnson's discussion of how fragmented--perhaps multidisciplinary is a better term--cultural studies is. His suggestion, that the various disciplinary components of cultural studies should not be compressed into an aggregate, is fascinating to me; nearly all other academic reading I've done suggests otherwise, that a rigid and well-articulated means of inquiry should. . .no, must be employed. In Johnson, it seems less about forming an unbending, formal approach, and more about redefining and repositioning the different components and how they work together. It struck me that this is very similar to the type of inquiry cultural studies, at least to some degree, undertakes: an investigation of how different individuals and groups interact and grapple for power or position in their environments.

The question Johnsons poses at the outset of the piece also caught my eye: "should cultural studies aspire to be an academic disciplne" (75). For me, it raised the question of disciplinary validity. Historically, composition and rhetoric struggled to escape the stigma of a "soft science" until it was legitimized in the eyes of critics through theory-building and research (quantitative and otherwise). The means of inquiry Johnson presents is fascinating to me and clearly valuable, but I wonder if its openness and versatitlity would incite resistance to it being considered a discipline all its own.

That's all for now,
Bill

Welcome

2007-08-27T12:51:00.000-06:00

Welcome to Cultural Studies. We'll use this space to reflect on the readings and to develop projects of our own.